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Summary
Tax and service induced mobility of economic agents is one of the most important factors in
shaping regional and economic performances. Indeed, since the fundamental contribution of
Tiebout (1956), it is acknowledged that individuals move among regions and countries to sat-
isfy their preferences with respect to the bundle of tax and services that each jurisdiction is
providing.
With this respect, the mobility of high-skilled individuals is a fundamental public policy issue.
In fact, these agents play a fundamental role in fostering the local development given their
high productivity and their ability to generate positive spillovers within jurisdictions’ territo-
ries. Therefore, governments are incentivized to shape their policies to attract this kind of
individuals and may compete with each other to reach this target. In this context, tax and
services induced mobility of high-skilled individuals become a fundamental driving force that
influences national and regional policies and economic performances. Therefore, understanding
the determinants of economic mobility is paramount.
This doctoral thesis is devoted to investigating empirically the determinants of tax and service
mobility by means of the discrete choice approach considering two specific cases. As for tax in-
duced mobility, the effect of marginal income taxation on European football players’ migration
patterns is investigated in Chapter 2. As for service induced mobility, the effect of financial
and in-kind aid policies on university students’ location decision is considered in Chapter 3.
Chapter one provides an introductory overview of the tax and service induced phenomenon.
The chapter starts by summarizing the theoretical literature regarding tax and service induced
migration and the debate regarding this phenomenon. The second part of the chapter is devoted
to a general discussion of the discrete choice approach in the context of individual economic
mobility.
Chapter two analyzes the tax induced mobility of high-skilled workers from an empirical
point of view. More specifically, the chapter investigates the effect of top marginal tax rates
on turnover and migration patterns of football players in 16 European countries between 2007
9
and 2016. The analysis is carried by estimating a two-sided matching model using a maximum
score matching approach. This strategy has permitted to estimate the structural parameters
of the underlying decision process of footballers by accounting for the competition between
agents in the market and get rid of factors affecting both the demand and supply side for which
information is hardly accessible. These parameters are then exploited to quantify the sensitiv-
ity of the population of tax payers to taxation and the heterogeneity of these effects on the
base of players’ abilities and nationalities. Findings indicate a heterogeneous effect of marginal
taxation.
Chapter three analyzes the service-induced mobility of university students by focusing on
the effect of financial and in-kind aid policies on their choices of location. This phenomenon
is analyzed by using a unique dataset with administrative data on Italian university students
enrolled for the first time in the academic year 2014-2015, along with detailed information on
the financial and in-kind policies of the Diritto allo studio universitario program. The analysis
is by considering explicitly the heterogeneity in students’ preferences. Firstly, a Conditional
Logit model is estimated to identify the systematic variation in students’ preferences by in-
teracting individual characteristics with alternatives’ attributes. Secondly, a the Latent Class
Logit model in order to consider explicitly the heterogeneity in students’ preferences. The latter
approach allows to model systematic and random heterogeneity in preferences by exploiting the
individual characteristics of students. The sensitivity of students’ location decisions is quan-
tified by computing willingness to pay and semi-elasticity measures. Findings indicate that
policies that provide scholarships together with places in dormitories are effective in attracting
more students.
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Chapter 1
Discrete choice methods for the analysis of tax
and services induced mobility
1.1 Introduction
Tax and services induced mobility is a fundamental driving force that influences national and
regional economic performances.
Indeed, since the seminal contribution of Tiebout (1956), it is acknowledged that individuals
move across regions and countries on the basis of their preferences regarding the bundle of
tax and government services that the jurisdiction is providing. One of the most important
consequences of this phenomenon is the introduction of inter-jurisdictional competition (IC).
Indeed, in a context with mobile individuals, policymakers may have the incentive to shape
their policies to attract specific groups of people and to expel others (Brueckner, 2000). This is
especially true if we consider the mobility of high-skilled individuals, top incomes and businesses
that can play a fundamental role in fostering the local development.
IC for high-skilled individuals can constrain the actions of independent governments in
many aspects. Firstly, it can reduce the ability of governments to collect fiscal revenues and
redistribute income with progressive taxation. A relatively high tax rate can incentivize top-
incomes and high-skilled workers to leave the jurisdiction, this way reducing the tax base and
fiscal revenues. This can ultimately cause a general setting of tax rates below the optimal level
and reduce substantially the resources available in each jurisdiction. Secondly, it can cause a
suboptimal provision of public goods and government services. Governments can be induced to
over-provide services that attract high-skilled workers and to under-provide others those that
11
can be fundamental for other social groups.
Because of this, a huge body of literature has been focused on the modeling tax and services
induced mobility and its consequences on optimal tax rates and service provision. This has
been done by taking into account several aspects of IC such as strategic interactions between
jurisdictions, behavioral responses of individuals, externalities and spillover effects between
different policies and levels of governments.
The first section of this chapter is devoted to summarizing the debate existing in this
literature, focusing in particular on tax and service competition models that account for the
mobility of workers and high-skilled individuals.
Tax and service induced mobility have been extensively analyzed even from the empirical
point of view. In this respect, a great effort has been devoted to identifying adequate econo-
metric approaches that can help to detect the elements that affect individual mobility and
attractiveness of regions and countries. The discrete choice approaches seem to be among the
most powerful tools available to researchers. These approaches are mainly based on random
utility models (see Section 1.3 below) in which individuals choose their preferred alternatives
by maximizing their utility. The second part of this chapter is dedicated to a general discussion
of these methods in the context of individual mobility and migration.
1.2 Related theoretical literature
Tax and services induced mobility of individuals has been extensively analyzed by the theoret-
ical literature. One of the fundamental contributions in this literature is the original model of
Tiebout (1956). In this model, individuals decide the jurisdiction into which reside based on a
set of fiscal packages that each jurisdiction provides. These fiscal packages are a combination of
public goods, services, and tax rates. Under a set of strong assumptions, this mobility should
be efficiency improving leading to the optimal provision of fiscal packages and a perfect match
between individuals’ preferences and jurisdictions supply.
More recently, some models have relaxed the assumptions of Tiebout’s model leading to
different conclusions. To quote just a few contributions, Wildasin (1988) and Wildasin (1991)
have considered the presence of strategic interactions and fiscal externalities between jurisdic-
tions in a Nash competition framework. They conclude that fiscal competition can lead to the
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underprovision of public goods and social inefficient allocation of labor. The same conclusion is
reached by McGuire (1991), where jurisdictions compete for mobile workers in a context where
individuals have preferences for redistribution. In this model, the competition may lead to a
sort of prisoner dilemma scenario. Each jurisdiction has the same incentive to reduce taxes on
rich individuals to induce them to migrate into their territory. This will result in a destructive
competition with sub-optimal tax rates and the underprovision of public goods.
The overall literature on tax and service induced mobility can be generally related to the
concept of inter-jurisdictional competition (IC). According to the review presented in Kenyon
(1997), the IC can be defined as the competition between governments that try to win some
scarce resource or avoid a particular cost. Free movement of goods, services, and people all
contribute to this competition and can constrain the actions of independent governments.1
At the core of this literature, there is the necessity by jurisdictions to solve a trade-off
between their attractiveness for high-skilled individuals and top incomes and pursue their ob-
jective in terms of public good provision, redistribution, etc. Therefore, the identification of
instruments that allow governments to solve this trade-off is of fundamental importance. In
this respect, a substantial amount of literature has been focused on the definition of optimal
policies that allow solving this trade-off.
With regards to the tax-induced migration, since the seminal contribution of Mirrlees (1982),
it is well known that the ability of countries to redistribute income through taxation and
their optimal level of redistribution is negatively affected by the magnitude of the elasticity of
mobility to taxation. Building on this concept, the literature has investigated different models
of optimal taxation in the presence of migration which has shed some light on the tools available
to countries for balancing the trade-off between redistribution and their attractiveness for top
taxpayers. In particular, Simula and Trannoy (2010) have developed a model that considers
a situation in which one highly redistributive country has to choose its marginal tax rate
considering the presence of one foreign country characterized by a low and constant marginal
tax rate. The model links directly the optimal tax rate schedule to workers’ choices of location
(extensive margin) and their labor supply (intensive margin). A similar situation is investigated
in Piketty and Saez (2013) where a simple and estimable optimal tax rate formula is derived.
The main result of these models is that the optimal tax rate is inversely related to the elasticity
1See Ferreira, Varsano, and Afonso (2005) for an extensive review on fiscal competition.
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of mobility and the elasticity of taxable income.2 These models have been generalized in
Lehmann, Simula, and Trannoy (2014), who consider a framework with competition between
non-symmetric Rawlsian countries, individual heterogeneity in the distribution of tax-payers
skills and simultaneous interactions between government; and in Simula and Trannoy (2017)
allowing the governments to differentiate the tax schedule between native and foreign workers.
Considering revenue-maximizing countries, Kleven, Landais, Saez, and Schultz (2013) have
derived a model of optimal taxation considering that the labor market demand can be either
elastic or rigid. Moreover, considering the optimality degree of regional differentiation in tax
rates, Milligan and Smart (2019) have developed a model considering a federation of states
in which the optimal tax rate is a function of the elasticity of mobility on the state level
and the elasticity of taxable income at the national level. In this framework, regions have the
incentives to compete to attract more tax-payers reducing their tax rates. This competition can
result in a general reduction of tax rates that can be suboptimal from the national perspective.
However, given a set of elasticities of migration at the regional level, countries can internalize
this competition effect and set the federal tax rates maximizing the tax revenues at the federal
level. These studies have in common the importance of the elasticity of mobility as a measure of
the sensitivity of tax-payers location choices to taxation. This fundamental parameter measures
the percentage change in the number of taxpayers in one jurisdiction caused by a one percent
change in the tax rate. It can be estimated through the discrete choice approaches that will be
summarized in Section 1.3 below.
Much less effort has been devoted to the definition of optimal policies that account for
service-induced migration. In this respect, to the best of our knowledge, the literature has
analyzed the role of amenities (i.e. environment conditions, health facilities, teachers/ratio
pupils, etc.) and specific public expenditures in attracting highly skilled workers. For example,
Florida (2002) presented evidence that amenities can attract knowledge workers and affect the
distribution of human capital. These results are then embodied in the theoretical model of
Mathur and Stein (2004) that permits to understand under which conditions policies that aim
to increase local amenities can attract more highly skilled workers and can succeed in fostering
local development.
2See Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz (2012) for a review on the behavioral responses associated with marginal tax
rates that considers various channels such as, for example, labor supply, career choices and tax compliance
14
More recently, some papers have started to consider these two instruments together by defin-
ing optimal policies that embody both taxation and public provision of amenities and services.
For example, Krieger and Lange (2010) have developed a model in which revenue-maximizing
governments compete for highly skilled workers suing two strategic variables: income tax rates
and amenities provided to students. Their result suggests that an increase in student mobility
can intensify tax and amenity competition and erode public revenues. Ruiz del Portal (2017)
extends the optimal taxation models in the presence of migration to consider commodity tax-
ation and the provision of public goods that can attract highly skilled individuals. His results
indicate that the provision of such public goods can reduce the migration response of highly
skilled workers and, therefore, permits governments to levy higher income tax rates.
These results depend crucially on the relative importance in individuals’ utility functions of
public goods, tax rates and amenities provided by jurisdictions. Therefore, to find an empir-
ical approach that can quantify the impact of these elements on the attractiveness of regions
and countries is paramount. The next section directly faces this issue discussing the recent
advancements in the empirical approaches that can be used to understand the determinants of
individuals’ migration decisions.
15
1.3 The discrete choice approach
This section presents a schematic discussion of the approaches that can be used to understand
the determinants of individuals’ location decision process: the discrete choice approach.
These methods are based upon the Random Utility Models family (RUMs) (Train, 2003).
RUMs assume that a decision maker maximizes her utility by choosing one alternative from a
set of mutually exclusive alternatives that are characterized by their attributes. Formally, let
assume there is a population of agents n ∈ N and a set of alternatives j ∈ J in time t ∈ T . In
the context of individual mobility and migration, these alternatives may be countries, regions
or jurisdictions in general.
If the agent n choose to locate in jurisdiction j at time t she obtains the following utility:
Unjt = β
′xjt + njt (1.1)
where Unjt indicates the utility of agent n if she decides to locate in j at time t, xjt is the vector
of alternatives’ observed attributes and njt captures factors that enter in the utility Unjt but
are not observed by the researcher. To save on notation, we drop the t subscripts in the rest
of the chapter.3. Consisting with the assumption of utility maximization, agent n will choose
alternative j only if:
Unj ≥ max
j′
Unj′ with j 6= j′ (1.2)
therefore only if alternative j is with the highest utility in the choice set.
Given condition 1.2, the probability that agent n to choose alternative j is given by the
following:
Pnj = Prob(Unj > Unj′) ∀ j 6= j′ (1.3)
In order to estimate this probability, researchers can employ different methods and different
assumption. Next sections will discuss some of the available alternatives.
3Without any loss of generality, we let the number of choice situations T to be equal to 1
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1.3.1 The Conditional Logit Model
If we assume that the error term nj is i.i.d type I extreme value distributed (or Gumbel), the
probability in Eq. (1.3) can be written as (Mcfadden, 1974):
Pnj =
exp(β′xj)∑J
j=1 exp(β
′xj)
(1.4)
this probability can be estimated through a Conditional Logit model (CL) by using a maximum
likelihood approach. The CL is a very powerful tool that allows the researcher to understand
the systematic effects of alternative’s attributes on decision makers’ utilities and her choice
probabilities. This approach can be used to estimate utility functions such as the one presented
in Eq. (1.1). Moreover, the probability formula in Eq. (1.4) exhibits several useful proprieties:
the estimated probabilities are always comprised between 0 and 1, the probability to choose
one alternative is increasing in the utility of the individual and the sum of all the probabilities
attached to each alternative is always equal to 1.
The CL is the most standard discrete choice technique and is widely used in individual mo-
bility literature. As for tax-induced migration, for example, the CL has been used to understand
the effect of taxation on mobility decision of football players in Europe (Kleven et al., 2013) and
on international location decision of top inventors (Stantcheva, Akcigit, and Baslandze, 2016).4
This approach has been applied also in the empirical service-induced migration to analyze the
determinants of location choices of university students in Italy (Pigini and Staffolani, 2015) and
in the US (Long, 2004).5
To give an example of how previous literature has used the CL approach we will draw on
the analysis of tax-induced migration of football players provided by Kleven et al. (2013). In
this case, the utility of a player n in country j at time t is defined as:6
Unjt = α ln(1− τnjt) + α ln(wnjt) + homenj + Znt + µj + njt (1.5)
where τnjt is the average tax rate valid in country j for player n at time t, wnjt is the gross wage
4See Chapter 2 for a summary of empirical tax-induced taxation literature
5See Chapter 3 for a summary of the empirical literature regarding the attractiveness of universities.
6We are referring to a different version of equation (3) of the paper. We have modified the original specifi-
cation to better explain the characteristics of the CL approach.
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of player n in country j at time t, homenj is a dummy that takes value 1 if player n is citizen
of country j, Znt are player’s individual characteristics such as age and age-squared, and µj is
a set of country fixed effects.
Therefore, by identifying the parameter α in Eq. 1.5, the researcher can have an estimate of
the sensitivity of football players to income taxation. These parameters can be further exploited
to compute elasticities and estimate an optimal tax rate in the presence of migration.
One particular characteristic of this specification is the definition of Znt. Given that the
parameters are identified by comparing the utilities attached to each alternative we have that
all the determinants used in a CL framework need to vary over alternatives. Nevertheless, this
element can be an issue if we consider decision maker’s attributes included in Znt. In fact, these
variables are likely to do not vary among alternatives. For example, the age of an individual
who is deciding into which country migrates to does not vary among countries. However, it
can be an important driver of individuals’ preferences. In these cases, to account for individual
characteristics, the researcher has to define them in a way that can be handled by the model.
Kleven et al. (2013) have solved this caveat by defining Znt as:
Znt = θ(znt ⊗ µj) (1.6)
where θ is the vector of parameters related to each element in Znt. Therefore, each individual’s
attribute is interacted with the country fixed effects, this way permitting the effect of these
variables to vary over alternatives. The same technique can be used to understand if there is
any systematic variation in individuals’ preferences related to their characteristics. In this case,
assuming that xjt represent alternatives’ characteristics, the variable Znt can be defined as:
Znt = θ(znt ⊗ xj) (1.7)
therefore, each individual’s characteristic is interacted with all the alternatives’ attributes. By
estimating a parameter for each interaction term in Znt, the researcher can have an estimate of
the systematic heterogeneity in individual preferences.7 For example, through this technique,
we can understand how the effect of marginal taxation changes for individuals with different
7See Balia, Brau, and Moro (2020) for an example of the use of this technique in the context of mobility
related to hospital choices.
18
age.8
Limits of the Conditional Logit
Along with its useful properties, the CL approach presents several limitations that are relevant
in our context. Drawing on Train (2003), these limitations can be clarified considering three
situations: repeated choices, heterogeneity in preferences and substitution patterns.
i. Repeated choices. The CL assumes that unobserved factors are independent across differ-
ent choices. This assumption can be crucial if the same individual is observed to choose more
than one time. If the unobserved factors are not correlated over time the CL is able to capture
the dynamics of the choice process. However, if the unobserved factors are correlated over time,
the assumption of independence of errors is violated. In this case, the CL is misspecified. This
issue can be overcome by specifying the utility function to model explicitly the correlation be-
tween different choice situations or by using a Mixed Logit approach that is outlined in Section
1.3.3.9
ii. Heterogeneity in preferences. Although the CL is able to represent systematic variation
in tastes by interacting individual variables with alternatives’ attributes, it fails in capturing
the unobserved heterogeneity that depends upon unobserved factors. These factors can be
individuals’ unobservables or idiosyncratic preferences. The existence of such heterogeneity, by
implying a correlation between included regressors and the error term, can result in distorted
estimates of utility parameters. In these cases, the CL is misspecified. For example, let us
consider a simple version of the utility presented in Eq. (1.5) in which the utility of player n
depend only upon the marginal tax rate τnj:
Unj = (α + ηnj) ln(1− τnj) + nj = α ln(1− τnj) + ηnj ln(1− τnj) + nj (1.8)
where ηnj is a random variable that affect the preferences of worker n with respect to the
8As we will see in Chapter 3 this strategy can be unfeasible or sub-optimal if xj and znt have many elements.
9With relationship to this limitation, another useful approach is given by the family of Dynamic Discrete
Choice approaches. In these models, the individual’s choice in time t affects her choices in time t+1 by affecting
the utilities attached to the various alternatives or by changing agents’ choice set. For example, if the agent
chooses to enroll in high school at time t, she will have different career alternatives in time t + 1. However,
this work is focused on static discrete choice models, the reader interested in dynamic models should see the
seminal contribution by Rust (1987) and the survey by Arcidiacono and Ellickson (2011) for an overview of
these models. See Declercq and Verboven (2018) for an example of dynamic discrete choice on students’ career
choices.
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marginal tax rate τnj. Given that ηnj is not observe, it will become part of the error term
˜nj = nj + ηnj ln(1 − τnj). Consequently, given that ˜nj contains the variable of interest
ln(1 − τnj), it is impossible to assume that the error terms are not correlated with included
regressors. This issue can be overcome by applying more sophisticated techniques such as the
Mixed Logit presented in Section 1.3.3.10
iii. Substitution patterns. Given that the sum of choice probabilities is equal to 1, if the
probability of one alternative increases, the probabilities of other alternatives have necessarily
to decrease. The way in which a specific model deals with how alternatives’ choice probabilities
are related to each other is called substitution pattern. CL assumes that substitution patterns
are only one type of substitution pattern: the ‘proportional substitution pattern’. This pattern
is a consequence of a general property of the CL: the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives
(IIA). IIA states that the probability ratio between alternative j and alternative i is independent
from other alternatives different from i and j. For example, suppose that agent n is choosing
among three jurisdictions A1 and A2 that is located in country j and one jurisdiction B that
is located in country j′. Country j and j′ are very different in terms of language, culture, and
other amenities. Suppose now that a reduction in the tax rate of jurisdiction A1 increases its
choice probabilities by 1%. In this context, given that A1 and A2 are more similar, an increase
in A1 choice probability should cause a stronger reduction in the probability to chose A2 rather
than the one to chose B. However, given that the probability ratios between A2 and B are
not affected by attributes of alternative A1 we will have that their choices probabilities need
to decrease proportionally by the same amount to keep the same probability ratio. Therefore,
we will overestimate the effect on the probability to choose B, and underestimate the effect
on the one to choose A2. This problem can be overcome by using the Nested Logit approach
presented in Section 1.3.2 or by using a specific definition of alternative attributes in the Mixed
Logit outlined in Section 1.3.3.
10The issue of unobserved heterogeneity in preferences can be addressed also by using different techniques
such as the Heteroskedastic Conditional Logit or the Generalized Multinomial Approach. These methods are
supposed to identify two kinds of heterogeneity: scale and taste heterogeneity. The first refers to the situation
in which there is some unobserved factor that affects some individuals in the sample so that their choice process
appears more random from the researcher’s point of view. The second refers to the simple variation of tastes due
to unobserved factors. However, as pointed out by Hess and Train (2017), these two sources of heterogeneity
cannot be separately identified and any estimates of their effect will result in a mix between scale and taste
heterogeneity. The Mixed Logit overcome this problem by allowing to control for any kind of heterogeneity
through a more general definition of estimated parameters.
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1.3.2 The Nested Logit Model
The Nested Logit (NL) model allows the researcher to divide the choice set in subsets called
nests. The nests are constructed by considering that two alternatives in the same nest are more
correlated than two alternatives in different nests. In our previous example, the researcher may
assume that jurisdictions in country j and j′ belong to two different nests. The first contains
A1 and A2, while the second contains B. Given this definition, the NL will be estimated
considering that the IIA property is valid only inside one nest and that is not valid across
nests. Therefore, the substitution patterns inside the same nest will be proportional, whereas
the ones across nests will depend on the attributes of the alternatives in the other nest. For
example, the increase in the choice probability of alternative A1 caused by the reduction of its
tax rate will result in a stronger reduction in A2’s probability than the one estimated for the
alternative B.
It is worth to remark that choices in different sets do not have to be sequentially ordered.
Indeed, the formulation of nests regard only the correlation and the similarities between alter-
natives and does not depend in any way on the timing of the decision process.
Examples of NL can be found in the empirical literature regarding the service-induced
migration of students. Pigini and Staffolani (2013) have applied the NL to understands the
effects of university characteristics on students’ education choices. In particular, they consider
a two-level nested structure. In the first, the high-school leaver decides whether to enroll
at university and the field of study. In the second, she chooses which university to attend.
Kelchtermans and Verboven (2010) have studied the effect of tuition fees on choices regarding
enrollment, the university to attend and the field of study into which enroll of students in
Belgium.
Drawing on Kelchtermans and Verboven (2010), let assume that student n face a choice set
made by k ∈ K universities. Each university provides a set of courses j ∈ J .11 In this case,
we assume a nesting structure in which each university represent a nest that contains all the
courses provided.
11For simplicity we do not consider the choice regarding the enrollment.
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If student n chooses the study option j in university k she will obtain the following utility:
Unkj = θ
′Yk + β′kXkj + kj (1.9)
where Yk are universities attributes and Xkj are the characteristics of each course provided by
university k. For example, the Yk may contain the amount of tuition fees or some characteristics
of the hosting region, whereas Xkj may include the number of professors employed in the course
j by university k.
If we assume that the error term kj in Eq. (1.9) is distributed following a general extreme
value distribution, we have that the probability that agent n chooses alternative j in nest k ∈ K
is (Mcfadden, 1978; Cameron and Trivedi, 2005):
Pnkj = pk × pj|k = exp(θ
′Yk + ρkIVk)∑K
l=1 exp(θ
′Yl + ρlIVl)
× exp(β
′
kXkj/ρk)∑Jk
r=1 exp(β
′
kXkr/ρk)
(1.10)
where:
IVk = ln
Jk∑
r=1
exp(β′kXkr/ρk) (1.11)
where pk and pj|k indicate, respectively, the probability to choose university k and the one to
choose course j in university k, ρk is the scale parameter that is a measure of the correlation
between the component of the nest K and IV is the inclusive value. This last term permit to
consider the contribution of the choice regarding the course k in the probability regarding the
choice of university k.
The NL can be generalized in many ways to consider three-level nests and overlapping
nests. These extensions make this approach very flexible and permit researchers to have a
better understanding of phenomenons that have more complex choice structures.
1.3.3 The Mixed Logit Model
The Mixed Logit (ML) model is the most general discrete choice approach, it nests all the mod-
els presented so far and can be used to overcome the CL limitations that we have presented in
Section 1.3.1. McFadden and Train (2000) have shown that ML can be used to approximate
any choice model with any distribution of preferences to any degree of accuracy. This result
implies that the ML is not affected by any theoretical restriction in the definition of prefer-
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ence distributions and correlation structure between parameters. However, the choice of the
distribution of preferences is crucial and will embody some theoretical restrictions.
In the ML framework, the utility that individual n obtains choosing alternative j can be
denoted as (Hess and Train, 2017):
Unj = x
′
njβn + nj (1.12)
where, differently from Eq. (1.1), the vector of parameters βn vary randomly over people. This
feature of the ML permits to control for the unobserved heterogeneity, this way solving the CL
limitation regarding the heterogeneity in preferences.
Assuming that the error term nj is i.i.d. extreme value we can write the probability that
agent n chooses alternative j, conditional on the individual parameter βn, as:
Pnj(βn) =
exp(x′njβn)∑J
j=1 exp(x
′
njβn)
(1.13)
this formula indicates that the conditional choice probability of individual n depends on her
vector of utility coefficient βn. In order to derive the unconditional probability of individual n
the researcher need to specify the cumulative distribution function of utility coefficients in the
population F (β|φ). This distribution depends on the parameter φ that is defined according
to the preferred cumulative distribution. F (β|φ) can be continuous or discrete, differs among
different elements of the vector βn, and allow any type of correlation among parameters. This
flexibility allow the ML to account for the existence of repeated choices, nesting structure and
any kind of heterogeneity in preferences (Train, 2003).
Concerning heterogeneity in preferences, we have that the ML offers various solutions. For
example, if the researcher believes that it exists only for one regressor, she can impose a
random distribution for the respective coefficient and let the others to be fixed. Moreover,
if the researcher believes that two regressors are correlated she can allow this correlation to
be estimated by the ML. For example, suppose that people that are more sensitive to the
jurisdiction tax rate are more sensitive also to jurisdiction’s amenities. In this case, instead of
interacting these two regressors with each other, the researcher can simply allow them to be
correlated.
Furthermore, the individual distribution of parameters can be let to depend on individ-
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ual characteristics, this way allowing the researcher to identify the systematic variations in
individual tastes.
In respect to the nesting structure in agents’ decision process, we have that the ML does not
exhibit the IIA property and can be modeled to approximate any kind of substitution pattern.
The nesting structure can be defined by using a dummy variable that indicates the nest and
letting the coefficients associated with this regressor to be randomly distributed. The only
drawback of this procedure is that the ML is computationally more intensive than the NL.
As we have seen, F (β|φ) can be defined to be continuous or discrete. This difference can
lead to two different models that share all the advantages that we have outlined in this section.
In particular, if F (β|φ) is defined to be continuous we will have an infinite mixture Mixed Logit
or Mixed Logit. By contrast, if F (β|φ) is assumed to be discrete, we will have the finite mixture
Mixed Logit or Latent Class Logit model (LCM). Given that the LCM is at the core of chapter
3, in this chapter we will focus only on the infinite mixture Mixed Logit.
The ML model has been used in health economics literature in order to understand the
preferences of patients in choosing hospitals. For example, Sivey (2012) has applied a LCM
model to understand the effect of travel time and waiting time on patients’ decision regarding
the choice of hospital for cataract operations; Gutacker, Siciliani, Moscelli, and Gravelle (2016)
and Varkevisser, Geest, and Schut (2012) have applied an infinite mixture ML to understand
the effect of hospitals’ quality on patients hospital decisions considering UK and Netherlands.
For example, Balia et al. (2020), have applied an ML in estimating the demand for elective
hospital care. In their model, patient n chooses a hospital j based on the following utility:12
Unj = β
′xj + θ(zn ⊗ xj) + nj (1.14)
where xj include hospitals characteristics (e.g. distance, mortality rate, hospital’s quality and
size) and zn contain observable individual characteristics (e.g. age, education and gender). As
we have seen in Section 1.3.1, this specification can be estimated through a CL. It permits to
understand if the effect of hospital’s characteristics on patient’s demand varies systematically
on the basis of their individual characteristics.
In order to capture also unobserved heterogeneity, the authors have estimated a ML con-
12We refer to a simplified version of equation (1) in the paper.
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sidering that parameters β may have a continuous distribution F (β|φ). In this case, we have
that the βn in Eq. (1.12) can be written as (Greene and Hensher, 2003):
βn = β + Γvn (1.15)
where β is the preference parameter estimated in the sample, and vn is a random term that
enters in the definition of the parameters. This last term is used to account for random variation
in tastes and can be defined to allow for correlation between parameters. This specification has
permitted to relax the IIA property and to derive a set of individual parameters.
Moreover, Eq. (1.15) can be modified in order to have a distribution of individual parameters
that depend upon a vector zn of patient individual characteristics:
βn = β + γzn + Γvn (1.16)
This definition of βn embodies all the features of ML that we have outlined before. In fact,
the individual distribution of parameters will depend on decision makers’ characteristics and
can be defined to allow any type of heterogeneity in preferences. Therefore, this individual
parameter will give information on the effect of the respective regressor accounting for both
random as well as systematic variation in individual tastes.
These parameters can be exploited to compute measures of agent’s sensitivity to alternatives’
attributes such as willingness to pay measures or semi-elasticities.
1.4 Recent advances in modeling mobility
1.4.1 The Maximum Score Matching Estimator
Until this point, we have assumed that individual choices depend only upon alternatives’ and
decision makers’ characteristics. In our logic, for example, workers decide into which jurisdiction
locate simply by comparing the utility that they can gain in each alternative. However, in
reality, we have that workers’ location decisions may depend upon firms hiring decisions. Indeed,
if the worker wants to live in jurisdiction j she will need a firm in that jurisdiction that is willing
to hire her. Moreover, in the same world, there could be other workers that want to be hired
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from the same firm. Therefore, workers will be competing with each other to match their
preferred firm. On the other hand, we have that the same firm will have to choose the worker
based on her characteristics. In this context, if more firms want to hire the same worker, they
will compete with each other to match with their preferred partners.
Therefore, in this context, every workers’ location decision that we observe is the outcome
of a process of market interactions between workers and firms. In this case, using standard
discrete choice approaches may lead the researcher to a wrong interpretation of the results.
Indeed, if we model the choice of the workers without considering explicitly the role of firms,
our estimates will be a mix between firms’ and workers’ behavioral responses (Stantcheva et al.,
2016).
One possible solution to this issue is the Maximum Score Matching (MSM) estimator (Fox,
2018). This approach is presented in detail in Chapter 2.
The MSM is a semi-parametric estimator based on the single-agent multinomial choice max-
imum score developed by Manski (1975) that allows the researcher to estimate the parameters
underlying the matching process between two types of agents in a specific market. In this kind
of model, the agents have a role defined ex-ante (one can be either worker or firm), and the
matches are the outcomes of a process of interaction between agents that take their decisions
interdependently.
The MSM detains various advantages compared to other methods presented so far. First,
it allows the estimation of parameters underlying the matching process without having data
on the transfers that happens between individuals. This characteristic allows controlling for
every transfer between agents that may affect the location decision process even though the
researcher does not have data on them. Second, it allows a more general definition of the error
term than the classical type I extreme value used in Logit models. Third, its computational
simplicity enables the researcher to use a not artificially limited set of alternatives and individual
covariates.
In order to provide a brief outline of this approach, we can take advantage of a simple
example. Suppose that in there is a population of workers n ∈ N and a set of firms a ∈ A.
Each firm is located in one jurisdiction j ∈ J . Suppose to observe, in a market m ∈ M , a
match ωan between worker n and firm a in jurisdiction j. In this case, the local production
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function of the match observed is:
pi(ωan) = V (n, a, j) + U(n, a, j) (1.17)
where V (n, a, j) indicates the utility that firm a obtain in matching with n in jurisdiction j and
U(n, a, j) is the utility that worker n obtains by matching with a in jurisdiction j. Therefore,
the local production function is given by the sum of agents’ utilities. Each agent utility depends
on the characteristic of the partner and the jurisdiction considered. The aim of this approach
is to estimate the local production function pi(ωan).
Now, suppose that in the market m we observe another match between n′ and a′. In this
case we can write the local production function of the observed set of matches ωm as:
Π(ωm) = pi(ωan) + pi(ωa′n′) (1.18)
where pi(ωa′n′) is the local production function of the match between worker n
′ and firm a′.
The last equation helps us to define the equilibrium concept used in the estimation process of
the MSM: the pairwise stability condition (Kim, 2018; Fox, 2018; Kuehn, 2017). This condition
states that the observed set of matches ωm is a pairwise equilibrium if no coalition of agents
prefers to deviate from the observed set of matches. Therefore, the set of matches ωm is a
pairwise equilibrium if:
Π(ωm) ≥ Π(ω˜m) (1.19)
where ω˜m is a counterfactual match where the worker n is matched with firm j
′ and worker n′ is
matched with firm j. Therefore, the pairwise stability condition states that the set of matches
ωm is a pairwise equilibrium if the two workers cannot increase their utility by exchanging their
job positions.
This equilibrium concept permits to compare the observed matches with the counterfactual
ones to estimate the local production function of the single match. Moreover, it allows the
estimation of the model without having data on equilibrium transfers between partners and
agent-specific characteristics. In fact, everything that is exchanged between partners is erased
from the equation.13 Moreover, given that the same agent appears both in the real set of
13See Chapter 3 for a detailed explanation.
27
matches than in the counterfactual, every variable that is agent-specific and does not depend
on the specific match is erased. Because of this element, the researcher can use only match-
specific variables. However, this strategy allows controlling for unobserved factors that are
agent-specific.
In order to proceed to the estimation we need to define the parametric local production
function as:
Π(ωm) =
∑
ωi∈ωm
pi(ωi) =
∑
ωi∈ωm
X(ωi)
′θ + ωi (1.20)
where ωi is one observed match in the set ωm, X(ωi) are the match-specific variables, θ is
the vector of parameters that measure the effect of the variables on the pi(ωi), and ωi is
the unobservable component of the local production function. Given the parametric local
production function we can rewrite the pairwise stability condition as:
∑
ωi∈ωm
X(ωi)
′θ ≥
∑
ω˜i∈ω˜m
X(ω˜i)
′θ (1.21)
Finally, this condition can be used into the objective function of the MSM in order to estimate
the vector of parameters θ:
max
θ
QM(θ) =
M∑
m=1
Gm∑
g=1
1
[ ∑
ωg∈ωm
X(ωg)
′θ ≥
∑
ω˜g∈ω˜m
X(ω˜g)
′θ
]
(1.22)
where M is the number of observed markets, QM is the score function that we need to maximize
and Gm is the set of pairwise inequalities in each market. This set is constructed comparing in
each inequality one set with two observed matches ωg with another set with two counterfactual
matches ω˜g. The logic behind this maximization is very simple: every time that the pairwise
stability condition in brackets is satisfied we add 1 to the score function. Therefore, when we
reach the maximum of QM we will have identified the parametric local production function and
the set of parameters θ.
The MSM permits the estimation of the matching process behind the location decision of
workers by focusing on the matches utilities. This strategy allows the researcher to have a
better understanding of the phenomenon by accounting for the fact that observed location
choices can be a mix of workers and firm behavioral responses.
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The MSM has been applied in different contexts. Just referring to ‘many-to-one’ applica-
tions, Yang, Shi, and Goldfarb (2009) estimate the brand alliances between basketball players
and teams; Mindruta, Moeen, and Agarwal (2016) compare the MSM with standard discrete
choice estimators in a context of strategic alliances in the biopharmaceutical industry; Baccara,
I˙mrohorog˘lu, Wilson, and Yariv (2012) quantify the effects of network externalities on choices
of faculty regarding offices in a new building; Schwert (2018) investigates the matching process
between firms and bank in the loan market. Moreover, the MSM is analyzed in the survey on
the applications of empirical matching models made by Chiappori and Salanie´ (2016).
Chapter 3 is the first example of MSM applied to individual location choices. In particular,
MSM is used to understand how marginal income taxation can affect football players’ location
choices.
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Chapter 2
Best Score in the Match: Marginal Taxation and
Labor Mobility in the European Football Mar-
ket
Abstract
The international mobility of high skilled workers represents a crucial public pol-
icy issue, especially when occurring in an environment characterized by low mobility
costs and relevant international differences in top tax rates. In this work, we study
the effect of top marginal tax rates on turnover and migration patterns of football
players in 16 countries between 2007 and 2016. This phenomenon is analyzed both
at the international and inter-regional levels by exploiting national and regional
variations in the effective marginal tax rate. We estimate a two-sided matching
model using a maximum score matching approach. This allows us to account for
the competition on each side of the market, and get rid of factors affecting both the
demand and supply side for which information is hardly accessible (namely, wages
of top-level workers). The structural parameters of the underlying decision process
are exploited to quantify the sensitivity of taxpayers’ equilibrium locations to taxa-
tion, the existence of sorting effects and the heterogeneity of these effects based on
the ability of the player. In a context of elastic labor demand, the elasticity of mi-
gration relative to the net-of-tax rate is between 0.07 and 0.12 for natives, 1.20 and
1.37 for foreigners while it is around 0.22 if when considering the whole population.
The estimated elasticities are higher when considering top-players suggesting that
lower tax rates can increase the average quality of workers in the country by at-
tracting more high-ability players who, in a context of rigid labor demand, displace
low-quality players.
JEL Classification: H30, H21, C14, J61, L83
Keywords: Income taxation, Geographic Labor Mobility, Maximum Score Estimation, Many-
to-One Matching, Superstars
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Introduction
International mobility of high skilled workers (and the related erosion of national tax revenues)
represents a crucial public policy issue, especially when occurring in an environment, such as
Europe, characterized by low mobility costs and relevant differences in top tax rates among
countries.
In this context, governments are poorly able to collect fiscal revenue and redistribute income
with progressive taxation, because ‘best’ taxpayers could leave the country, this way causing
a reduction of the tax base, and ultimately of taxation revenue. On the contrary, countries
and regions could have incentives to attract high skilled workers given their high productivity
and their ability to generate positive spillovers within a country. Moreover, tax differentials
can reduce the market power of firms in high-tax jurisdictions and distort the matching process
between firms and workers. Indeed, Krenn (2017), in his theoretical model on firms competition
for talented CEOs, shows that a large tax differential can induce the worker to match with the
less preferred firm if it is located in a low tax jurisdiction. Therefore, understanding how the
top earners’ equilibrium locations are sensitive to income taxes and which are the determinants
of their patterns of migration is paramount.
The importance of high-skilled migration in general, and its determinants have been high-
lighted in the literature1 that has focused on its effect on both receiving and sending countries
(Stantcheva et al., 2016). Starting from the seminal contribution of Mirrlees (1982), this phe-
nomenon has been deeply analyzed by the theoretical literature in order to derive a model of
optimal taxation in the presence of international migration and tax competition across coun-
tries. In more recent times, Lehmann et al. (2014) have derived a model of tax competition and
international migration considering a framework with costly mobility, non-symmetric countries,
individual heterogeneity in the distribution of workers’ skills and simultaneous interactions be-
tween governments. This model has been further extended in Simula and Trannoy (2017)
allowing governments to differentiate the tax schedule between native and foreign workers.
In spite of the presence of this body of theoretical literature, only recently this phenomenon
has been empirically investigated, because of the lack of good microdata containing information
1See Kerr (2013) for an extensive review of the link between global migration and innovation in the US.
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about the citizenship and work history of workers. Migration choices of highly skilled workers2
have been studied in a few empirical works. Kleven et al. (2013) investigate the role of top
tax rates on the international migration of football players in the European footballers market.
Stantcheva et al. (2016) study the effect of taxation on the location choice of inventors across the
United States and Europe. Preferential schemes for top earners in Denmark and the difference
in the elasticity of mobility to taxation between foreigners and natives are instead the focus of
the study by Kleven, Landais, Saez, and Schultz (2014).
Related to that, a few studies have been focusing more in general on inter-regional migration
of high skilled workers. For example, Moretti and Wilson (2017) analyze the sensitivity of the
migration choices of star scientist to changes in personal and business tax rates across US
states. Agrawal and Foremny (2018) use administrative data to understand the role of taxation
on the choices of migration of the entire universe of top incomes in Spain. All these works
share the expected result that the probability of the worker to locate in one country or region
is negatively affected by the marginal tax rate.3
Starting from this literature, we aim to understand how much migration patterns of top
incomes are sensitive to income taxation using a new dataset on football players’ careers and
marginal taxation on both national and regional levels. In particular, we address two main
empirical challenges pointed out by Kleven et al. (2019) and Stantcheva et al. (2016): i. the
availability of precise data on earnings and tax rates; ii. the role of the firms in the location
decision process. The first issue has been addressed in the literature using data on specific
sectors where these data were available or using administrative data with detailed information
on migration decisions and wages. The second issue is related to the fact that the observed
choices are the outcome of market interactions between workers and firms and, therefore, the
observed elasticities can be a mix between employers the employees’ behavioral responses.
Indeed, income taxation affects the surplus that workers and firms gain from their match on
the base of their market powers and characteristics. For example, as highlighted in Stantcheva
et al. (2016), the firms could have the incentive to internalize all the tax burden in order
to attract star workers. Conversely, workers of poor quality can be more prone to bear all
the cost of taxation. Moreover, workers’ equilibrium locations can be affected also by firms’
2An important share of these top earners are the so-called superstars (Rosen, 1981)
3See Kleven, Landais, Mun˜oz, and Stantcheva (2019) for a review on the main empirical challenges and
policy implications regarding the effect of personal taxation on the geographic mobility of people
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characteristics that are independent of the taxation that the researcher cannot identify using
data only on the migration decisions of workers in different countries. If it is not accounted for
the firm’s characteristics and agents’ market power our results could be a mix between tax and
non-tax responses and depend on taxation incidence.
We address these two challenges by using an innovative empirical strategy proposed by Fox
(2018): the Maximum Score Matching Estimator. This technique allows us to consider that
all location decisions that we observe are the outcome of market interactions between agents
that compete in each side of the market to match with their preferred partners. With this
modeling strategy, as we will see below, we account explicitly for the fact that income tax rates
have an effect on the surplus arising from the employee-employer match that may impact on
individual’s equilibrium locations. Namely, given that individuals’ migration patterns are the
results of matches between firms and workers, the tax rate, by affecting the utilities related to
these matches, contributes to the determination of individuals’ equilibrium locations.
As a unit of observation, we use players-teams matches. This enables us to control for
the agent-specific characteristics and isolate a pure taxation effect. Incidentally, by exploiting
the matching nature of the phenomenon, this method allows us to get rid off of the lack of
information on earnings, wages, and agent-specific unobservables.
Hence, our contribution is threefold. First, we model the workers’ location process account-
ing even for the role played by firms by solving the problem of availability of precise data on
earnings and agent-specific unobservables. Second, we use both regional and national variation
in top tax rates and the information regarding the preferential schemes that allow specific kinds
of workers to enjoy a reduced tax rate. This has permitted us to have a precise measure of the
tax burden affecting a match in a specific region in Europe. Finally, a dataset on the careers of
football players richer than that used by Kleven et al. (2013) is used. Namely, our dataset con-
tains information on several individuals and team covariates (e.g. individual and team market
value) that permits to identify the distribution of the skills among the top 16 European leagues
over the period 2007-2016.
Our results suggest that the income taxation incentive is an important determinant of top-
earning workers’ migration patterns even when considering a matching model in which labor
demand and supply interact. Indeed, we find evidence that, ceteris paribus, a match is more
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valuable if it happens in a lower tax jurisdiction. By means of a simulation procedure, the
main results in terms of elasticities of mobility to the net-of-tax rates are as follows. The
effect of income taxes is stronger when considering foreigners and top-players. This result has
different consequences depending on the elasticities of labor demand. If we consider an elastic
labor demand, we find an estimate of the elasticity of migration to taxation around 0.22 for the
whole population, between 0.07 and 0.117 when considering natives and between 1.37 and 1.197
for foreigners. These results suggest that foreigners’ equilibrium locations are more sensitive
to the income tax rate than the native ones. Moreover, we find that elasticities are always
positive but much stronger when considering top players. For example, if we consider natives,
the elasticity of the population of bottom quality players ranges from 0.025 to 0.028 whereas the
one estimated for top players ranges from 0.310 to 0.495. This result suggests that a reduction
in the income tax rates can improve the average quality of top earners workers in the country.
This conclusion is confirmed even if we consider a rigid labor demand. In this context, the
elasticities are estimated to be negative at the bottom of the quality distribution and positive,
even though lower in magnitude, for top players. Hence, we find evidence of a displacement
mechanism in which top players migrate into low tax jurisdictions pushing away bottom quality
players.
2.1 Background
2.1.1 Related literature
The importance of migration of talented workers and its consequences on the economy has been
extensively analyzed in the literature (e.g. Kerr, 2013; Clemens, 2011; Freeman, 2006). This
phenomenon has been studied considering its effects on human capital accumulation whether
in sending as well as receiving countries (see, for example, the references in Stantcheva et al.
(2016)) and countries’ ability to attract high-skilled workers. Concerning this last element, this
study tries to understand the determinants of high-skilled migration patterns and, in particular,
the effect of taxation on their equilibrium locations. Indeed, as highlighted in Esteller, Piolatto,
and Rablen (2016), labor mobility is a crucial phenomenon that has to be considered in the
determination of optimal tax schemes. In fact, in a context of free mobility, workers may relocate
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into jurisdictions in which they are more productive on the base of their net-of-tax returns.
However, the presence of tax differentials between jurisdictions can distort workers’ location
choices encouraging migration towards low-tax jurisdictions. Hence, to maximize efficiency, the
optimal taxation models should take into account the tax induced mobility this way reducing
the distortion in location incentives and recover a more efficient distribution of the labor factor.
Therefore, understanding how much workers’ locations choices are sensitive to taxation in
general is paramount.
In this work, we focus on the migration of European football players among European
countries. Regarding this point, the migration of football players and its effect on the quality
of countries’ leagues has been studied also in the sporting economics literature. For example,
Vasilakis (2017) studies the effect of the reduction in mobility restriction followed by the so-
called Bosman rule in 1995 in Europe on the football sector in general.4 In particular, he finds
that the liberalization of football players’ mobility in Europe has increased the scale of the
migration phenomenon and encouraged the production of talent in poor countries. However,
his results suggest that the inequalities in prestige and performances among European countries
have increased. Still regarding the Bosman, rule Balsmeier, Frick, and Hickfang (2018) have
found a positive impact of high-skilled foreign players in Germany on the performances of their
teammates. Finally, Berlinschi, Schokkaert, and Swinnen (2013) find that the migration of
footballers in countries with high-quality teams has a positive effect on the performances of
sending countries’ national teams. Hence, besides the importance of migration of high-skilled
in general, this literature suggests that understanding the effect of taxation on the migration
decisions of football players can be relevant even to understand its role as an attractor for
talents in this sport.
With regards to the tax-induced migration, since the seminal contribution of Mirrlees (1982),
it is well known that the ability of countries to redistribute income through taxation and
their optimal level of redistribution is negatively affected by the magnitude of the elasticity
of mobility to taxation. Building on this concept, the literature has investigated different
models of optimal taxation in the presence of migration which have shed some light on the tools
available to countries for balancing the trade-off between redistribution and their attractiveness
4This rule allowed players to move to a new team at the end of their contracts without paying a fee to their
old team. Indeed, before this rule, players, or their new teams, had to pay a transfer fee even if the contract
between the old team and the player was ended.
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for top tax payers. In particular, Simula and Trannoy (2010) have developed a model that
considers a situation in which one highly redistributive country has to choose its marginal
tax rate considering the presence of one foreign country characterized by a low and constant
marginal tax rate. The model links directly the optimal tax rate schedule to workers’ choices
of location (extensive margin) and their labor supply (intensive margin). A similar situation is
investigated in Piketty and Saez (2013) where a simple and estimable optimal tax rate formula
is derived. The main result of these models is that the optimal tax rate is inversely related
to the elasticity of mobility and the elasticity of taxable income.5 These models have been
generalized in Lehmann et al. (2014), who consider a framework with competition between
non-symmetric Rawlsian countries, individual heterogeneity in the distribution of tax-payers
skills and simultaneous interactions between government; and in Simula and Trannoy (2017)
allowing the governments to differentiate the tax schedule between native and foreign workers.
Considering revenue-maximizing countries, Kleven et al. (2013) have derived a model of optimal
taxation considering that the labor market demand can be either elastic or rigid. Moreover,
considering the optimality degree of regional differentiation in tax rates, Milligan and Smart
(2019) have developed a model considering a federation of states in which the optimal tax rate
is a function of the elasticity of mobility on the state level and the elasticity of taxable income
at the national level. In this framework, regions have the incentives to compete to attract more
tax-payers reducing their tax rates. This competition can result in a general reduction of tax
rates that can be suboptimal from the national perspective. However, given a set of elasticities
of migration at the regional level, countries can internalize this competition effect and set the
federal tax rates maximizing the tax revenues at the federal level.
These studies have in common the importance of the elasticity of mobility as a measure
of the sensitivity of tax-payers location choices to taxation.6 Concerning this point, there is
a growing body of empirical literature that has focused on the estimation of the elasticity of
mobility.7 These studies have been focused on both international and inter-regional migration.
On the international side, the most closely related paper is Kleven et al. (2013) who investigate,
5See Saez et al. (2012) for a review on the behavioral responses associated with marginal tax rates that
considers various channels such as, for example, labor supply, career choices and tax compliance
6Taxes are not the only policy tool that jurisdictions can use to attract high-skilled workers. For example,
Buettner and Janeba (2016) explore the incentives of German jurisdictions to subsidize cultural activities in
order to attract highly educated employee.
7See Esteller et al. (2016) and Kleven et al. (2019) for a review on both theoretical and empirical literature
focused on the link between mobility and the choice of the optimal tax rate
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through a model in which the players choose the country to migrate to, the effect of marginal
income taxation on the migration choices of European football players. They estimate an
elasticity of mobility close to one for foreign players and a smaller estimate (around 0.15) for
natives. Moreover, the elasticities are higher for top-quality players than for the low-quality
ones. This suggests that the tax rate could be a useful tool to attract high-quality foreign
players. Stantcheva et al. (2016) study the effect of taxation on the international mobility of
inventors and scientists finding similar results regarding domestic and foreign inventors. To our
knowledge, this is the first paper that tries to consider the role of companies in the location
decisions of workers in an international context. The authors highlight that tax rates can have
a distortionary effect on the match between firms and workers and, therefore, the results can be
a mix of firm and workers’ behavioral responses. For example, firms could have the incentive
to internalize all the tax burden in order to attract star workers or, conversely, workers of poor
quality can be more prone to bear all the cost of taxation. Moreover, location choices can be
affected by firms’ characteristics that are independent of taxation and that could have effects
that are not identifiable using data only on migration on the national level. With regard to
the possibility for countries to use preferential tax schemes, Kleven et al. (2014) study the
effect of a reduction of tax rates for high-income foreigners implemented in Denmark in 1992
on the immigration of top-tax payers in the country finding that these kinds of tools can be
used by countries to attract more high-skilled workers. These results are confirmed also in the
aforementioned paper by Kleven et al. (2013) that explore the effect of preferential schemes in
several European countries. Top incomes’ migration decisions can be influenced also by capital
taxes. For example, using Forbes Magazine’s data on billionaires and international capital tax
rates, Sanandaji (2014), has found that very rich people are more likely to move to countries
with lower capital taxes and higher per capita incomes.
With respect to the relationship between inter-regional migration and taxation, Moretti and
Wilson (2017) have explored the determinants of migration choices of star scientists among US
states. In particular, they exploit the regional differences in personal and corporate income
taxation to understand the effect of taxation on both the supply and the demand of star
scientists. In a similar context, Moretti and Wilson (2014) have studied the effect of subsidies
and R&D tax credits on the biotech star scientist choices of location. They find that these
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policies have a direct positive effect on the supply of star scientists in the biotech industry.
This positive effect extends indirectly to all the workforce in the sector, employment in local
services and employment in closely related industries. The relationship between innovation
and taxation in the US has been analyzed recently also in Akcigit, Grigsby, Nicholas, and
Stantcheva (2018). Using data on patents dating back to 1920, the authors study the effect
of both corporate and income taxation on the innovation process over the 20th century. In
particular, they find that taxation has a significant effect on the number and the quality of
patents and the supply of inventors at the state level. Interestingly, inventors are affected even
by corporate taxation, especially if they work inside a corporation. This element suggests that
the role of companies and their ability to transfer a part of the tax burden on workers has to
be taken into account in estimating the sensitivity of migration choices to taxation. Although
these papers point to a relevant role of taxation in attracting inventors from other states Bell,
Chetty, Jaravel, Petkova, and Van Reenen (2019a) and Bell, Chetty, Jaravel, Petkova, and Van
Reenen (2019b) have shown that the financial incentives, namely taxation, have a small effect on
aggregate innovation at the country level. This result arises from the fact that these incentives
affect only individuals who have already been exposed to the opportunity of an inventor career
and inventors of marginal quality. The authors suggest that the most relevant tool to foster
aggregate innovation is to increase the exposure to innovation career opportunities of children,
especially if they come from underrepresented groups such as women or low income families.
Extending the focus on the entire universe of tax payers, Agrawal and Foremny (2018)
use Spanish administrative data to understand the migration choices of the residents in Spain
exploiting the variation of income tax rates among Spanish regions. They find that, conditional
on moving, a one percent increase in the net-of-tax rate in a region increases the probability
to move in that region by 1.5%. However, they estimate, on aggregate, an elasticity of top tax
payers of 0.85. This means that an increase in tax rates generates a mechanical increase in tax
revenues that is larger than the loss due to behavioral responses.
This result calls directly the theoretical argument of, among the others, Musgrave (1959) and
Oates (1972) and tested in Feldstein and Wrobel (1998), according to which regions governments
should refrain from redistributive policies because this will result in an out-migration response
from the former, and, consequently, in an erosion of the tax base. This theoretical prediction has
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been tested also in Young and Varner (2011), Varner and Young (2012), and Young, Varner,
Lurie, and Prisinzano (2016) using the natural experiment of the millionaire taxes in New
Jersey, California and among US states.8 The authors find that, in general, an increase in the
top tax rate had little, marginally significant, effect on the migration choices of wealthy people.
Their results show that rich people are less mobile than the general population and embedded
in the regions in which they have success. These results have been confirmed also with respect
to elderly wealthy people in Bakija and Slemrod (2004), who examine the effect of inheritance
taxes in the US finding that there is strong evidence of a behavioral response to these taxes
but that this effect is small in comparison to the mechanical effect given by the rise in tax
revenues. By contrast, Schmidheiny and Slotwinski (2018), exploiting a preferential income tax
regime for foreigners in Switzerland, find a strong response in location and migration choices
for high-income earners and a non-significant effect for low-income earners. Interestingly, they
find a significant effect on location choices and moving probability only for those foreigners that
reside in high tax jurisdiction without finding a significant effect on those who live in low-tax
jurisdictions suggesting that the effects of tax increases and tax decreases can be asymmetric.
2.1.2 Moving a step forward
Kleven et al. (2019) highlight that one of the most important challenges in studying tax induced
migration is the lack of precise information on wages and earnings. This problem has been
addressed previously by focusing on specific sectors where these data are available or using
administrative data.
In this study we aim to overcome this empirical difficulty by using a different empirical
strategy, namely, the Maximum Score Matching estimator (MSM) developed by Fox (2018).
This method, among various advantages9, allows the researcher to estimate a matching model
between agents who compete in a market to match with their preferred partners. The MSM
has been used in the literature in several different fields. Just referring to ‘many-to-one’ appli-
cations, Yang et al. (2009) estimate the brand alliances between basketball players and teams;
Mindruta et al. (2016) compare the MSM with standard discrete choice estimators in a context
8The millionaire tax movement is a trend observed in the US consisting of states that start to raise the
progressivity of their tax systems to compensate the general drop in federal top tax rates.
9See Section 2.4 for details on this estimator.
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of strategic alliances in the biopharmaceutical industry; Baccara et al. (2012) quantify the ef-
fects of network externalities on choices of faculty regarding offices in a new building; Schwert
(2018) investigates the matching process between firms and bank in the loan market. Moreover,
the MSM is analyzed in the survey on the applications of empirical matching models made by
Chiappori and Salanie´ (2016).
2.1.3 The market of European football players
The European football market is characterized by specific characteristics regarding teams, play-
ers and how their labor contracts are defined.
In each European country, there is one top-national league to which up to the 20 best
football teams in the country take part. Teams can participate even to other competitions such
as national or international cups.10 The season of year t starts usually in August/September
of year t and ends in May/June of year t+ 1.11 Moreover, in each season there are two market
windows, usually in summer and in January, in which teams can buy and sell players. This
calendar poses some difficulties in the definition of the relevant tax rates. Following Kleven
et al. (2013) we assume that the relevant tax rate for the year t season is the year t tax rate
given that most of the teams’ composition is decided before the beginning of the season.
Football teams are firms located in a specific city that use a specific stadium. This partic-
ularity hampers the possibility of relocating to other jurisdictions to take advantage of lower
tax rates or other economic incentives. Hence, each observed migration pattern only depends
on workers’ mobility. Moreover, each team employs about 25-45 players in its squad.12 The
number of players in teams depends upon various factors such as the dimension of the market,
number of fans, financial resources, number of competitions in which the team qualifies, and
country-specific rules regarding the number of youths and national players. This number is
naturally bounded by the fact that teams can employ, in each match, 11 players in the main
line-up plus 3 players from the bench as substitutions. Given that the number of workers is
neither fixed nor totally unbounded, there could be some complications in the definition of the
10In Europe there are two European competitions in which a restricted number of teams participates in, on
the basis of their performances and country rankings: the European League and the Champions League
11This rule is excepted by the northern countries (such as Norway and Sweden) where the year t season starts
in March of year t and ends in November of the same year.
12With ‘squad’ we refer to all the players who are employed by the team
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market structure. Indeed, if the number of players is relatively fixed, we end up with a rigid
labor demand. Conversely, if this number is totally flexible, we have an elastic labor demand.
This has important consequences on both the empirical model to estimate and the choice of the
optimal tax schedule to apply. As explained in Section 2.2, we overcome this problem by using
an empirical approach enabling us to let the market structure to be endogenously determined
in equilibrium. It turns out that our main econometric specification will not depend on any
ex-ante assumption on the elasticity of the labor demand. However, in the computation of the
elasticity of mobility to taxation we will consider two cases: one in which team’s dimension
is kept fixed at the one observed and one in which we let it to be freely determined in the
simulation algorithm on the base of the results coming from the empirical model.
Teams and players sign contracts that define the affiliation duration, salary and other ben-
efits related to players’ performance, sponsorship and image rights on the merchandising sold
by clubs. The combination of these payments makes very difficult to detect the overall com-
pensation earned by the players. Indeed, where data are available, they only cover wages or
provide information only on very important players. Moreover, during the affiliation, if a player
wants to change his team before the end of his contract or, conversely, if a team want to hire
a new player employed by some other teams, the clubs involved can negotiate a transfer and a
transfer fee that is not part of players’ taxable income. These rules have been established after
the so-called ‘Bosman rule’, decided by the European Court of Justice in December 1995.13
Given these characteristics, each contract in the European football market can be seen as
the equilibrium outcome of a many-to-one two sided matching model with transferable utility
(Fox, 2018). In these kinds of models, the agents have a role defined ex-ante (worker or firm)
and the matches are the outcomes of an interaction process between agents that consider the
choices made by other agents (Yang et al., 2009). The maximum score matching estimator
provides an empirical tool consistent with this theoretical framework by means of which to
assess the effects of the marginal income taxation on the relocation and migration patterns of
European football players.
13See note 4
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2.2 Theoretical Framework
Building on Kleven et al. (2013) and Lehmann et al. (2014), let us assume that in Europe there
is a population P of potential football players with an endowment of ability si ≥ 0, in a set of
countries C. The utility of the player to play in country c ∈ C is given by:
U(si, c) = µ(c) + (1− τic)× wi(si, c) (2.1)
where µ(c) measures the preference of the player for country c, τic is the marginal tax rate in
country c, and wi is the wage earned by the player i. Following Lehmann et al. (2014), we refer
to Eq. (2.1) as the ‘gross utility’. This is the utility of player i if he decides to stay in country
c and the level of his net utility if he decides to migrate in country c′ 6= c supporting a cost
of migration m. The cost of migration depends on a variety of underlying factors such as the
home country, the financial cost of migration, the differences in languages and culture, and the
geographical distances. Therefore, the player will choose to migrate from c to c′ only if:
U(si, c
′)−m ≥ U(si, c) with c 6= c′ (2.2)
namely, a migration will take place only when the net utility that the player gains by migrating
in country c′ is bigger than the gross utility gained by staying in country c.
We want now to consider two important elements: the preferences of teams and regions’
characteristics. On the one hand, players’ migration patterns are the outcome of a matching
mechanism in which players and teams are competing on both sides of the market to match
with their preferred partners. On the other hand, each team is attached to a local stadium and
a city and, therefore, the characteristics of the region that hosts the team plays a fundamental
role in this decision process.
To account for these two elements, we assume that in country c there is a set of regions
n ∈ Nc and a set of teams in each region n called An. In this case, the utility of the player i
with ability si to play in team a ∈ An, in region n and in country c is given by:
U(si, n, c, a) = µ(n, c, a) + (1− τin)× wai(si, a, n, c) + I ×m (2.3)
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where µ(si, n, c, a) measures the preference of player i to play in team a, in region n and in
country c, τin is the marginal tax rate in region n for player i, wai is the salary paid by team
a to a player with ability si in region n and in country c, and I is the indicator function that
takes value 1 if the player i is supporting the cost of migration m. Given that the teams are
located in a specific region and in a specific country, we can rewrite the Eq. (2.3) as:
U(si, a) = µ(si, a) + (1− τin)× wai(si, a) + I ×m (2.4)
this include all the informations regarding countries and regions in the subscript that refers to
the team a. A key feature of Eq. (2.4) is that the income tax rate is region-specific. Indeed, as
we will see in Section 2.3.2, we are able to exploit the regional differences in tax rates in many
countries of Europe and, therefore, modelling also the intra-national migration of footballers
along with the international one.
Given Eq. (2.4), the player i is willing to play in team a only if the utility that he receives
is greater than the utility that he can obtain when playing for other teams a′ 6= a. Hence, he
is willing to play for team a only if:
U(si, a) ≥ max
a′
U(si, a
′) with a 6= a′ (2.5)
Therefore, player i decide his best partner comparing each team in the market and considering
the region in which the team is located as well as the tax rate valid in that region. Consequently,
we can indicate the mass of players that are willing to play in team a as:
P¯a(τin, wai) =
∑
i∈P
1
[
U(si, a) ≥ max
a′
U(si, a
′)
]
(2.6)
where 1[.] is the indicator function that takes value 1 if the condition inside the brackets is
satisfied. Hence, P¯a(τin, wai) indicates the mass of players for whom the condition (2.5) is
satisfied.
At this point, we can model the way teams choose their partners from the set of players
P¯a(τin, wai). Let assume that teams An have a defined number of vacancy spots. If the team a
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hires the player i with ability si, it obtains the following net value:
V (si, a) = φ(si, a)− wai(si, a) (2.7)
where φ(si, a) is the value added by the player to the team evaluation function, and wai(si, a)
is the salary paid by the team. With respect to the determinants of V (si, a), two important
elements have to be pointed out. First, the term φ(si, a) depends on the ability of the player si
and on the specific characteristics of team a such as the number of the players that are already
playing for it and their characteristics. Second, the wage wai(si, a) depends on the ability of
the player si, the team a and the region n in which the team is located and can differ from
players’ marginal productivity because of agent’s market power. This market power can be
heterogeneous among players and teams and can derive from various sources: the dimension of
the market in the region or in the country, the prestige of the team, scarcity of the player, the
prestige of the player, etc. For example, with rigid labor demand and an excess in labor supply,
teams can have an higher market power and, therefore, extract a positive surplus from players.
On the other hand, the opposite can occur whether we consider the most talented players. In
fact, in this case, due to the scarcity of talent, players can have an higher market power and
extract a positive surplus from teams. It is worth pointing out that, because our estimation
strategy and the fact that we are observing team-players matches, we do not need to define
explicitly the elasticity of the labor demand or the teams’ market powers. In fact, we can let
the structure of the market to be endogenously determined in the equilibrium.
In this setting, the team a will choose to hire player i with ability si only if the value that
it can gain from the hiring is greater that the one deriving from other players i′ 6= i and only
if it has a vacancy spot. Therefore, it will hire the player i only if:
V (si, a) ≥ max
i′
V (si′ , a) with i 6= i′ (2.8)
However, considering the condition (2.5), we know that only a subset P¯a(τin, wai) of the popu-
lation P is willing to play in team a. Hence, we can rewrite the (2.8) considering the condition
(2.5) as:
V (si, a) ≥ max
i′∈P¯a(τin,wai)
V (si′ , a) with i 6= i′ (2.9)
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The inequality (2.9) shows that the team is actually choosing among the subset P¯a(τin, wai) of
players. In this way, we are accounting for both players and team preferences. Therefore, if the
conditions (2.9) and (2.5) are satisfied, we will observe a match ωai between team a and player
i with an associated utility equal to the the sum of agents’ utilities:
pi(ωai) = V (si, a) + U(si, a) (2.10)
where, as seen before, the utilities of players and teams depend on the characteristics of partners,
the region where the match takes place and the tax rate valid in that region.
Using the condition (2.9), we can now define the number of players that are playing in team
a as:
Pa(τin) =
∑
P¯a(τin,wai)
1
[
V (si, a) ≥ max
i′∈P¯a(τin,wai)
V (si′ , a)
]
(2.11)
consequently, the mass of tax payers that are playing in the region n is defined as:
Pn(τin) =
∑
a∈An
Pa(τin) (2.12)
The Eq. (2.12) indicates the sum of the team-players matches that we are observing in one
region n. This number depends on the characteristics of the region n in the country c (such as
market dimension and marginal tax rate τin), the preferences of teams located in n and those
of the players in the market. In this setting we are considering a situation where the players
choose in which team they want to play. However, the results are identical even if we consider a
situation where the teams move first and the players choose in the set of teams that are willing
to hire them.
Finally, from Eq. (2.12) we can derive our parameter of interest: the elasticity of mobility to
taxation. This parameter indicates the sensitivity of tax payers’ migration patterns to marginal
tax rates and can be used to compute the optimal marginal tax rate in the presence of migration.
In particular, the elasticity measures the change in the number of taxpayers caused by a one
percent change in the tax rate and is defined as:
εn =
dPn
d(1− τin) ×
1− τin
Pn
(2.13)
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where (1 − τin) is the net-of-tax rate that measures how much the disposable income of the
players i increases when the wage wai increases by one Euro.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Football Data
We have collected data on the careers of football players that have played in the first leagues
of 16 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, England, France, Germany, Greece,
Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey. These
countries have been chosen to consider all the top-25 European leagues according to the UEFA
ranking.1415 These data are collected from various online sources such as Transfermarkt.com,
UEFA.com, and Footballsquads.co.uk.
The most important source is Transfermarkt.com. This web site is one of the most im-
portant online community of football supporters in which are available data regarding various
characteristics of teams and players that, in some cases, are available from 1996 to 2016. Al-
though we use all the information available in the construction of our variables, we restrict
our analysis to the matches observed between 2007 and 2016 because of the lack of complete
taxation data before 2007. The information available at the player level consist of the name, the
age, the foot, the height, the position in the field, the club affiliation with information on the
data in which the contract has been signed, the nationality and the market value. The market
value is particularly important because is used to assess the quality of the players. However,
this variable has one important characteristic: it is not directly observed. Indeed, the market
value is assessed by the registered users of Transfermarkt.com through a process of collective
judgments (Peeters, 2018). This variable has been used previously in the sports economics
literature. For example, Bryson, Frick, and Simmons (2013) uses this market value as a proxy
for players’ salaries while investigating the salary return to the ability to play soccer with both
feet; Herm, Callsen-Bracker, and Kreis (2014) evaluate the accuracy of this market value in
predicting real transfer fees finding that this community based market value is a good predictor
14The UEFA ranking is a measure of the leagues’ quality based on the past results of the teams
15We do not include countries such as Serbia and Romania because of the scarce availability of marginal tax
data. The data on top tax rates in Russia are available only since 2010.
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of the fees actually paid by teams; and Peeters (2018) who finds that transfermarkt ’s market
value outperforms other standard predictors such as FIFA ranking in forecasting international
soccer results. Because of these elements, we believe that the market value can be a good proxy
for players’ quality. Moreover, the fact that the market value is not observed allows us to have
a quality indicator even when the player has not changed the team.16 One possible limitation
of this variable is that it does not represent only the intrinsic ability of the player but can
be affected by the quality of the team in which the player is employed. Namely, players with
the same intrinsic ability but in different teams can have different evaluations only because
one of the teams is more prestigious. However, this limitation is common to all the indicators
available and, most importantly, it permits to consider that players in high-quality teams can
have other characteristics besides ability that can be an important element for a team such as,
for example, the experience in European competitions.
At the team level, we observe: the country, the position in the league, the UEFA coefficient
of the league and the city of the stadium were the team is situated. This latter variable is used
to define the regions where the team is located and, therefore, the relevant marginal tax rate.
Following Kleven et al. (2013), we restrict our sample to those players aged between 17 and
43 years and that are citizens of one of the countries in the sample. We exclude the other players
because we cannot observe their work history and, therefore, we cannot compute counterfactual
alternatives for their location choices. Intuitively, this choice is made because, otherwise, the
non-European players would be always foreigners in every country and, therefore, we cannot
identify the effect of their foreigner status on their location choices. Indeed, in that situation,
we cannot compare the country in which they play with their home country and estimate the
cost of migration from their home country. In order to follow this strategy and to have a
complete dataset, we drop also all the players for whom we do not observe the date of birth,
the market value and the starting date of the contracts. This last information is very important
because allow us to identify fake transfers in the dataset. Indeed, another characteristic of our
dataset is that the matches that we observe could be the outcome of some trading strategy of
teams. Namely, one team can buy a player only as a counterpart of some next transfer. In
these cases, we could observe the same player in different teams in the same season. To avoid
16If the player has been playing in the same team for his entire career the real market value is unobservable
since there is not a market transaction that regards the player.
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these issues, we have used the information on the starting date of the contracts keeping only
the last contract signed by the player in each season. We exploit this information even in the
cases when the player changes the team in the middle of the season to impute the right tax
rate. The last step of our strategy regards the nationality of players that have two or more
citizenships. In these cases, we keep the information on the first nationality that is selected in
Transfermarkt.com. This citizenship is the most associated with the player football history.17
Given this strategy, our analysis is based on a dataset with data on 12,380 players and 392
first-leagues teams observing 41,816 team-players matches.
2.3.2 Taxation Data
To choose the correct taxation data we need to solve two caveats: in which country (or region)
the players are taxed and which kind of tax rate is relevant for their migration decisions.
Indeed, the relevant tax rate for the migration decision is the average tax rate (ATR). However,
to use the ATR is problematic because it depends non-linearly on earnings, with the related
endogeneity issues, and because we do not use data on the salaries earned by footballers. To
solve these issues, we exploit two characteristics of our sample. First, given that footballers
have to train daily, it is plausible that they have to live next to the team’s city. Hence, we can
assume that they are taxed on the base of the tax system valid in the country (or the region) in
which they work. Second, considering that footballers earn high salaries compared to countries’
top tax brackets for income taxes and payrolls, we can assume that the relevant tax rate is the
marginal tax rate (MTR).18
To compute the marginal tax rate we have combined three types of taxes: the top marginal
income tax rates, the employer and employee social security contributions, and the value added
tax. Following Kleven et al. (2013) and Mertens and Montiel Olea (2018) we define the marginal
net-of-tax rate as19:
1− τ = (1− τi)(1− τw)
(1 + τV AT )(1 + τe)
(2.14)
where τi is the top marginal income tax rate, τw is the uncapped social security contribution at
17For instance, the national team of the player.
18Kleven et al. (2013) and Moretti and Wilson (2017) show that their results are similar using ATR instead
of MTR.
19The derivation of the marginal net-of-tax rate is in the Section 2.A of the appendix
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the worker level, τV AT is the Value Added Tax, τe is the uncapped social security contribution
at the employer level and τ is the combined marginal tax wedge. In this way, we can measure
how much the disposable income of the worker increases when the marginal labor cost for the
firm increases by one Euro.
To compute this marginal net-of-tax rate we have collected tax data from various sources:
OECD tax database, European Commission tax databases, the International Bureau of Fiscal
Documentation (IBFD) country surveys, the PriceWatersCoopers on-line sources, KPMG on-
line sources, and various national sources. We cross-checked these sources with the tax rate
time series available in Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva (2014) in order to have a correct database.
To exploit both international and inter-regional variation, we have collected data on both
national and regional levels. In particular, we observe a regional variation in marginal tax
rates in 6 countries: Denmark, Italy, Norway, Sweden Switzerland, and Spain. Moreover, we
account for preferential taxation schemes for footballers or top earners in many countries: Spain,
Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark, France, and Turkey. In these countries, we observe that the
marginal taxation is different for foreigner football players or football players in general. This
latter characteristic of our dataset permits us to analyze how the preferential schemes affect
the distribution of skills within a country comparing the native and the foreigner elasticities of
migration.
Data on tax rates are combined according to the country-specific rules provided by national
agencies. Moreover, we also cross-checked using the sub-central tax rate series available in the
OECD Tax Database for representative regions and information on tax computations available
in IBFD’s country surveys.
2.3.3 Descriptive Statistics and Graphical Evidence
Table 2.1 reports the descriptive statistics of our sample showing the information on the char-
acteristics of players and marginal tax rates by country. From the first column, we can see that
Italy is the country with the highest number of observed matches (4,056), followed by Turkey
(3,541) and Netherlands (3,336). Regarding the share of foreign players (column 2), we can
notice that England has a share of foreign players which is more than twice the average share
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in the sample (43.05%) followed by Germany (28.53%) and Belgium (24.90%).20 The third and
the fourth column show, respectively, the share of Top and Bottom quality players. These two
groups are identified on the base of players’ locations in the quality distribution computed for
each year and each position in the field. Indeed, we classify the players in four general positions
(goalkeepers, defenders, midfielders and offenders) in order to have a quality indicator that
accounts for the differences existing in the market value distributions among these categories.
The players’ quality is computed as the average of all the market values that we observe during
the players’ career until the year before the observed match. We use this strategy to account for
the possibility that teams may consider players’ entire growth path in term of quality in their
evaluation decision.21 We define as Top players those who are in the top 25% of the position-
year specific quality distribution and as Bottom players those who are below this threshold.
From these data, we can have a glimpse of the difference in quality distribution among coun-
tries. In particular, we can individuate a group of five countries (England, France, Germany,
Italy, and Spain) that have a share of Top players way bigger than the average, confirming
the common knowledge that these leagues are more able to attract the best talented players in
Europe. Columns 5 and 6 report the average top marginal tax rates valid for native players and
foreigners. In particular, we observe a difference between tax rates for foreigners and natives in
Belgium, Denmark, France, Netherlands, and Spain. In these countries there are specific tax
regimes for foreign top earners which aim to attract high skilled workers.22 For example, the
so-called Beckham Law in Spain established a flat tax system with a tax rate 24% for workers
with an income higher than 600,000 Euro from 2004 to 2010.23 24
Table 2.2 shows the variation in marginal top tax rates, the figures in the first three columns
are computed as pooled average considering all the sample period whereas those in the last
three columns are computed as absolute differences over time. We observe regional variation in
6 Countries: Denmark, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. These differences are
small in all the countries except for Switzerland if we consider the average differences, and are
substantial if we consider the absolute differences computed over time. Even though the differ-
20In Table 2A.1 in the Appendix we present the origin-destination flows by country-pairs.
21This strategy is similar to the one used in Kleven et al. (2013) where players’ quality is computed considering
the quality of teams in which the player has played during his entire career.
22In Figures 2A.1-2A.3 in the Appendix we show the evolution over the period 2007-2016 of top marginal tax
rates for natives and foreigners in the 16 countries of the sample.
23See Kleven et al. (2014) for a comprehensive analysis of the Danish preferential system.
24Turkey has a special tax regime that reduces the income tax rate to 15% for football players in general.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
N Foreigners
(%)
Top
(%)
Bottom
(%)
τn τf
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Countries 41816 18.52 22.76 77.24 57.38 50.76
Austria 1881 11.91 1.06 98.94 58.33 58.33
Belgium 2382 24.90 8.19 91.81 75.24 56.18
Denmark 2147 15.00 1.72 98.28 65.52 40.25
England 2943 43.05 65.92 34.08 59.75 59.75
France 2659 11.36 35.43 64.57 67.03 46.92
Germany 3277 28.53 39.27 60.73 55.86 55.86
Greece 2848 19.14 7.02 92.98 56.04 56.04
Italy 4056 16.07 36.76 63.24 56.37 56.37
Netherlands 3336 22.36 11.15 88.85 60.02 42.02
Norway 1795 15.77 1.39 98.61 60.87 60.87
Portugal 2036 11.94 14.05 85.95 70.97 70.97
Russia 1929 9.54 23.48 76.52 39.36 39.36
Spain 3246 17.50 46.95 53.05 55.64 36.09
Sweden 2202 8.81 1.73 98.27 73.64 73.64
Switzerland 1538 19.05 3.97 96.03 47.16 47.16
Turkey 3541 11.16 18.24 81.76 27.97 27.97
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for our sample covering the period 2007-2016. The sample includes
the players that are citizens of one country in the sample and play in a European top league. Column (1) reports
the number of player-team matches observed. Column (2) reports the percentage of foreign players. Columns
(3) and (4) report the shares of players that are, respectively, in the top 25% and below the top 25% of the
quality distribution computed according to players’ market values. Column (5) and (6) report the average top
marginal tax rate applying, respectively, to native and foreign players.
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Table 2.2: Variation in top tax rates (2007-2016)
Average 2007-2016
Min Max ∆ Min Max ∆
Sweden 72.96 74.81 1.85 72.83 75.07 2.23
Norway 59.33 61.21 1.88 58.29 61.21 2.92
Italy 54.08 57.65 3.56 53.25 59.20 5.95
Spain 52.27 57.15 4.87 34.48 63.64 29.15
Switzerland 42.03 54.93 12.89 27.67 56.52 28.85
Denmark 40.40 57.49 17.09 40.00 70.13 30.13
All Countries 27.97 74.73 46.76 27.67 75.36 47.68
Notes: This table reports the minimum and the maximum of top tax rates observed, and the average difference
between regional and international top tax rates. The figures in columns from 1 to 3 are computed as pooled
averages while the figures in columns from 4 to 6 show absolute differences considering all the sample period.
ences in average are small we need to consider that the migration within countries is likely less
costly than the international one. Therefore, even a smaller difference in tax rates could cause
a significant effect. For example, using administrative data on tax payers in Spain Agrawal
and Foremny (2018) find that, conditional on moving, the probability of moving to one region
increases by 1.5% when its tax rate decrease by 1%.
Figure 2.1 shows some graphical evidence of the relationship between MTR and the out-
migration of native players (Panel A) and between MTR and the in-migration of foreign players
(Panel B). Each plot presents the coefficient associated with MTR coming from a linear regres-
sion between players’ shares, MTR and a constant. This coefficient can be roughly interpreted
as an indicator of the correlation between the two variables. Panel A shows the relationship
between the share of players who are playing in their home country with the MTR valid for
native players. Panel B shows the relationship between the fraction of foreign players in each
country and the MTR on foreign players. Focusing on panel A we can notice that the share
of native players that migrate away from their home country is strongly negatively correlated
with the top tax rates valid in the country. This result suggests that the MTR in the player’s
native country is important in the location decision process of footballers. However, panel B,
shows that the fraction of foreign players in the country is weakly correlated with the top tax
rate valid for foreigners. The difference between these two types of correlation seems to indi-
cate that the players are more interested in the MTR valid in their home country than in the
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Panel A: Out-migration of native players
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Panel B: In-migration of foreigner players
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Figure 2.1: Cross-Country Correlation between Tax Rates and Migration, 2007-2016
Notes: Each dot stands for one country: AT=Austria, BE=Belgium, DK=Denmark, EN=England, FR=France, DE=Germany,
GR=Greece, IT=Italy, NL=Netherlands, NO=Norway, PR=Portugal, RU=Russia, ES=Spain, SE=Sweden, CH=Switzerland,
TR=Turkey. Panel A shows the relationship between the share of players who are playing in their home country with the MTR
valid for native players in that country. Panel B depicts the relationship between the share of foreign players in each country and
the MTR valid for foreign players in that country. In each plot we show the coefficient of the relevant MTR coming from a linear
regression of the shares against MTR and a constant. All the plots refer to pooled averages computed on the entire period between
2007 and 2016.
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Out-migration of native players by quality
Top 25% of the quality distribution Bottom 75% of the quality distribution
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Figure 2.2: Cross-Country Correlation between Tax Rates and Shares of Natives by Quality,
2007-2016
Notes: Each dot stands for one country: AT=Austria, BE=Belgium, DK=Denmark, EN=England, FR=France, DE=Germany,
GR=Greece, IT=Italy, NL=Netherlands, NO=Norway, PR=Portugal, RU=Russia, ES=Spain, SE=Sweden, CH=Switzerland,
TR=Turkey. The two plots show the relationships between the fraction of players playing in their home country and the MTR
valid in the origin country considering players in the top 25% of the quality distribution (on the left) and players in the bottom 75%
of the quality distribution (on the right). The quality distribution is based on market values distribution in each year for each position
in the field. In each plot we show the coefficient of the relevant MTR coming from a linear regression of the shares against MTR and
a constant. All the plots refer to the entire period 2007-2016.
one valid in the destination country. This could be due to the fact that, when deciding where
to locate, the players are always comparing the MTR of the country in which they live with
the one valid in all the possible destination countries and, therefore, the first MTR appears in
every comparison. We account for this in our estimation strategy in two ways. First, we control
for a dummy that indicates whether the player is native of one country or not. Second, our
estimation strategy is based on a comparison between an observed match and all the feasible
counterfactual matches. Hence, the estimator compares the MTR of the country in which the
player is playing with all the MTR that he will face matching with a different team in a coun-
terfactual match.25 The plots of Figure 2.1 shows the average correlation between the effective
tax rates and the migration patterns assuming that the effect is homogeneous among all the
sample. However, as shown in Kleven et al. (2013) and Stantcheva et al. (2016) the effect of
the MTR could differ on the base of the worker’s ability. Hence, in Figure 2.2, we present
the correlation between the share of natives and the MTR in the origin country splitting our
sample in Top players (on the left) and Bottom players (on the right). From Figure 2.2 we can
25These results are symmetric if we consider the fraction of players that play abroad and the share of natives.
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see that the negative relationship between the share of players playing in their home country
and the MTR in these countries depends on the quality of the player and is stronger for players
with higher quality. Moreover, Figure 2.2 shows that Bottom players are less mobile and tend
to stay in their home country more than Top players. This suggests that a higher tax rate
could cause a reduction in league quality encouraging the out-migration of Top players and the
in-migration of Bottom players. This effect could be due to two different causes: the relevance
of the MTR and the market power of the player. Relating to the first, higher market value
could be related to a higher wage for the player (Bryson et al., 2013). Therefore, in this case,
the MTR could be more relevant given that the more is higher the income the more the MTR is
similar to the ATR. Hence, the indicator of the position of the worker in the quality distribution
could be seen as an index of the intensity of the treatment given by the tax rate (Stantcheva
et al., 2016). Relating to the second cause, players with higher quality might have better job
offers in the international market and have more opportunities to avoid a high-MTR country
migrating towards a low-MTR one. Moreover, players with lower quality might be entrapped
in their home country and fill the spots left by the high-quality players. Hence, in a context
of rigid demand there could be a mechanism where the high-quality players that leave the
countries are replaced by the low-quality ones and, on the other hand, the low-quality player
in a country with lower tax rates are displaced by the high-quality foreign players. We account
for this feature in two ways: exploiting the heterogeneity of the effect of marginal taxation
through dummy variables indicating the position in the quality distribution, and estimating
the elasticity of mobility considering that the vacancy spots in each country are fixed.
2.4 Maximum Score Matching Approach
This work takes advantage of the Maximum Score Matching estimator (MSM) developed in
Fox (2018). The MSM is a semi-parametric estimator based on the single-agent multinomial
choice maximum score developed by Manski (1975) that allows the researcher to estimate the
parameters underlying the matching process between two types of agents in a specific market.
This estimator detains various advantages compared to the standard discrete choice approaches
used in the previous literature. First, it allows the estimation of parameters underlying the
matching process without using data on wages. This characteristic is particularly important
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in our case given that the data regarding the players’ wages are hardly accessible considering
our sample of countries. Moreover, football contracts are characterized by various bonuses
and benefits that, even when the information is available, complicate the computation of the
exact total amount of money earned by the worker. Second, it allows a more general definition
of the error term than the classical type I extreme value used in Logit models. Third, its
computational simplicity enables us to use a not artificially limited set of alternatives and
individual covariates. Moreover, it ensures the validity of the estimates in spite of considering
a subset of all potentially available choice alternatives (Fox, 2007).
The MSM is well suited for the estimation of a many-to-one two-sided matching model (Fox,
2018). This model seems to be a good approximation of the European football market because
it considers a market where the agents have a role defined ex-ante (one can be either player
or team) and the matches are the outcomes of a process of interaction between agents that
take their decisions interdependently.26 This model is based on the concept of local production
function that is defined as the sum of the utilities of agents who participate in the match.
For example, if we observe a match between a team a and a player i we have that its local
production function is given by the Eq. (2.10). Now, if we consider that the team a is matching
with a set of players Pa(τin) we can rewrite the local production function of the set of matches
that refers to the team a as:
pi(ωa) =
∑
i∈Pa
[
V (si, a) + U(si, a)
]
(2.15)
where the local production function is given by the sum of the value added by the set of
players Pa to team a and the utilities of the players Pa defined using equations (2.4) and (2.7).
Moreover, each team competes in a specific session market for its preferred partners. Therefore,
if we define with m ∈ M a market in which we observe team a and team b we can write the
local production function of the set of matches ωm as:
Π(ωm) = pi(ωa) + pi(ωb) (2.16)
where pi(ωa) and pi(ωb) are defined according to Eq. (2.15). pi(ωb) is defined considering the
26The many-to-one nature of the model derives simply from the fact that a team can enroll many players
each season but a player can play only for a team at a time.
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matches between team b and the set of players Pb. This last equation helps us to define the
equilibrium concept used in the MSM estimator: the pairwise stability (Kim, 2018; Fox, 2018;
Kuehn, 2017).
The pairwise stability condition states that no coalition of agents prefers to deviate from
the observed matches. In our case, therefore, this condition states that the two teams cannot
increase their utilities or profits exchanging each other two players. This concept of equilibrium
is similar to the best response condition. Indeed, given the rest of the matches, two agents,
when forming the coalition, compare the utility under the current relationship with the one
that they would gain in the counterfactual matches (Kim, 2018). Despite each match is formed
considering the entire assignment of observed matches, this condition is pairwise because it
assumes that, when considering a possible deviation, teams assume that the other rivals stay at
their current matchings (Kuehn, 2017). Formally, to define the condition of pairwise stability
we need to define a counterfactual set of matches ω˜m where at least one player from Pb is
matching with team a and one player from the set Pa is matching with team b. Given this
definition, the set ωm is a pairwise equilibrium if:
Π(ωm) ≥ Π(ω˜m) (2.17)
where Π(ω˜m) is the local production function of the counterfactual set of matches ω˜m. This
stability condition has some important consequences. First, if the condition in Eq. (2.17) is
satisfied we have that a rank order property holds (Fox, 2007):
Pr(ωm|a, b, Pa, Pb,m) ≥ Pr(ω˜m|a, b, Pa, Pb,m) (2.18)
The rank order property states that the probability to observe the actual set ωm is greater than
the one of observing the counterfactual set ω˜m. This useful property can be used to define
the objective function of the MSM in a way that is similar to the usual maximum likelihood
estimator (Fox, 2007). In fact, the identification of the parameters of the local production
function, as we will see below, is based on the pairwise comparison between the local production
function of the actual set of matches ωm with a set of counterfactual matches ω˜m. Moreover,
this equilibrium concept permits to use the inequalities defined in (2.17) to estimate the model
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without using data on the equilibrium wages.
In order to explain this advantage and to save notation let us assume that we observe only
two matches: player i with team a and player j with team b. Recalling Equations (2.4) and
(2.7) we know that, if we observe a match between team a and player i, the agents’ utilities
can be written as:27
U(si, a) = µ(si, a) + (1− τia)× wai (2.19)
V (si, a) = φ(si, a)− wai (2.20)
The pairwise stability condition states that if we are observing the match ωai instead of ω˜aj
must be the case that either team a prefers i to j at the equilibrium salaries or that player j
prefers team b because it offers an higher wage than team a (Kuehn, 2017). However, if team a
prefers j and the second condition is true the team may increase its utility simply increasing its
salary offer to player j. In this case, team a could offer a wage w˜aj to make player j indifferent
between the two teams so that:
µ(sj, b) + (1− τjb)× wbj = µ(sj, a) + (1− τja)× w˜aj (2.21)
taking logs and rearranging the equation we can isolate the counterfactual wage w˜aj as:
ln w˜aj = lnµ(sj, b, τbj) + lnwbj − lnµ(sj, a, τaj) (2.22)
where µ(sj, a, τaj) = µ(sj, a) + (1 − τja) and µ(sj, b, τbj) = µ(sj, b) + (1 − τjb). Given that
the team a can offer w˜aj to player j, in order to not observe a deviation from the equilibrium
matches ωai and ωbj the following condition must hold:
lnφ(si, a)− lnwai ≥ lnφ(sj, a)− ln w˜aj (2.23)
this condition states that the observed matches are a pairwise stable equilibrium if team a
prefers to match with i instead of j even if player j is indifferent between the two teams, i.e. if
team a prefers i at the observed salaries. Now, substituting Eq. (2.22) into Eq. (2.23) we get
27To save notation we write wai instead of wai(si, a).
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the following:
lnφ(si, a)− lnwai ≥ lnφ(sj, a) + lnµ(sj, a, τja)− lnµ(sj, b, τbj)− lnwbj (2.24)
the same equation can be derived considering player i and team b:
lnφ(sj, b)− lnwbj ≥ lnφ(si, b) + lnµ(si, b, τbi)− lnµ(si, a, τai)− lnwai (2.25)
Finally, defining the local production function of a generic match ωai as pi(ωai) = φ(si, a) +
µ(si, a, τai) and combining Eq. (2.24) and Eq. (2.25) we get:
pi(ωai) + wai − wai + pi(ωbj)− wbj + wbj ≥ pi(ω˜aj) + pi(ω˜bi) (2.26)
pi(ωai) + pi(ωbj) ≥ pi(ω˜aj) + pi(ω˜bi) (2.27)
from this equation, since the matches on the right hand side of the inequality are the coun-
terfactual ones, we can cancel out wages and recover the pairwise stability condition showed
in Eq. (2.17). Indeed, Eq. (2.27) states that the sum of the local production function of the
observed matches is greater than the one coming from the counterfactual set. Moreover, this
condition permits us to estimate the local production function constructing a set of inequalities
based on Eq. (2.27) without using data on wages.
A third characteristic of the MSM estimator is that it prevents the use of agent-specific
variables. This can be seen as a drawback of this estimator technique because force the re-
searcher to use only match-specific variables or interactions between agent-specific variables.
On the other hand, this characteristic permits to control for a full set of individual fixed effect
and for all the unobservable that are agent-specific. This feature of the MSM comes directly
from the condition Eq. (2.27). To understand this property of the estimator we need to define
the parametric local production function of a generic match ωai:
pi(ωai) = φ(a, i) + µ(a, i, τai) = αXa + βXi + θXai + εai (2.28)
where Xa are the team-specific variables, Xi are the player-specific variables, Xai are the match-
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specific variables and εai is the unobservable component of the local production function. Since
the same agent appears in both sides of inequalities defined using Eq. (2.27), all the agent-
specific variables cancel out and, therefore, we can identify only the parameters associated with
the match-specific variables. Thus, for the match ωai, we can rewrite the Eq. (2.28) as:
pi(ωai) = θXai + εai (2.29)
Consequently, if we observe a set of matches ωm in the market m we can write the set’s local
production function as:
Π(ωm) =
∑
ωi∈ωm
(pi(ωi)) =
∑
ωi∈ωm
X(ωi)
′θ + εωi (2.30)
where ωi is one match of the set ωm, X(ωi) is the matrix of match specific variables, θ is
the vector of parameters that measure variables’ effect on pi(ωm), and εωi is the unobservable
component of the local production function of the match ωi.
The MSM assumes that agents have preferences over the observables characteristics of the
partners. This assumption lead to two main consequences. First, the estimate of the local
production function is semi-parametric. This means that we can estimate parametrically the
observable component of the local production function of the set of matches ωm and non-
parametrically its unobservable component. Second, we do not need to define a specific dis-
tribution for the unobservables. This estimator is consistent if observable and unobservable
components are uncorrelated, if the unobservable component is i.i.d. across matches28 and if
the parameter space θ is compact. Given these assumptions and the semi-parametric nature of
this estimator we can rewrite Eq. (2.17) using only the observable components of the parametric
local production function as:
∑
ωi∈ωm
X(ωi)
′θ ≥
∑
ω˜i∈ω˜m
X(ω˜i)
′θ (2.31)
28One consequence closely related to this assumption is that the conditional distribution of the unobserv-
ables conditioned on the observable component F (εωi |X(ωi)) is continuous and exchangeable. F (εωi |X(ωi)) is
exchangeable if F (εωi |X(ωi)) = F (ρ(εωi)|X(ωi)) where ρ is a permutation.
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This last condition is used to define the objective function of the MSM as:
max
θ
QM(θ) =
M∑
m=1
Gm∑
g=1
1
[ ∑
ωg∈ωm
X(ωg)
′θ ≥
∑
ω˜g∈ω˜m
X(ω˜g)
′θ
]
(2.32)
where M is the number of observed markets, QM is the score function that we need to maxi-
mize and Gm is the set of inequalities in each market. Each inequality is constructed defined
by comparing two observed matches ωg with two counterfactual matches ω˜g. The set of pa-
rameters θ is identified by maximizing the objective function adding 1 to the score function
every time that the condition in brackets is satisfied. The most important characteristic of
MSM’s objective function is its computational simplicity. In fact, to evaluate it we do not
need to non-parametrically estimate the choice probabilities, the distribution of unobservables
or to compute integrals used with the maximum likelihood approaches (Fox, 2018). Moreover,
MSM’s objective function is a step function. This feature complicates both its maximization
and computation of the standard errors. These problems are solved by using a differential
evolution algorithm (Storn and Price, 1997) that allows the maximization of a step function
and a subsampling procedure to compute the interval of confidence (Politis, Romano, and Wolf,
1999; Romano and Shaikh, 2008).
We implement the MSM in R using a modified version of the toolkit provided in Santiago
and Fox (2008). The new code is able to handle a huge amount of data more efficiently in order
to allow us to estimate this model in a setting characterized by a huge number of agents on
each side of the market.
2.4.1 Identification strategy
As we have explained in the previous section, the effect of the various determinants of matches
utilities is identified by maximizing the objective function in Eq. (2.32). Namely, we identify
our parameters of interest by comparing actual matches with the counterfactual ones. The
latter matches are defined by constructing a new set of matches in which at least two players
deviate from the observed equilibrium by exchanging their team. Therefore, identification is
given by exploiting the differences between matches’ attributes that agents observe in actual
matches with those that they would observe in counterfactual matches. Nonetheless, there are
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various threats to our identification strategy that we should discuss.
The first threat to this identification strategy is that matches attributes should be not
affected by matching assignments (Schwert, 2018). Indeed, this condition is violated we will
have a very unlikely scenario in which choices in time t− 1 (before the match) are the result of
matches observed in time t (after the match). To avoid this problem we use all the information
available to players one market window preceding the season, i.e. the data are observed in time
t− 1.
A second issue is related to the fact that our measure of MTR might be endogenous. This
condition could be violated because tax policies may depend on the political or economic power
of agents or be decided in response to migration patterns between different kinds of players.
However, we can exploit some advantage of our estimation strategy to reduce this concern.
First, agents’ economic or political power can be seen as an agent-specific unobservable that may
impact on tax rates. However, as explained in the previous sub-section, the MSM permits to
control for all the unobserved agent-specific characteristics by exploiting the pairwise stability
condition stated in Eq. (2.17). Second, as in Kleven et al. (2013), we use various policy
changes in order to have quasi-experimental variations that permit us to identify the causal
link between taxation and migration. We define the MTR that players would face in actual and
counterfactual matches by exploiting: i. spatial and temporal variation across 16 countries; ii.
spatial and time variation in regional tax rates within 6 countries; iii. preferential taxation
schemes for foreigners in 5 countries.29 Moreover, as explained in Section 2.3.2, the use of
MTR instead of ATR has permitted to avoid the endogeneity issues related to the fact that
ATR depend upon workers earnings and need the computation of counterfactual wages in
destination countries.30 31
Another possible limitation of our analysis is that we do not have data on agents that are
outside of our observed market such as players without a contract or that are playing either in
one country outside our sample or in a European lower league. This can be an issue given that,
without this information, we cannot construct the complete set of counterfactual matches that
29Figures 2A.1-2A.3 and Table 2.2 show, respectively, the evolution over time of the MTR valid for native as
well as foreign players across countries and the average variation at the regional level.
30See Kleven et al. (2013) and Agrawal and Foremny (2018) for more details on ATR simulation strategies.
31On top of these elements, more pieces of evidence on the causal link between marginal taxation and migration
has been provided by Kleven et al. (2013) by exploiting exogenous policy changes using a synthetic control
approach.
62
agents would face in reality. However, as explained before, the MSM ensures the validity of the
estimates even though when considering a subset of all potentially available alternatives (Fox,
2007).
Therefore, we believe that given the nature of our data and our empirical strategy endo-
geneity is less an issue in our context.
2.4.2 Estimation Procedure
In this section, we describe the estimation procedure followed to estimate the effect of taxa-
tion on the match between players and teams and, consequently, on footballers’ equilibrium
locations. This procedure is defined to account for the specific characteristics of the MSM
estimator.
Market definition
First, we need to define the set of independent markets. These are independent in the sense that
one agent cannot compete in more than one market. Given that the players play in different
positions we separate the players in offenders, defenders, midfielders, and goalkeepers to account
for the fact that players are more likely to compete with players in the same position of the
field.32 Indeed, it is implausible that a goalkeeper or a defender is competing with an offender
to match with its preferred team. However, players can change their role in their careers this
way competing in more than one market.33 To avoid this possible issue we define each season
as a separate market obtaining 40 markets (10 years for 4 positions). In this way each market
will be composed by players of one specific position in a specific season on the supply side and
teams on the demand side.34
Match-specific variables definition
The second step of our estimation procedure concerns the definition of the match-specific vari-
ables that characterize the local production function of the matches. The first determinant
used is the variable Time in the Country indicated as ln(Timecountry). This is defined as the
32A similar strategy is used in Yang et al. (2009) concerning basket players.
33We observe 13 players that change their category in our sample
34Given this definition, the teams are seen as the collection of different position-specific unities.
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logarithm of the number of semesters that one player has spent in one specific country. We
use semesters instead of years to consider that one player can change his team in the middle
of the season. This variable is used to understand the presence of some persistence in players’
choices regarding countries: a positive coefficient would indicate that the match utility increase
when the player has already played in that specific country. Players, in this cases, can have
some advantage in terms of knowledge of the language and the culture, and, especially, a more
precise knowledge about the characteristics of rival teams and league’s style of football.35 The
second and the most important determinant of the local production function is the logarithm of
the net-of-tax rate indicated as ln(1− τ) and computed according to Eq. (2.14). This variable
allows us to understand the effect of the marginal tax rate on matches’ utility. As we have seen
in Section 2.1.3 we use, as year-t season tax rate the tax rate that was valid at the beginning of
the season. A positive coefficient would indicate that matches are more likely to occur, or are
more valuable, in relatively low-tax countries or regions. The third determinant is given by the
logarithm of the Quality of the match indicated as ln(Matchqual). This is computed as the inter-
action between the standardized qualities of players and teams. As explained in Section 2.3.3,
player’s quality is computed as the average of all the market values that we observe during the
player’s entire observable career until the year t− 1, whereas team’s quality is computed as the
sum of the quality of the players that were playing in the team in year t− 1. Moreover, team’s
quality is computed considering even players that are not born in one of the countries of our
sample. This strategy is followed in order to account for the possible fundamental contribution
that this kind of player can have on teams’ performances and quality. In order to have an easier
interpretation of our results, we normalize both quality indicators so that their values are com-
prised between 0 and 100 and we use as maximum for this standardization the highest quality
observed in one specific market. In this way, we have a different quality distribution for each
year-position cell that permits to account for the differences in average market values existing
among different players’ categories. This variable is used to understand if there is some positive
sorting effect between teams and players based on their quality and how these characteristics
influence matches’ local production functions. The last determinant is the variable Prior Rela-
tionship. This is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the two agents have already matched
35For example, Italian football is known to be more defense-oriented whereas English football is perceived as
more physical.
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in the past. This variable allows us to understand if there is some persistence in the preferences
of both kinds of agents for their partners. Indeed, a positive coefficient would indicate that
the match’s utility increases when it comprises two agents that have already met in the past.
The logic behind this variable is similar to the one explained for the Time in the Country : if
the agents have already matched in the past it may be that the player has a better knowledge
of the environment surrounding the team, the characteristics of other teammates and of the
league in which the team compete. These elements can be very positive in the valuation of
one partner because allow agents to reduce the uncertainty regarding the real quality and the
real characteristics of their partners. To understand if there is heterogeneity in the effects of
these determinants, we estimate a set of interactions that permits us to understand whether
the effects of these determinants differ on the base of players’ characteristics. In particular,
we interact the logarithm of the net-of-tax rate with three dummies: Topyear, Foreigner and
Foreigner×Topyear. The first dummy takes value 1 if the player located above the 25% of the
year-specific quality distribution. These quality distributions are computed following the strat-
egy explained before but without considering the player’s position. This strategy is followed
because the effect of the tax rate is more likely to be heterogeneous on the base of players’
salaries that, as explained in Section 2.1.1, may be more related to the simple market value.
The dummy Foreigner takes value 1 if the player is playing in a foreign country and allow us to
understand whether the effects of the various determinants on matches’ utilities differ between
foreigners and natives. The interactions with Foreigner × Topyear finally are estimated to
understand if the effect of net-of-tax rate on matches’ local production functions differs when
considering a top foreign player. In this way, the baseline match used as a reference for the
interpretation of the results is a match where one generic team is matching with a low-quality
native player. The variables Quality of the match and Prior relationship are interacted with a
slightly different set of dummies: Topmkt, Foreigner and Foreigner×Topmkt. In this case, we
consider the dummy Topmkt which is defined considering the market-specific quality distribu-
tion. This different strategy is used because it is more likely that teams consider the position
occupied by players in the field when evaluating them rather than only their general market
value. All the variables used in the estimation are computed considering the information avail-
able until the market window preceding the season so that agents’ attributes are not affected
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by matching assignments (Schwert, 2018).
Pairwise stability inequalities
The third step regards the definition of the inequalities used in the objective function of the
MSM. These inequalities are constructed on the basis of Eq. (2.31). In particular, for each
observed couple of matches we construct the set of inequalities defining the counterfactual
matches by exchanging two players at a time. For example, if we observe a set of matches in
which Ronaldo is matched with Juventus FC and Neymar is matched with Paris Saint-Germain
FC the counterfactual set will be composed by a match between Neymar and Juventus FC and
another match between Ronaldo and Paris Saint-Germain FC. This logic is followed for each
couple of matches observed and for any possible combination between the observed matches.
The identification of the vector of parameters will be based on the pairwise comparison between
observed and counterfactual matches using the objective function defined in Eq. (2.32). Given
the combinatorial nature of this process, the final set of inequalities can be huge and cause an
increase in the computational burden of the estimation process. However, Fox (2018) suggests
that, when the number of inequalities becomes computationally intractable, is it possible to
use a random subsample of the entire set of inequalities without losing the estimator’s consis-
tency. Therefore, in the estimation sample, we use only a 40% random subsample of the set of
inequalities.36
Estimation of the matches’ local production function
When the set of inequalities is constructed we can estimate the local production function by
maximizing the objective function defined by Eq. (2.32). To maximize this objective function
and identify the vector of parameters we need to fix one coefficient to +1 or -1 (Fox, 2007).
This restriction is due to scale identification. Indeed, given the semi-parametric nature of the
estimator, we can identify the set of coefficient up to an order-preserving transformation of
the parameters (Manski, 1975).37 This means that, as in standard discrete choice approaches,
we can interpret only the relative magnitude of the coefficients and their sign. We choose the
36We have run the estimations several times with sample of different dimensions obtaining always similar
results.
37Namely, the same matching patterns can be generated by an infinite variety of set of coefficients, which
differs only by a constant that multiplies all the coefficients.
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Table 2.3: Single Variable Explanatory Power (Percent)
Normalization θ = +1 θ = −1
ln(TimeCountry) 90.94 0.81
ln(1− τ) 1.65 22.39
ln(MatchQual) 43.02 42.29
PriorRelationship 31.47 0.36
N. of Inequalities used 10274607 10274607
Notes: The column headed θ = +1 and θ = −1 correspond to a positive or negative normalization for
variables. The scores correspond to the percentage of observed inequalities statisfied using the objective
function defined in Eq. (2.32).
variable to use as a reference by computing the objective function of Eq. (2.32) using one
regressor at a time and estimating two models: one with the coefficient fixed to +1 and another
with the coefficient fixed to -1. The choice of the reference variable is based on the model’s
goodness of fit that is given by the ratio between the value of the score function and the number
of inequalities used (Fox, 2007). Table 2.3 shows the results of this procedure displaying the
variables used in each estimation and the percentage of inequalities satisfied fixing the coefficient
θ to +1 or -1. As we can notice the variable with the highest explanatory power is the logarithm
of Time in the Country that satisfies, when considering a positive coefficient, the 90.94% of the
inequalities used in the estimation. Thus, we estimate the local production function maximizing
the objective function (2.32) using as reference regressor the variable Time in the Country.
Finally, we compute the interval of confidence using a sub sample procedure by estimating
the same specification across 200 random samples of 4 markets each time. Given that the
rate of convergence is 3
√
N , the empirical sampling distribution of our vector of parameters is
(Schwert, 2018):
θ˜s =
(
ns
N
)1/3
(θˆs − θˆ) + θˆ (2.33)
where θˆs is the estimate from the subsample s, θˆ is the estimate from the full sample used in
the estimation, ns is the dimension of the sample s and N is the number of observation in the
estimation sample. For a generic significance level α we construct the interval of confidence
taking, as boundaries, the α
2
th and the (1− α
2
)th percentiles of the empirical distribution of θs.
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The coefficient will be considered as statistically significant if the constructed interval does not
38Given that the empirical distribution (2.33) is not uniform our interval of confidence can be asymmetric.
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contain the value 0 and, therefore, the two boundaries have the same sign. We construct the
intervals considering the three standard significance levels (1%, 5% and 10%) and we choose
the interval that indicate a significant coefficient considering the lowest level of significance.
If the three intervals contains the value 0 we will show the 10% interval of confidence in the
results.
Given our estimate of the local production function, we are able to understand how the
determinants of migration patterns highlighted previously affect football players’ location de-
cisions and their relative importance.
2.4.3 The Elasticity of Mobility to Taxation
In the previous literature (e.g. Kleven et al. (2013)) the elasticities of migration are computed
using the probabilities estimated through a discrete choice model to estimate the expected
changes in each country’s population deriving from a 1% change in the net-of-tax rate. However,
the semi-parametric nature of the MSM does not allow a direct estimate of the probability
to observe the matches and, therefore, to compute marginal effects and elasticities. In this
cases Manski (1975) suggest two different approaches. The first consists in recovering the
probability to observe a match assuming an ex-post distribution for the error term. However,
this approach will result in a loss of the advantage to use a more general definition of the error
terms. Moreover, it does not ensure that the number of predicted matches will be equal to
the one observed, this way arising complications in the computation of elasticities. Indeed,
in this case, we cannot properly account for the rigidity of the demand and the eventual
displacement effects between different categories of players. The second approach consists in
estimating the probability of the match non-parametrically.39 However, this procedure could
be computationally expensive in our case given the dimension of our sample.
A third possible strategy is to estimate the elasticities through a simulation approach.
This approach consists of using the estimates of the local production function to simulate the
matching assignments. In this way, we can simulate the variation in the number of taxpayers
caused by a change in the net-of-tax rate of 1% and compute the elasticity of mobility using Eq.
(2.13). The matching assignments are simulated using the algorithm used in Schwert (2018).
39In a previous version of Fox (2018) the author suggests to use the sieve methods.
68
This procedure is made up of three steps:
1. Compute the local production function for each potential player-team match in each
market according to our estimates;
2. Sort all the possible matches by the estimated local production function values;
3. Select the most valuable matches in descending order.
We repeat this procedure until we reach the number of observed matches and each player is
matched with one team. Differently from Schwert (2018) we apply this procedure considering
two scenarios: one in which teams have a maximum number of vacancy spots and one in which
we let teams match with an indefinite number of players. In both scenarios, we consider that
players can match with only one team at a time. This last assumption makes our strategy
very similar to the one used in the standard conditional logit approach. Indeed, as noted by
Schmidheiny and Bru¨lhart (2011), the conditional logit represents a zero-sum world in which,
despite the elasticity of the demand, the dimension of the supply is kept fixed. We use this
strategy to have results that are comparable with those found in the previous literature and
because we cannot estimate an exit option in which players can decide do migrate outside of
Europe or to do not play at all.
The two scenarios differ in the assumptions regarding the elasticity of the demand and the
dimension in the market. When fixing the number of vacancy spot, we assume that the labor
demand is rigid and that the dimension of the market is fixed to the one observed. In this way,
we can explore the existence of displacement effects between different kinds of players. On the
other hand, in the second scenario, we are not assuming anything about the elasticity of the
labor demand. Indeed, if we let the teams match with an indefinite number of players we are
letting the dimension of the market to depend solely on the results of our estimation model.
The results associated with this second strategy are more comparable with those found in the
literature where the elasticities are usually estimated considering an elastic labor demand.40
40??One exception is, for example, Kleven et al. (2013) where the authors estimate two different specifications
considering both elastic as well as rigid labor demand. In the first case the model used is a conditional logit with
alternative fixed effects that allow to account for the dimension of the market and, therefore, gives estimates
considering a context of perfectly elastic labor demand. In the second case they do not include country-fixed
effects and, therefore, the coefficient are influenced, among the others determinants, by the dimension of the
market in the countries.
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In general, our strategy for the computation of the elasticities has three main advantages:
we do not need to assume any error distribution, the procedure is computationally less costly
than a non-parametric technique and, we can consider different scenarios to better understand
the results of the structural model estimated with the MSM.
This strategy allows us to understand how footballers’ equilibrium locations are affected
by the marginal tax rate and how these elasticities change with respect to players’ nationality
and quality level. In particular, given that our estimates represent the firms’ and workers’
joint responses we can identify the effect on players’ migration patterns by exploiting the fact
that firms cannot migrate in order to avoid income taxation. Therefore, the effect of marginal
taxation on equilibrium locations is identified by simulating its effect on matches utilities and
comparing how these effects impact on players’ migration patterns.
2.4.4 Results
This section shows the results regarding the estimation of matches’ local production function
obtained following the procedure explained in Section 2.4.2 and the results concerning the
elasticity of mobility obtained using the simulation strategy explained in Section 2.4.3. This
paragraph closes explaining the various advantage of the estimation strategy used in this study
in the light of the estimation results.
Point estimates results
Table 2.4 reports the results for 7 different specifications of the match local production function.
The table shows the estimated vector of coefficient, their interval of confidence, the number of
inequalities used in estimation and the percentage of inequalities satisfied. This last element
can be seen as a measure of the goodness of fit of the model (Fox, 2018). As we can notice
all the specifications estimated satisfy a very high percentage of inequalities, always above the
90% of the set of pairwise stability inequalities used in estimation. This suggests that the fit
of the model is very good with a percentage of satisfied inequalities which is higher or similar
than those reported in other studies that use this estimation strategy (e.g. Fox (2018), Yang
et al. (2009), and Schwert (2018)).
The columns (1)-(3) of Table 2.4 present the results of specifications in which matches’
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utility depend only upon the logarithm of the net-of-tax rate (indicated as ln(1 − τ)) and
the logarithm of time in the country (indicated as ln(TimeCountry)) taking into account the
effects of the agent-specific variables.41 The positive coefficient associated with ln(TimeCountry)
indicates that the matches’ utilities are positively correlated with the semesters spent in the
country by the player. This result is not surprising, by spending time in one country the players
can learn more about the specific characteristics of the league and of the country in which they
are playing and, therefore, become more useful for the teams. Moreover, this variable is useful
for the interpretation of MSM’s results. Indeed, as in every discrete choice approach, the
coefficients can be interpreted only in terms of their relative magnitude and, therefore, we can
use this coefficient to translate the effects of the other variables in terms of semesters of life in
one country. For example, a coefficient of +2 indicates that a unitary increase in the variable
gives the same utility to the match as 2 semesters of player’s career in the country.
Turning to the effect of the net-of-tax rate, the first specification considers the effect of this
variable in general (ln(1−τ)) and exploiting the heterogeneity of the effect based on the foreign
status of the player (ln(1− τ)× Foreigner). The positive coefficient associated with ln(1− τ)
indicates that the matches are more valuable if they happen in a country with a relatively
higher net-of-tax rate or a lower tax rate. However, this effect is not the same for every group
of players. Indeed, if the match includes a foreign player, the positive effect of the net-of-tax
rate on the utility of the match decrease by -0.332. This effect is stable in terms of signs across
all the specifications estimated and is related to the fact that, as shown in Table 2.1, the vast
majority of observed matches are between teams and native players.
In specifications (2) and (3) we have added two different interactions terms to understand
if the effect of taxation is different for matches in which the player is a top player ( ln(1− τ)×
Topmkt) or a top foreign player (ln(1 − τ) × Foreigner × Topyear). The preliminary results
of these two models indicate that the effect of taxation increase if the player in the match
is a top-foreign player and that is not statistically different for matches that include a top
player with respect to the baseline given by a low-quality native player. However, these results
can be biased because the specifications examined do not account for the role played in the
local production function by the quality of the match measured as the interaction between
41All the specifications used, as explained in Section 2.4, account for all the possible agent-specific variables
and agent fixed-effects that are erased from the local production function thanks to the pairwise stability
condition.
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players’ and teams’ qualities and the prior relationship between teams and players. Therefore,
in models (4)-(7) we extend the previous specifications considering the regressors ln(MatchQual)
which measures the effect of the quality of the match and PriorRelationship which account
for the effect of the past matches between agents. Moreover, across the different models, we
explore the effects of these variables considering different subgroups of players to understand
if the effect is different when considering foreign and top-quality players. In particular, model
(4) adds to the previous specifications three interactions terms: ln(MatchQual) × Foreigner,
ln(MatchQual) × Topmkt and ln(MatchQual) × Foreigner × Topmkt. These terms measure the
effect on the local production function of match’s quality when it includes, respectively, a foreign
player, a top-quality player, and a foreign top-quality player. As we can notice, the model (4)
does not include the term ln(MatchQual). This is due to the fact that, when including this
variable, the estimation algorithm does not converge, failing in the identifications of the vector
of coefficients. Therefore, in this model, we are assuming that the effect of match’s quality on
the local production function is null when the match includes a low-quality native player and
we can interpret the other coefficients with relation to this baseline.
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Table 2.4: Maximum Score Matching Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ln(TimeCountry) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Supercons. Supercons. Supercons. Supercons. Supercons. Supercons. Supercons.
ln(1− τ) 2.172*** 2.170*** 2.307*** 2.263*** 2.208*** 2.436*** 2.649***
[1.17 3.21] [1.16 3.58] [1.44 3.55] [1.51 3.15] [1.22 3.07] [1.38 3.43] [1.68 3.82]
ln(1− τ)× Foreigner -0.332*** -0.332*** -0.469*** -0.431*** -0.491*** -0.716*** -0.753**
[-0.36 -0.28] [-0.37 -0.28] [-0.54 -0.41] [-0.48 -0.36] [-0.55 -0.31] [-0.89 -0.42] [-0.92 -0.59]
ln(1− τ)× Topyear -0.002 -0.006 0.283 0.305 0.454* 0.786***
[-0.46 0.46] [-0.25 0.24] [-0.05 0.61] [-0.07 0.68] [0.03 0.88] [0.16 1.55]
ln(1− τ)× Foreigner × Topyear 0.344*** 0.025 0.050 -0.223*** -0.038
[0.26 0.42] [-0.05 0.10] [-0.05 0.15] [-0.48 -0.13] [-0.16 0.08]
ln(MatchQual)× Foreigner 0.184*** 0.168*** 0.268*** 0.179***
[0.14 0.24] [0.11 0.24] [0.24 0.40] [0.07 0.26]
ln(MatchQual)× Topmkt 0.660*** 0.801*** 0.865*** 1.032**
[0.49 0.78] [0.59 0.92] [0.35 1.09] [0.81 1.25]
ln(MatchQual)× F.× Topmkt 0.010 0.015 0.174*** 0.136***
[-0.05 0.07] [-0.06 0.09] [0.05 0.36] [0.00 0.32]
PriorRelationship 1.089** 9.076*** 7.056***
[0.75 1.43] [7.02 12.85] [3.89 9.83]
PriorRelationship× Topmkt -7.867*** -6.387***
[-11.41 -5.51] [-9.19 -3.40]
PriorRelationship× Foreigner 0.785
[-0.08 1.65]
% of Inequalities satisfied 92.42% 92.68% 92.74% 94.88% 96.09% 96.05% 96.05%
N. of Inequalities used 10274607 10274607 10274607 10274607 10274607 10274607 10274607
Notes: The parameter on ln(TimeCountry) is fixed to +1 due to scale identification. The estimates of this paramater in a model with only one regressor finds the point
estimate of +1, instead of -1. Given that the parameter can take only two values (+1, -1) its estimate is superconsistent. See Fox (2018) for details on superconsistency.
All the variables are expressed in natural logarithms. Each estimation uses a 40% random sample of the entire set of inequalities. For each coefficient the table reports
the interval of confidences computed through a sub-sampling procedure across 200 random sample of 4 markets at a time. One coefficient is statistically significant if
its interval does not contain the value 0. The interval of confidence are reported considering the lowest level of significance for which the interval does not contain the
value 0. ***, **, * indicate, respectively, that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. If the coefficient is not significant at these levels the table reports
the interval of confidence computed considering a 10% level of significance.
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The models from (5) to (7) explore the effect of the past relationship between teams and
players adding three regressors: PriorRelationship that indicate the difference in term of utility
between a match including two partners who have already matched and a match in which the
two agents have never met, PriorRelationship× Topmkt and PriorRelationship× Foreigner
that measure how this difference can change when the match includes a top-quality player or a
foreign player.
The first feature that is possible to notice is that the model’s goodness of fit increases when
we control for matches’ quality and prior relationships. This indicates that these variables add
explanatory power to our models. In particular, the model’s goodness of fit increases from the
model (1) to model (5) and remain relatively stable across specifications (5)-(7). These models
satisfy more than the 96% of the pairwise stability inequalities used in estimation. However, if
we compare model (5) with models (6) and (7) is it possible to notice that most of the coefficients
change their magnitude and their signs compared with the previous specifications. This element
suggests that, although the goodness of fit stays almost constant, these last two models are able
to give us more complete information on the relationship between match’s utility and the past
experience of the partners. Therefore, our main result and our considerations will be based on
these two specifications.
As in the previous models the baseline used to interpret these results is a match between
a team and a native low-quality player. As we can see the results of these two models are
qualitatively similar: although the coefficients’ magnitude changes their signs remain the same.
The net-of-tax rate has a positive effect on the matches’ utility in general, the coefficient
associated with ln(1−τ) is positive and statistically significant. The effect of taxation, however,
is weaker for matches with foreigners given that the coefficient of ln(1 − τ) × Foreigner is
negative and significant. As seen before, this effect is related to the fact that the majority of
observed matches include a native player. Moreover, this result is in line with the graphical
evidence presented in Figure 2.1 and it confirms the intuition that players are, in general,
more interested in the tax rates valid in their origin country rather than the one valid in the
destination country. Indeed, the negative coefficient indicates that the net-of-tax rate is less
important for the utility of the match when it includes a foreign player. The coefficient attached
to ln(1− τ)×Topyear is positive and statistically significant in both models indicating that the
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net-of-tax rate is more important when the match includes a top-quality player. This result
is in line with the one presented in Figure 2.2 and can be due to two different reasons. First,
top-players are likely to have a stronger market power than the other players in choosing their
best partners and the country in which they play. Second, top-players have a higher wage and
the marginal tax rate is a better proxy for the income taxation that these players face in reality.
Therefore, this result can be driven by the fact that the taxation treatment is stronger for this
kind of players. The effect of taxation on matches that include a top-quality foreign player
differs across the two models. Indeed, although the sign is always negative the coefficients’
magnitude changes strongly. In general, however, the effect of taxation seems to be weaker for
these players for the same reasons that we have seen for foreigners in general.
Turning on the effect of the quality of the match we can notice that the coefficients associated
with the three interaction terms are always positive and statistically significant. From these
results, and recalling that our baseline is given by a match that includes a low-quality native
player, three main results can be highlighted. First, the match’s quality has a stronger effect
if we consider a foreign player with respect to the baseline. One possible interpretation of this
result is that players that are migrating prefer to match with partners that ensure a career
opportunity and, therefore, are more interested in the resulting quality of the match. However,
given the matching structure of our estimator, this result could indicate that teams are willing
to hire a foreign player only when the resulting quality of the match is higher than the one that
would result from a match with a native player. Therefore, matches that include a foreigner have
a local production function that depends positively on the level of the resulting quality. The
second element is that the role of the quality of the match changes strongly if we consider a top-
player. Indeed, the coefficient associated with the interaction ln(1− τ)× Topmkt has a positive
coefficient which is way bigger in magnitude than the one attached to ln(1 − τ) × Foreigner.
This result is not surprising: a top-player is obviously interested in matching with a very good
quality team and, at the same time, very good quality teams are more interested in hiring
top-quality players. Lastly, these two results are confirmed by the coefficient of the interaction
term ln(1− τ)× Foreigner × Topmkt. This coefficient is positive, indicating that the matches
are more valuable when they include a top-quality foreign player and the resulting quality of
the match increases.
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The results regarding prior relationship indicate that a match is more valuable when the two
partners have already matched in the past but is weaker if we consider top players. Moreover,
we do not find evidence of a difference in this effect between natives and foreigners. These
results depend on two elements: teams are more likely to prefer a player that already knows
their characteristics and their rules and a player is more likely to prefer a known environment
where he has already played. This effect is likely to be weaker for top players because, by
changing teams, they can improve their career outcomes. Indeed, is it plausible that very
good teams hire players only when they are already at the top of the quality distribution and,
therefore, we will observe always very few top players matching with their old teams.
To improve the interpretation of our result in the next subsection we present the results of
our simulation approach.
Simulation results
As explained in Section 2.4.3 our simulation strategy considers two different scenarios. The
first assumes that the labor demand is elastic. This means that teams can match with an
indefinite number of players on the base of the estimated local production function. The
second scenario assumes that the labor demand is rigid and teams have a maximum number of
vacancy spots equal to the number of players observed in the team during the 2016 season. In
both scenarios each player can match with only one team at a time. However, differently from
Kleven et al. (2013), both scenarios are estimated using the same econometric specification for
the local production function. Indeed, one of the advantages of the MSM is that we do not need
to assume a specific elasticity of the labor demand for the estimation and, therefore, all the
coefficients depend on the observed market structure that is let to be endogenous determined
in equilibrium. Therefore, in the first scenario we are not assuming that the labor demand is
perfectly elastic but we are simply letting the number of players that match with each team
to be freely determined on the base of the estimated local production function. On the other
hand, the second scenario is extremely useful to understand the effects of marginal taxation
in the context of rigid demand and competition between players. Indeed, when the number of
vacancy spots is fixed at the team level, players with different quality levels can be affected
differently by the marginal taxation. For example, on the base of the results shown in Table
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2.4, the reduction of the marginal tax rate in one country is likely to attract both top-quality
and low-quality players. However, if the labor demand is perfectly rigid, we will observe a
sorting effect on the base of players’ quality: top-players will enter the country pushing away
low-quality players. Indeed, in this case, teams will have the opportunity to choose among
top-players substituting the low-quality ones. In fact, the results of models (6) and (7) of Table
2.4 suggest that the effect on matches’ utilities of the net-of-tax rate is stronger if they include
a top-quality player.
Table 2.5 reports the results of our simulation approach in terms of models’ goodness of
prediction. This is measured comparing the observed set of matches with the one simulated
considering a scenario in which tax rates are kept fixed. The first two columns of Table 2.5 report
the number of observed and predicted matches. As we can notice, the simulation approach is
able to predict the exact number of observed matches. This is a consequence of the fact that,
as in the conditional logit approach, our simulation strategy represents a zero-sum world in
which the labor supply is perfectly rigid at the European level and the number of players and
matches is kept fixed to the one observed in the data. The columns 3-5 of Table 2.5 present the
percentage of correctly predicted matches considering, respectively, team-player level, regional
level, and country level. A simulated match is considered correctly predicted at the team-player
level if it includes the couple of agents that we observe in the data. In the second and the third
columns the simulated match is correctly predicted if, in the simulated scenario, the player is
assigned to a team in the region or in the country in which he was playing in the observed data
in 2016. In these cases, the regions are defined as the lowest tax decision unit available.42
As we can see the performances in terms of goodness of prediction of the two models are very
similar in the two scenarios considered. In particular, if we consider an elastic labor demand
we have that the algorithm predicts correctly the 38% of observed matches at the team level
and around 60% and 82% of the observed matches on the regional and the country level.
These results are similar in the rigid demand scenario in which the algorithm performs worse
at team-player and country levels. This is somewhat surprising because the second scenario,
by keeping fixed the number of teams’ vacancy spots, should replicate better the observed set
of matches forcing the algorithm to follow the distribution of tax-payers that we observe in
42In countries where tax rates do not vary on regional level the lowest tax decision unit is the country,
conversely, if the country present regional variation in tax rates, we consider the region as the lowest tax
decision unit.
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Table 2.5: Goodness of Prediction
Predicted
Matches
Observed
Matches
% Correct
Matches
% Correct
Regions
% Correct
Countries
Elastic Demand
Model (6) 5014 5014 38.23 60.91 81.89
Model (7) 5014 5014 38.25 60.99 81.93
Rigid Demand
Model (6) 5014 5014 30.73 61.75 79.78
Model (7) 5014 5014 31.35 62.25 80.12
Notes: the table compares the goodness of prediction of the simulation approach based on model (6) and model
(7) of tabel 2.4. Panel Elastic Demand considers a scenario in which a team can match with an indefinite
number of players. Panel Rigid Demand considers a scenario in which the number of players that can match
with the team is fixed to the one observed in the sample. The first and the second columns report, respectively,
the number of observed and predicted matches. The columns 3-5 reports the percentage of correctly predicted
matches considering, respectively, the team-player level, the regional level and the country level. Regions are
the lowest tax decision unit available. The results are based on year 2016.
the data. However, given that our simulation approach is able to predict around the 80% of
the observed country-player matches in all the scenarios considered we are confident that our
specifications are able to describe correctly the phenomenon examined and, therefore, we can
use our simulation approach to estimate the elasticity of mobility to taxation.
The results of this exercise are reported in Table 2.6. In particular, for each model and
scenario considered, we have computed the average elasticity of international mobility to a 1%
increase in the net-of-tax rate in general and considering only natives or foreigners. We have
split our sample in top and low-quality players. Looking at the results of the elastic demand
scenario we can see that, in general, a reduction of 1% in the tax rate can increase the number
of tax payers by around 0.2%. This effect is stronger when considering top players (around
0.7) and weaker with respect to the population of low-quality players (around 0.07). These
results confirm the conclusions drawn on the base of the estimated local production function
and indicate that a reduction in the net-of-tax rate can, ceteris paribus, improve the quality
distribution of players in one country. However, the most interesting results are those regarding
the differences in the effect between natives and foreigners. In general, we have estimated an
elasticity between 0.11 and 0.07 native population and between 1.20 and 1.37 for foreigners.
These results are in line with the previous literature. For example, Kleven et al. (2013) find
a point estimate for the elasticity of the number of native players around 0.15 and around 1
for foreigners. The differences in the results can be explained considering that our elasticity
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Table 2.6: Average Elasticity of International Mobility to Taxation
General Natives Foreigners
Avg Top Low Avg Top Low Avg Top Low
Elastic Demand
Model (6) 0.220 0.758 0.066 0.117 0.495 0.028 1.197 1.655 0.681
Model (7) 0.210 0.710 0.067 0.077 0.310 0.025 1.370 1.817 0.768
Rigid Demand
Model (6) 0.000 0.297 -0.084 -0.016 0.243 -0.082 0.119 0.523 -0.102
Model (7) 0.000 0.442 -0.126 0.036 0.494 -0.080 -0.260 0.240 -0.559
Notes: the table reports the elasticities of mobility to a 1% increase in the net of tax rate computed using the
simulated assignments for the year 2016 based on the results of models (6) and (7) of table 2.4. Panel Elastic
Demand considers a scenario in which a team can match with an indefinite number of players. Panel Rigid
Demand considers a scenario in which the number of players that can match with the team is fixed to the one
observed in the sample. Each elasticity is the weighted average of countries elasticities weighted by the ratio
between the number of players in each group in the country and the number of players in each group in the
sample. The results are shown for the general population of players, for natives and for foreigners. For each
group we computed the average elasticity (Avg), the elasticities for top players (above the 25% of the quality
distribution) and low quality players (below the 25% of the quality distribution).
estimation is computed considering the joint response of players and teams. Moreover, the
difference of the magnitude of the effect between native and foreigner populations is related to
the fact that the base of native players is much larger than the one of foreigners given that most
players play at home (Kleven et al., 2013). These results suggest that a general reduction of the
tax rate is less cost-effective than a reduction that targets only foreign players. Moreover, given
that the effect is stronger when considering top players, we can confirm the previous result:
a reduction in the tax rate can improve the quality distribution in one country, especially for
foreigners.
The results of the rigid demand scenario present evidence of sorting effects given by the fact
that the elasticities present positive values for top players population and negative values for
low-quality players population. This suggests that when one country reduces its marginal tax
rate, the share of top quality players that country increases this way pushing away low-quality
players. This result is valid if we consider all the players as well as if we consider natives and
foreigners. However, our results do not suggest that the foreign players will displace the native
ones. Indeed, the values of the average elasticities for natives and foreigners present different
signs in the two models. Model (6) predicts a negative elasticity of natives’ population and
a positive one for foreigners’ population. This indicates that, according to model (6) foreign
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Table 2.7: Average Elasticity of International Mobility to Taxation: Preferential
Schemes for Foreigners
General Natives Foreigners
Avg Top Low Avg Top Low Avg Top Low
Elastic Demand
Model (6) 0.114 0.369 0.041 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.192 1.619 0.712
Model (7) 0.143 0.495 0.043 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.395 1.859 0.768
Rigid Demand
Model (6) 0.000 0.139 -0.039 -0.054 0.000 -0.068 0.396 0.726 0.217
Model (7) 0.000 0.381 -0.109 -0.079 -0.051 -0.086 0.570 2.031 -0.315
Notes: the table reports the elasticities of mobility to a 1% increase in the net of tax rate valid for foreigners
computed using the simulated assignments for the year 2016 based on the results of models (6) and (7) of table
2.4. Panel Elastic Demand considers a scenario in which a team can match with an indefinite number of players.
Panel Rigid Demand considers a scenario in which the number of players that can match with the team is fixed
to the one observed in the sample. Each elasticity is the weighted average of countries elasticities weighted by
the ratio between the number of players in each group in the country and the number of players in each group in
the sample. The results are shown for the general population of players, for natives and for foreigners. For each
group we computed the average elasticity (Avg), the elasticities for top players (above the 25% of the quality
distribution) and low quality players (below the 25% of the quality distribution).
players, on average, displace natives in the case of a reduction in the tax rates. However, model
(7) predicts the opposite: natives’ population has a positive average elasticity while foreigners’
population have a negative point estimate. Therefore, we do not have conclusive evidence
regarding the existence of a displacement effect between foreigners and natives. This result is
in contrast with the one found by Kleven et al. (2013) that find evidence of displacement effect
in the context of rigid labor demand.
The previous results indicate that the effect of taxation is stronger if we consider foreign
players. Therefore, it can be interesting to simulate the effect of a preferential taxation scheme
that targets only them. The results of this exercise are reported in Table 2.7 where the simu-
lations are carried considering a 1% increase in the net-of-tax rate valid for foreign players.
Looking at the elastic demand scenario we can see that a preferential scheme has affected
the native population of players. Moreover, the results of the effect of the tax rate on foreigners
are very similar to those presented in Table 2.6. This is not surprising because, in this scenario,
the number of vacancy spots in teams is let free and, therefore, we do not have any competition
effect between different kinds of players. Therefore, a policy that targets only foreigners will
not affect the distribution of natives across countries and will affect the foreigners in a way
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similar to the one caused by a general reduction in tax rates. Turning on the results of the
rigid demand scenario we can highlight a very interesting element: the effect of the preferential
scheme is, on average, positive when considering foreigners and negative if we consider natives.
Therefore, we have evidence of a displacement effect between foreign and natives players. With
respect to the sorting effect between foreigners, we can notice that the two models predict a very
different effect of the preferential scheme on this population: model (6) predicts an elasticity
lower than one for top players’ population, while model (7) predicts an elasticity around 2 for
the same population and a negative effect on low-quality foreigners’ population. However, Table
2.7 suggests that a general reduction in the net-of-tax rate is more effective than a preferential
scheme in increasing the number of top players. Indeed, the elasticities of top players following
a general reduction of the marginal tax rate, presented in Table 2.6, are higher than the one
found simulating a preferential scheme.
In conclusion, the results of our simulation approach are mostly in line with the previous
literature even though we have found evidence of displacement effects between natives and
foreigners populations only considering the preferential scheme scenario. Our results, however,
confirm that taxes can be seen as an effective tool to attract highly productive workers that,
depending on the rigidity of the labor demand, can displace low-quality players increasing the
quality level of the country. The elasticities results presented here can also be used to compute
the revenue-maximizing tax rates following the model of optimal taxation in the presence of
migration of Mirrlees (1982) and used by Kleven et al. (2013) in the elastic demand scenario. In
this framework revenue-maximizing tax rate is an inverse function of the elasticity of migration
and can be computed using the formula:
τ ∗ =
1
1− εn (2.34)
where τ ∗ is the optimal tax rate and εn is the elasticity of mobility to taxation estimated in the
elastic demand scenario. Using this formula our estimates yield an optimal tax rate of around
82%. This result is similar to the one found in Kleven et al. (2013) and is well above the average
marginal tax rate observed in the data. Therefore, our results suggest that the observed tax
rates are suboptimal and that an increase in their values can yield an increase in tax revenues
without causing an excessive loss in terms of the population of highly skilled workers.
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Was it worth?
The previous sections have presented the results of our estimation strategy. Although the
point estimates are slightly different, these results are in line with those found in the previous
literature concerning the effect of marginal tax rates on the mobility choices of footballers and
top earners in general. At this point one question should interest the reader: was it worth to
use this new methodology approach?
First, the results of our approach are similar to those found by Kleven et al. (2013). This
element suggests that our estimation approach is consistent with those used in the previous
literature although we do not use data on agent-specific variables and we do not assume ex-ante
the market structure. Indeed, our simulation approach has allowed us to estimate the elasticities
in the two contexts of rigid and elastic demand without requiring ad hoc specifications for each
scenario but keeping the local production function of the matches unchanged.43 This element
is interesting because we can identify the utility of the match in general and then simulate the
various scenarios to understand how these utilities can cause different matching assignments
on the base of the assumed market structure or by changing the policies without assuming
anything on the market structure and agents’ market powers in the econometric specifications.
Second, the approach used in this study allows identifying directly the effect of the various
determinants on the utility of the match rather than on the utility of the players. This element
is extremely useful in the interpretation of the results. Indeed, in the conditional logit models
all the coefficients are interpreted as the parameter of the worker’s utility function although,
as pointed out by Akcigit et al. (2018), the results could be a mix between firm and workers
behavioral response. Therefore, allowing to explicitly consider the matching nature of the labor
market, our approach permits a more reliable interpretation of the results in terms of matches’
utilities considering the decision process of all the agents that are competing in the market.
Third, this approach allowed us to understand the effects of the various determinants of the
matching process exploiting all the information available at the team level instead of focusing
only on the country level. This permits us to use all the possible sources of variation present in
the data estimating a model with a huge number of alternatives that would be infeasible using
a conditional logit.
43See note ?? for an example of the strategy used in Kleven et al. (2013).
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2.5 Conclusions
In this study, we have investigated the effect of marginal tax rates on equilibrium locations of
highly skilled tax payers using a dataset on European football players between 2007 and 2016
and exploiting regional and national variation of tax rates.
We have analyzed this phenomenon by estimating a two-sided matching model using a
maximum score approach. This strategy has permitted to account for the matching structure
of this labor market and to get rid of factors that affect the matching process but are usually
hard accessible (such as wages and transfers between agents).
With regards to the sorting patterns based on quality, our results indicate that matches’
utilities are positively affected by the resulting quality of the match if it includes a top-quality
player. This effect is stronger if we consider foreign players. The use of these variables has
permitted us to identify the effect of taxation on the utility of the match accounting for the
one deriving from the quality of the match.
Concerning the effect of taxation, our results suggest that the marginal income taxation
incentive is an important determinant of top incomes’ migration patterns even after considering
the matching nature of the labor market. Indeed, the coefficient estimated indicates that
matches’ utilities are positively affected by the net-of-tax rate suggesting that matches are more
valuable in jurisdictions with lower tax rates. This conclusion is confirmed by the estimated
elasticities. Indeed, in a context of elastic demand, the point estimate of the elasticity of
mobility to taxation is always positive and around 0.22 if we consider the whole population of
football players. However, we find that the effect is heterogeneous on the base of the nationality
of the player and his quality. Indeed, the estimated elasticities for the population of natives
range from 0.077 to 0.117 in the two preferred specifications whereas the one of foreigners’
population is always above 1 and comprises between 1.197 and 1.370. The effect of the net-of-
tax rate is estimated to be stronger when considering top-players than bottom quality players.
This result is in line with the one arising from the previous literature and suggests that the
income tax rate can be an effective tool to increase the average workers’ quality in one country.
Moreover, these results are confirmed even considering a rigid labor demand. In this context,
however, we find evidence of a cross-effect between different populations of players. Indeed, the
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elasticity results suggest that an increase in the net-of-tax rate can attract more top players
that displace bottom quality ones through a displacement effect.
Although these results are in line with the one arising from the previous literature the esti-
mation technique used here has proved to be effective in analyzing these kinds of phenomenons
without assuming ex-ante, in the estimation process, the structure of the labor market. Indeed,
our results are obtained using the structural parameters coming from the same model and as-
suming the structure of the market only in the simulation approach. This is a clear advantage
that allows simulating different scenarios without assuming that neither a supply-driven nor a
demand-driven location model. Moreover, the method has allowed the estimation of these fun-
damental parameters without using data on wages, transfers and agent-specific unobservable.
In the future, this method can be applied in different contexts and markets such as CEOs,
academic professors, and inventors.
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Appendix
2.A The Net-Of-Tax Rate
In order to have a comprehensive net-of-tax rate we have collected data on different tax rates:
• τi top marginal income tax rate
• τe social security contributions on employer
• τw social security contributions on employee
• τV AT value added tax
Following Kleven et al. (2013) we define the net-of-tax rate as the increase in the worker’s
consumption when the firm’s labor cost increases by 1 Euro. This rate is given by:
1− τ = (1− τi)(1− τw)
(1 + τV AT )(1 + τe)
(2.35)
We derive this formula following Kleven et al. (2013) and Mertens and Montiel Olea (2018) and
considering the specific rules that apply in each country. The first step to derive this formula
is to compute the marginal increase in the firm’s labor cost coming from the payroll taxes
(Mertens and Montiel Olea, 2018):
Tp =
τe + τw
1 + τe
(2.36)
where (1+τe) is the labor cost for the employer. Then, the marginal income tax Ti is computed
on net earnings after that the payroll taxes are deducted:
Ti =
(
1− τe + τw
1 + τe
)
× τi (2.37)
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Now we can compute the VAT using the same logic used for the payroll taxes. Indeed, we use
the marginal increase in the VAT measured by:
τV AT
1 + τV AT
(2.38)
Therefore, the marginal VAT tax TV AT is computed as:
TV AT =
[
1− τe + τw
1 + τe
−
(
1− τe + τw
1 + τe
)
× τi
]
× τV AT
1 + τV AT
(2.39)
Now we can derive the marginal tax wedge step by step:
1. Marginal payroll taxes:
τe + τw
1 + τe
2. Marginal payroll taxes plus marginal income tax:
τe + τw
1 + τe
+
(
1− τe + τw
1 + τe
)
× τi = τe + τw + (1− τw)τi
1 + τe
3. Marginal payroll taxes plus marginal income tax plus marginal VAT tax:
τe + τw + (1 + τw)τi
1 + τe
+
[
1− τe + τw + (1− τw)τi
1 + τe
]
τV AT
1 + τV AT
Rearranging the previous equation we can derive the tax wedge τ ∗:
τ ∗ =
τe + τw + (1− τw)τi + τe + τV AT
(1 + τe)(1 + τv)
Now we can compute the net-of-tax rate:
1− τ ∗ = 1− τe + τw + (1− τw)τi + τe + τV AT
(1 + τe)(1 + τv)
1− τ = (1− τi)(1− τw)
(1 + τV AT )(1 + τe)
In Figures (2A.1) - (2A.3) we show the evolution over the period 2007-2016 of top marginal tax
rates for natives and foreigners in the 16 countries of the sample.
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Figure 2A.1: Top Marginal Tax Rates in the 5 Top Countries
Notes: Top marginal tax rates include income taxes, payroll taxes and VAT. In case of regional variation the average tax rate is shown.
The five top countries are defined on the base of the average market values of players employed in the country’s first league. In panel
A is plotted the average national top marginal tax rate valid for native players. Panel B shows the evolution of the top marginal tax
rate valid for foreigners that meet the eligibility conditions
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Figure 2A.2: Top Marginal Tax Rates in Northern countries
Notes: Top marginal tax rates include income taxes, payroll taxes and VAT. In case of regional variation the average tax rate is shown.
In panel A is plotted the average national top marginal tax rate valid for native players. Panel B shows the evolution of the top
marginal tax rate valid for foreigners that meet the eligibility conditions. Russian data are available only since 2010.
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Figure 2A.3: Top Marginal Tax Rates in the other small leagues
Notes: Top marginal tax rates include income taxes, payroll taxes and VAT. In case of regional variation the average tax rate is shown.
In panel A is plotted the average national top marginal tax rate valid for native players. Panel B shows the evolution of the top
marginal tax rate valid for foreigners that meet the eligibility conditions
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In-migration of foreign players by quality
Top 10% of the quality distribution
AT
BE
DK
EN
FR
DE
GR
IT
NL
NO
PR
RU
ES
SECH
TR
MTR= 1.29
.
1
.
25
.
4
.
55
.
7
.
85
1
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 M
ig
ra
nt
 P
la
ye
rs
.3 .45 .6 .75
MTR on Natives players
Top 10% to Top 50% of the quality
AT
BE
DK
EN
FR
DE
GR
IT
NL
NO PR
RU
ES
SE
CH
TR
MTR= .77
.
1
.
25
.
4
.
55
.
7
.
85
1
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 M
ig
ra
nt
 P
la
ye
rs
.3 .45 .6 .75
MTR on Natives players
Below the 50% of the quality distribution
AT
BEDKEN
FR
DE
GR
IT NLO
PR
RU
ES
SE
CH
TR
MTR= .29
.
1
.
25
.
4
.
55
.
7
.
85
1
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 M
ig
ra
nt
 P
la
ye
rs
.3 .45 .6 .75
MTR on Natives players
Figure 2A.4: Cross-Country Correlation between Tax Rates and Shares of Foreigners by Quality,
2007-2016
Notes: Each dot stands for one country: AT=Austria, BE=Belgium, DK=Denmark, EN=England, FR=France, DE=Germany,
GR=Greece, IT=Italy, NL=Netherlands, NO=Norway, PR=Portugal, RU=Russia, ES=Spain, SE=Sweden, CH=Switzerland,
TR=Turkey. The three plots show the relationships between the fraction of native players in each quality subgroup and the MTR
valid in the origin country. In each plot we show the coefficient of the relevant MTR coming from a linear regression of the shares
against MTR and a constant. All the plots refers to the entire period 2007-2016.
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Table 2A.1: Origin-Destination flows
Destination
Origin AT BE DK EN FR DE GR IT NL NO PR RU ES SE CH TR
Austria 1657 1 18 23 1 128 22 19 17 7 12 4 3 1 28 37
Belgium 1 1789 5 104 41 46 18 40 265 5 8 19 21 0 6 19
Denmark 9 44 1825 55 33 73 4 30 116 83 1 2 18 64 5 10
England 1 6 7 1676 5 3 12 8 7 1 4 1 1 22 0 7
France 7 282 8 292 2357 74 76 144 33 14 69 20 134 4 73 23
Germany 92 20 22 72 8 2342 27 22 64 10 12 12 36 11 24 83
Greece 6 30 3 22 4 53 2303 52 16 0 11 1 15 1 2 6
Italy 2 7 0 63 31 44 28 3404 9 0 12 17 59 0 45 6
Netherlands 11 77 36 147 18 93 15 50 2590 3 23 20 42 17 11 38
Norway 7 11 60 41 16 33 6 7 30 1512 3 4 2 66 1 7
Portugal 0 18 5 76 58 33 88 54 8 1 1793 26 191 3 45 69
Russia 4 1 2 12 0 19 4 3 6 2 14 1745 6 1 3 1
Spain 49 45 2 237 8 48 199 92 25 1 58 27 2678 2 11 22
Sweden 12 22 152 57 28 41 26 44 121 156 7 19 11 2008 32 56
Switzerland 20 14 0 53 32 150 8 84 4 0 4 2 10 1 1245 11
Turkey 3 15 2 13 19 97 12 3 25 0 5 10 19 1 7 3146
The table shows the number of times when players citizen of one origin country have played in the destination countries considering all the sample period between 2007
and 2016
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Chapter 3
The Educated Moves: The Determinants of In-
terregional Mobility of Students In Italy
Abstract
The attractiveness of universities for students represents a crucial public policy
issue given the role that these institutions have in fostering local development. In
this work, we aim to understand the effect of financial and in-kind aid programs on
the location decision process of students. This phenomenon is analyzed by using a
unique dataset with administrative data on Italian university students enrolled for
the first time in the academic year 2014-2015 along with detailed information on
the need-based policies comprised by the Diritto allo studio universitario program.
We consider explicitly the heterogeneity in students’ preferences concerning these
policies. First, we estimate the systematic variation in students’ preferences by
interacting individual characteristics with alternatives’ attributes in a Conditional
Logit framework. Second, we take advantage of the Latent Class Logit model. The
latter approach allows to model systematic and random heterogeneity in preferences
by exploiting the individual characteristics of students. The estimated parameters
are exploited to quantify the sensitivity of student’s location choices by computing
willingness to pay and semi-elasticity measures. Our results suggest that policies
that provide scholarships and places in dormitories together affect positively stu-
dents’ choice probabilities, this way indicating that these policies are effective in
attracting more students in specific universities. Semi-elasticities results indicate
that students with better high school diploma grades are more sensitive to these
policies, this way suggesting that these services can be used as a tool to attract
better students.
JEL Classification: C25, I23, I28
Keywords: Financial and in-kind aid policies, Student mobility, University choice, Geo-
graphical distance, Latent Class Logit, Heterogeneity in preferences.
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3.1 Introduction
In the last decade, the Italian system of higher education has faced a reduction in both the
amount of public fundings as well as the number of students enrollments (EUA, 2019; Viesti,
2016). The entry rate to tertiary education has decreased from 65.8% in 2008 to 49.1% in 2015
and it has started to increase only recently reaching the 50.3% in 2017 (ISTAT, 2019). At the
same time, the migration flows of students from southern to central and northern regions have
increased (Cammelli and Gasperoni, 2015) this way contributing to the widening of the existing
gap between northern and southern regions in terms of economic growth (Fratesi and Percoco,
2014). These phenomenons, along with government policies that incentivize universities to
attract more students, have created an environment in which universities compete for students
(Cattaneo, Malighetti, Meoli, and Paleari, 2017).
The role of universities in fostering the local development has been recurrently studied by
the empirical literature concerning higher education. For example, Salter and Martin (2001)
have reviewed the existing literature regarding the public funding of basic program research
noting that universities play a positive role in the process of knowledge creation at the local
level allowing regions and nations to benefit from the global scientific process. Moreover,
universities contribute to increase the productivity of local workers (Moretti, 2004) and are a
fundamental player in the human capital accumulation process which is a key factor for the
economic competitiveness of regions (Bratti and Verzillo, 2019). From a regional perspective,
the migration of students has been recognized as a potential source of regional disparities
(Krugman, 1991).
These elements have stressed the importance of understanding the determinants of univer-
sities’ and regions’ attractiveness. Indeed, an increasing body of literature has focused on both
international and intra-national migration of students highlighting the role played by universi-
ties and hosting areas characteristics in attracting students and foster the formation of human
capital. For example, Long (2004) has studied the determinants of students’ enrollment and
migration decisions finding that tuition fees have a negative effect on students’ probability to
enroll in a specific university; Bratti and Verzillo (2019) and Biancardi and Bratti (2019) have
investigated the role of quality in determining the attractiveness of universities; Hu¨bner (2012)
94
and Dwenger, Storck, and Wrohlich (2012) have analyzed the effect of tuition fees on enrollment
probability in Germany.
In this study, we focus on the role of financial and in-kind aid policies in fostering universities’
attractiveness. Although the Italian education system has been extensively analyzed, to our
knowledge, the role of these policies is still unexplored. The only exception is the work by Pigini
and Staffolani (2015) in which the effect of financial and in-kind aid policies on enrollment as
well as location decisions of students has been investigated. By using survey data on Italian
high school leavers in a Conditional Logit (CL) framework the authors have found that these
policies have a positive effect on the probability to enroll in a specific university.
We aim to enrich this debate by analyzing the effects on Italian students’ location choices
of the financial and in kind policies provided by the Diritto allo Studio Universitario (DSU)
program. This program aims to guarantee the access to the Italian Higher Education System
to less advantaged students by providing different services such as scholarships, places in dor-
mitories and canteens. In the analysis, we take advantage of a unique dataset that includes
administrative data regarding the entire population of students enrolled in the academic year
2014-2015 for the first time along with detailed information regarding universities’ character-
istics and DSU’s policies. In particular, these data have allowed us to exploit the variability
existing in the provision of DSU’s services at the university level to separately identify the
effects of the different policies provided by the program.
The analysis is carried out explicitly accounting for the existence of heterogeneity in stu-
dents’ preferences. This is done by splitting the sample of students considering the field of
study chosen, this way exploring the existence of differences in tastes between different kinds of
students. Moreover, we take advantage of a more sophisticated discrete choice approach that
has not been used for modeling students’ choices: the Latent Class Logit Model (McFadden
and Train, 2000). This technique has permitted to overcome various limitations of the ap-
proaches used previously in the literature. In particular, it allows to model the heterogeneity
in students’ preferences by permitting the estimation of an individual set of taste parameters
that depends on students’ characteristics. This feature of the model allowed us to understand
whether different kinds of students have different tastes with respect to universities as well as
hosting areas characteristics and to identify which kind of students are more affected by the
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aid policies considered. Another distinctive feature of our estimation approach is that it has
permitted to consider a more realistic nested structure in which universities situated in the
student’s province of residence are in a separate nest with respect to those located outside. As
a consequence, we are able to consider more realistic substitution patterns compared with the
ones assumed in the CL approach.
Our results provide clear evidence of the presence of heterogeneity in students’ preferences
among different fields of study and based on students’ characteristics. Moreover, we found
evidence that even students with similar characteristics may react differently to aid policies
and universities’ characteristics depending on the field of study in which they are enrolled.
As for the results of financial and in-kind aid policies in attracting students, we have found
that scholarships that are provided without a place in the dormitory are not effective in at-
tracting students. Our interpretation of these results is that these policies cover only partially
migration and location costs of students. This interpretation is confirmed by the results re-
lated to places in dormitories with and without scholarships. In particular, these policies have
a positive effect on students’ choice probabilities and can be effective in attracting a higher
number of students. Moreover, semi-elasticity results indicate that these effects are stronger
for students with a higher high school diploma grade. This last element suggests that these
policies can be a useful tool in increasing the average quality of students.
However, willingness to travel results indicate that, in order to attract students from distant
areas, DSU’s offices should increase significantly their supply of in-kind benefits.
3.2 Related literature
The attractiveness of universities and hosting areas has been at the core of an increasing body
of literature that has analyzed this phenomenon across different contexts and using different
empirical strategies. In this section we review the existing literature highlighting the various
determinants of universities’ attractiveness that have been studied.
As outlined in Section 3.1, the role of universities in fostering local development has been ex-
tensively analyzed in the previous literature (see for example Salter and Martin, 2001; Moretti,
2004). However, since Krugman (1991), the literature has recognized that the migration of stu-
dents and graduates might increase regional disparities, especially in contexts in which these
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gaps are already relevant such as the Italian one (D’Agostino, Ghellini, and Longobardi, 2019).
In fact, as highlighted in Fratesi and Percoco (2014), the migration of highly educated people in
Italy has caused a brain drain effect that has reduced the stocks of human capital in southern
regions increasing it in central and northern regions. Moreover, students’ migration decisions
are ultimately related to their future choices after graduation. For example, Oggenfuss and
Wolter (2019), analyzing the migration of students and graduated among Switzerland cantons,
have found a strong relationship between location choices at the moment of the enrollment and
the choice of migration after graduation. Their results suggest that, once a student decides to
migrate to enroll at the university is less likely that she will decide to come back to her place of
origin after graduation. Interestingly, this result is even stronger for students with better high
school grades, this way increasing the negative effects of students’ out-migration. In addition,
Valero and Van Reenen (2019), analyzing information on universities in 78 countries between
1950 and 2010, have found evidence that the increase in the number of universities in one re-
gion is positively related to its future growth capacity and that the presence of universities has
positive spillover effects on neighboring regions.
In light of these results, the empirical literature has been focused on understanding which
are the principal determinants of migration and enrollment decisions of students to shed some
light on the elements that affect students’ preferences and universities’ attractiveness.
Since Long (2004), the distance to institutions, tuition fees, and college quality have been
considered the most important determinants of enrollment and mobility decisions. In this work,
the author has studied the determinants of students’ enrollment and location decisions by using
data on US high school graduates between 1972 and 1992. The results suggest that distance
and tuition fees negatively affect the decision on where to study but have a lower effect on the
probability to enroll, while the quality of the college is an important determinant of location
decisions. The second contribution of this paper is the introduction of the CL in analyzing
students’ choices. In particular, the estimation strategy used is based on a multinomial choice
model used to shed light on students’ location decisions and a binary Logit to analyze the enroll-
ment choices. Starting from this paper, the literature has been focused on understanding how
these determinants of universities’ attractiveness and the various hosting areas’ characteristics
affect students’ location preferences using different empirical strategies.
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The role of the distance as a deterrent in the location choices of students has been extensively
analyzed. For example, Kelchtermans and Verboven (2010) studied the effect of distance and
tuition fees on students’ enrollment, location, and field of study decisions using data on the
Belgian region of Flanders in a Nested Logit framework. Their results suggest that travel costs
are an important determinant of the decisions regarding where and what to study but that
they hardly affect the enrollment decision. These results are confirmed also in Gibbons and
Vignoles (2012) who, taking advantage of administrative data regarding UK students, have
found that the distance to the institution has a deterrent effect only on the decision regarding
the university to attend but does not affect the enrollment decisions. By contrast, Spiess and
Wrohlich (2010), focusing on German students, have found that the distance from the closest
university has a negative effect on the enrollment decision by increasing transaction costs such
as transport and housing expenditures. As for the field of study decision, Suhonen (2014) have
found evidence that the choice of a specific field of study is negatively related to the distance
between student’s residence and the first institution which provide a degree in that specific field
using data on a random sample of the Finland population in 2001.
Other works have used different empirical strategies to assess the role of the distance on
the aggregate flows of students between competing regions. For example, Agasisti and Dal
Bianco (2007) have studied the mobility patterns of students in Italy using a gravity model
approach on the aggregate flows of students between Italian provinces. Their results suggest
that once controlling for the distance as a deterrence, the characteristics of universities such
as the amount of resources invested in financial aid programs or the number of professors
per student have a positive role in increasing the aggregate in-flow of students in one specific
province. Cattaneo, Malighetti, Paleari, and Redondi (2016), using a competing destination
model and data on 39 airports in Italy, have analyzed the effect of the presence of airports on
the long-distance mobility decisions of Italian students between 2003 and 2012. They find that
the presence of airports increases the long-distance migration flows of students by reducing the
costs of migration and the deterrence effect of distance in general.
Besides the role of the distance, these papers have highlighted also the one played by char-
acteristics of universities and hosting areas. These elements have been at the core of various
papers in the recent literature. For example, Giambona, Porcu, and Sulis (2017), focusing on
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the Italian context, have analyzed the role of various characteristics of universities and hosting
provinces to assess how much of the differences in attractiveness between different institutions
are related to hosting areas’ characteristics rather than universities’ one. Their results highlight
that the economic features of the hosting areas (e.g. the labor market conditions), along with
the university quality of research, are key determinants of the attractiveness of hosted univer-
sities. These results are confirmed in D’Agostino et al. (2019) who, using a Multilevel Logit
model and micro-data on Italian students, have found that the characteristics of the hosting
provinces are important determinants of the out-migration flows from southern to northern
regions of Italy even after controlling for students’ characteristics.
Another important characteristic of universities that have been explored is the quality of
the research. For example, Ciriaci (2014) have explored the effect of the Italian Evaluation
Research Exercise (VTR) on migration flows from south to north Italy finding that the mi-
gration choices are positively influenced by the quality of research and teaching. Still focusing
on the VTR, Biancardi and Bratti (2019) have found that the results of this exercise have
affected significantly only top-performing universities and that this effect is larger for students
with better high school diploma grades. This result suggests that the effect of the quality
of research may be heterogeneous on the basis of the individual characteristics. Bratti and
Verzillo (2019) have confirmed the positive role of the quality of research by analyzing various
research quality indicators. The authors have found that, although the quality of research has
a positive effect on universities’ attractiveness, the cost of migration for students in Italy is
still the most important determinant of migration decisions. This result suggests that there is
still room for universities and regions to improve their attractiveness by reducing students’ mi-
gration, transportation and accommodation costs that can be potential barriers for students’
mobility. In fact, Lupi and Ordine (2009) have found that students’ mobility decisions are
constrained by family income and that less advantaged students tend to enroll in their region
of residence. Moreover, Tu¨rk (2019) has extended the standard gravity approach including,
along with the distance, a set of socio-economic indicators to assess the overall accessibility to
Italian universities. His results highlight that the quality of institutions has a heterogeneous
effect on the base of the socio-economic background of students and that the accessibility to
Italian higher education depends strongly on parents’ income and education. Therefore, the
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author suggests that a policy targeting less advantaged students with scholarships and grants
could be very effective in increasing the accessibility to tertiary education for less advantaged
students. These results are in line with the one arising from Pigini and Staffolani (2013) who
have analyzed the effect of university quality, migration costs and distance to the institution on
the choices of a sample of Italian high school leavers in 2004. The authors have highlighted the
presence of a strong heterogeneity in the effect of these variables based on the socio-economic
background of students and their performances in high school. In particular, weaker students
are more affected by university costs in general. The framework used is a Nested Logit model
in which students choose in two nests: the first considers together the enrollment and the field
of study decisions; the second considers the university choices. This empirical specification has
allowed the authors to explore the heterogeneity in the effects of these determinants by means
of interaction terms between alternative and individual characteristics. Therefore, this litera-
ture has clearly outlined the presence of a difference in preferences and opportunities between
students with different backgrounds.
In this respect, the literature has focused on two determinants of enrollment and migration
costs: tuition fees and financial aid policies. The effect of tuition fees on the probability to enroll
in a specific university is mixed and depends on the specific characteristics of the education
system considered. For example, Murphy, Scott-Clayton, and Wyness (2019) have analyzed
the effect of the introduction of tuition fees in England finding, surprisingly, that it has caused
an increase in enrollment rates without widening the disparities of access between students
with different economic backgrounds. However, tuition fees can have a fundamental role in
shaping the migration patterns of students. For example, Dwenger et al. (2012), by exploiting
the introduction of tuition fees part of Germany with a difference-in-difference approach, have
found that the introduction of tuition fees in students’ home state can incentivize them to
migrate outside the region. This result is confirmed by Hu¨bner (2012) who, analyzing the
choices of German high school graduates between 2002 and 2008, have found a reduction in the
probability of enrollment in a state which charges tuition fees by 2.74%.1 Despite the presence
of this mixed evidence on tuition fees, the literature has found evidence of the positive effects
related to financial aid policies. For example, considering the US, Deming and Dynarski (2009)
1See Dwenger et al. (2012) for a more detailed analysis of the recent literature on the effect of tuition fees
on enrollment rates.
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have found evidence that these policies can increase college attendance rates. These results are
confirmed in Castleman and Long (2016) who have found, through a regression discontinuity
design approach, a positive effect of the Florida Student Access Grant2 in terms of enrollments,
university outcomes, and degree completion.
Considering the Italian case, we have that very few papers have explicitly analyzed the
role of financial aid policies on students’ behavior. For example, Modena, Rettore, and Tanzi
(2018) have measured the effect of the need-based grants provided by the DSU programs on the
academic achievements of Italian students. They find that first-year students dropout rates are
negatively affected by these policies that can even prevent students from low-income families
to drop out of higher education. Moreover, the impact of these policies is heterogeneous on the
base of student’s residence, type of high school diploma and final grade. Vergolini and Zanini
(2015) have investigated the effect of a provincial program provided by the province of Trento
that had the aim to increase access to higher education of less advantaged students. Using
a regression discontinuity design they have found that the program has incentivized the out-
migration of students from their place of residence without increasing the enrollment rate. The
most closely related work to our research is the one by Pigini and Staffolani (2015). This work
has investigated the effect of the enrollment costs and financial incentives on both enrollment
as well as migration decisions of Italian high school leavers using survey data containing also
information on the social-economic background of students and the data regarding the DSU
program. In particular, the authors have applied a CL estimator assuming that the outside
option (non-enrollment) and the alternative universities belong to the same nest. Their results
indicate that the average number of fees has a negative effect on the probability to enroll and
that the financial incentives have a significant positive effect on the probability of enrollment
in a specific university.
The next section presents the institutional background of our study.
2The Florida Student Access Grant is a need-based grant program with the aim to increase college access
and improve student’s success in higher education.
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3.3 Institutional background
The Italian Higher Education (HE) system, differently from other European countries (e.g. the
UK or Ireland), relies upon an ex-post screening admission procedure.3 In this system, every
high-school graduated can enroll into an Italian university in any subject.4
Therefore, given the minimal selection process of this system, the choices regarding the
enrollment decision, the field of study and the university to attend depend almost solely on
students’ and families’ preferences. In this context, the role played by universities’ attractive-
ness is paramount (Pigini and Staffolani, 2013). Moreover, the Italian HE system is mainly
public and funded by the central government. The shares of public funds to be transferred to
universities are decided on the base of various indicators such as the number of enrollments
and the institutions’ ability to attract more students (Giambona et al., 2017). This feature, as
outlined in Giambona et al. (2017) and Cattaneo et al. (2017), has fostered the competition
between institutions incentivizing them to increase their attractiveness taking into considera-
tion the characteristics embodied in their hosting areas. These elements stress even more the
importance of understanding the determinants of student migration and the various tools that
universities can use to attract more students and, therefore, more resources for their activities.
As outlined in section 3.2, one of the most important determinants of students’ choices is
given by universities’ costs and by the distance between students’ home and the institutions.
Therefore, one of the tools that universities (and regions) can use to improve their attractiveness
is given by policies that aim to reduce these costs such as scholarships and places in dormitories.
In Italy, these policies have been organized inside a financial and in-kind aid program called
Diritto allo studio Universitario (DSU) program. This program has been outlined to encourage
enrollment and attendance by students from disadvantaged families. The DSU program is under
the exclusive competence of regions and has the objective to encourage motivated students to
enroll and obtain higher education regardless of their income (Prime Ministerial Decree, April
9, 2001).
3See Declercq and Verboven (2018) for a comparison between ex-ante and ex-post screening system in the
Belgian context
4This minimal selection process has some exceptions regarding faculties of medicine, health-related profes-
sions, primary education and the five-years bachelor course of architecture. In these courses, the number of
students is defined ex-ante and is evaluated with an entry test. These rules can be extended by universities also
to other subjects that require laboratory activities.
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The DSU program offers students three principal kinds of benefits: scholarships or grants,
places in dormitories without scholarships and places in dormitories with scholarships. The
application for these services is submitted voluntary each year by students to the local DSU
office responsible for the territory in which the chosen university is located.5 At the moment
of the enrollment, all the students that apply are ranked on the basis of the family economic
situation measured with an equivalized economic indicator called the Indicatore della Situazione
Economica Equivalente (ISEE).6 This indicator measures the economic situation of families on
the basis of various family’s socio-economic characteristics such as their income, wealth and
number of family members.
Each student that has applied to the DSU program can be classified into three categories on
the base of their residence: on-site students, commuting students and out-of-site students. The
first category is made up of students who reside in the hosting city. They can be eligible only for
scholarships and canteen services and the amount of the grant is lower than the one available
to other students. Commuting students are those who reside in a city that is close to the
hosting city and can be reached daily with public transportation. They can be eligible only for
scholarships that are higher than the one available for the first category but lower than the one
available to out-of-site students. Out-of-site students are the residual category, they are eligible
for the maximum amount of scholarships and places in dormitories. These services are provided
on the basis of two rankings: one for scholarships, in which all the students are competing, and
one for places in dormitories, in which only out-of-site students compete. Therefore, we can
have three kinds of benefits: scholarships, places in the dormitory and a package that provide
the two services together (Student Package).
If one student applies and wins a student package, the scholarship is reduced by an amount
that varies among DSU offices and that should cover the annual rent of the dormitory. The
minimum amount for the scholarships are decided by the Italian Ministry of Education, Uni-
versity and Research (MIUR) but varies among territories. For example, in 2014 the minimum
amounts proved by the DSU office of the city of Palermo (Sicily) ranged from 1,284 Euro for
5In general each Italian region has one DSU office that is responsible for the regional territory. However, in
some region, these programs are managed at the provincial (e.g. Veneto) or the university level (e.g. Lombardia)
6If two students have the same ISEE the rank is given accordingly to a rule that is decided by each DSU
office. These rules can depend on a patrimonial indicator, students’ age, high school diploma grade or other
information.
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on-site students to 3,909 Euro for off-site students.7 On the other hand, if one student wins
only the place in the dormitory she has to pay a rent accordingly to her ISEE. Even though
students in dormitories have to pay a rent (or a reduction of the scholarship) we have to con-
sider different advantages connected with this service. Indeed, the rent is usually lower than the
market one and is a function of students’ economic situation and it covers all the expenses (e.g.
Internet connection, electricity consumption, etc.). Moreover, students do not have to find an
apartment on their own in a new city and have the opportunity to live in an environment full
of other students.
Another distinctive characteristic of the DSU program is that, for the first year of enrollment,
the rankings are based only on the economic situation of students. Therefore, they do not
depend on a merit or performance measure and is not directly related to the high-school grade
of pupils. To account for this feature, we focus our analysis only on students that are enrolling
for the first year for the first time in an Italian university. Unfortunately, we are not able
to control for the economic situation of students and we treat the benefits connected to DSU
programs as a general characteristic of the university systems considered. However, given the
detail of our dataset, we are able to separately identify the effects of scholarships, places in
dormitories and student packages.
3.4 Data
3.4.1 Students’ Data
The data regarding students’ choices and characteristics are collected from the administrative
archive of the MIUR called Anagrafe Nazionale Studenti (ANS). The ANS contains information
on the entire population of students that have enrolled in an Italian university in 2014.8 This
work focuses on students that have taken their high-school diploma in 2014 and have enrolled
for the first time in an Italian university in the academic year 2014-2015.
The information available at the student level are the city of residence; gender; age; high-
7http://www.vivereateneo.it/bando-ersu-richiesta-borse-studio
8These data have been provided by the University of Cagliari (Italy) and are collected inside the research
project From high school to job placement: micro-data life course analysis of university student mobility and
its impact on the Italian North-South divide. financed inside the projects of relevant national interest (PRIN)
2017.
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school diploma grade and type; chosen university. In particular, for each university chosen we
have information on the city in which the university is situated and the degree course chosen
by the student.
The sample used in this work is selected considering the characteristics of the Italian HE sys-
tem on the bases Italian HE’ characteristics and the information available in the ANS archive as
follows. First, we do not consider the students enrolled in distance learning universities. These
institutions are not considered because they do not require students to live in the hosting area
and allow them to participate in university activities from their home. Therefore, students that
choose to enroll in these universities are not moving or choosing to move and their choice is not
influenced by hosting area characteristics or financial aid offered by universities. Second, we
do not consider students that enroll in courses of medicine, health-related professions, primary
education, sport, and in the field of study architecture. This choice depends on the character-
istics of the admission systems valid in these specific areas. In particular, as shown in Section
3.3 these courses have an ex-ante screening system in which the number of students is chosen
ex-ante on the basis of an entry test. Hence, students that ‘choose’ a specific university in these
fields are less likely to choose freely. For example, medical entry tests are national and the uni-
versity in which the student is enrolled is assigned on the basis of her ranking position. Only
very high-ranked students are able to choose their university and all the others are distributed
on the base of available places in all the national territory. Moreover, we do not consider all the
students that are enrolled in architecture even if they have chosen a course without the ex-ante
screening system. This choice is made to avoid sample selection bias in the results. Indeed, the
five-year course of architecture is the most important degree in this field of study absorbing the
30% of students in our sample.
Moreover, we do not consider students enrolled in agricultural and defense degrees because
these courses are offered by very few institutions in Italy and the choice of enrollment in a
specific region could depend more on the simple availability of the course than on university’s
and hosting area’s characteristics. We further restrict our sample excluding those students for
whom we do not observe the diploma grade. Following this strategy, we have retained a total
of 176,136 students.
Following the recent literature (e.g. D’Agostino et al., 2019; Kelchtermans and Verboven,
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2010), we have grouped the students in different subsamples on the basis of the information
regarding the degree chosen. In particular, we consider 11 fields of study: business & statis-
tics, chemistry & pharmacy, education, engineering, humanities, languages, law, life & natural
sciences, mathematical and physical sciences, psychology, social & political sciences.9 All the
analyses presented in this work are carried considering these groups as separate samples to
consider that students that prefer different fields might have different preferences regarding the
various university’s and hosting region’s characteristics. Moreover, as noted in Biancardi and
Bratti (2019), even the same university can have different characteristics on the base of the
field of study considered. For example, one institution that has a very high-quality research
department in economics may have a poor quality research department in psychology. The
use of different subsamples has two additional advantages. First, it reduces the computational
burden of the estimation by considering that students can choose only among universities that
provide a course in the same field of study.10 The second advantage is related to our sample
selection strategy. Indeed, the arbitrary exclusion of students on the base of the field of study
chosen might introduce selection bias in our results. However, given that we analyze each field
of study separately we have that each subsample represents the entire population of students
that have chosen that specific field. The only exception is given by the subsample of students
enrolled in education in which we have excluded those courses that apply an ex-ante admission
system. In this case, the sample selection bias might be still present but it will affect only the
results related to this specific group.
Moreover, we are not modeling the choices of students’ regarding enrollment and the field
of study decisions. In this respect, we are assuming that there is a fixed overall demand for
education in Italy and that our analysis regards only the choice between different universities
which provide a degree course in the field of study chosen. Therefore, we focus on the third
stage of a three stages decision process in which students decide whether to enroll in the first
stage, the field of study in the second and the university to attend in the third.
9The definition of each field of study is based on the official terminology provided by ISTAT.
10Indeed, if we consider that each student can choose among all the degrees provided the resulting dataset
will be composed by 108,852,048 rows (618 alternatives for 176,136 students).
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3.4.2 DSU data
The information regarding the DSU program are collected from the open data portal USTAT11
managed by the MIUR. USTAT is made by various sections that contain detailed information
on various areas that characterizing services supplied by universities and DSU offices.
This data contain various information such as the number of scholarships, places in dormito-
ries and canteens, the presence of a college that provides services to universities12, the number
of applications for the different services and the number of accepted applications. Moreover,
these data are provided considering two different levels: DSU offices and universities. In par-
ticular, the information regarding places in dormitories and canteens are available at the DSU
office level, whereas the ones regarding scholarships are available at the university one. There-
fore, it is possible to know exactly how many scholarships are provided by the DSU office in its
territory and the distribution of these scholarships among the different universities.
To account for these features, we have assigned all the information regarding places in
dormitories and canteens at each university on the basis of their geographical position. This is
an important feature of the dataset because some universities have dislocated branches in more
than one province (for example the university of Cattolica). In these cases, we have used the
information regarding the DSU office responsible for the area that is hosting the specific branch
of the university to assign the right amount of places in dormitories and student packages. As
for scholarships, we have exploited the information available at the university level. Moreover,
given that in some cases the scholarships are given together with a place in a dormitory, we have
computed three indicators: the number of scholarships, the number of places in dormitories
without scholarships and the number of places in dormitories that are provided together with
scholarships (student packages). To consider all the possible services offered by local agencies,
we consider even the services that some regions (namely, Trentino Alto Adige and Valle d’Aosta)
provide to students that have their residence in the region but study outside its territory. Using
this strategy we have a very complete and unique dataset that allows us to measure precisely
the effect of these services on the students’ location decisions.
11http://ustat.miur.it/opendata/
12Colleges are a different kind of institutions that are present only in some Italian provinces and provide
different services such as scholarships and places in dormitories on the basis of specific criteria. Given that
these criteria change among the different colleges we use only the information regarding the presence of the
college in the city that hosts the university.
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We have collected DSU data considering the academic year preceding the one for which
we have collected information on students’ choices (2013-2014). This strategy is followed for
two reasons. The first is related to possible endogeneity issues that could arise using the data
regarding the academic year 2014-2015. In that case, the number of applications and services
provided would depend on the number of students enrolled in that specific year, this way
introducing a simultaneity bias. The second is related to the information available to students
before enrollment. In fact, all the information regarding the number of applications received
and services provided in previous years are easily available to students that make expectations
on the probability to win a scholarship or a place in a dormitory. To further control for
this element, the analysis is carried considering the expected number of services available at
the universities computed as the number of places or scholarships available weighted for the
probability to win the service. This probability is computed as the ratio between accepted and
received applications.
3.4.3 Universities’ characteristics and geographical controls
The data regarding universities’ and hosting areas’ characteristics are collected from different
sources.
The information related to the education supply of Italian universities are collected from
USTAT. To follow the sampling strategy outlined in section 3.4.1, we have collected the in-
formation regarding the courses provided by universities and the city that hosts the principal
branch of the university.13 The information regarding the city is used to compute the distance
between students’ city of residence and institutions and to assign the right DSU office to the
university. In order to control for the characteristics of universities’ supply, we have collected
data regarding the number of professors and researchers employed by the university for each
field of study considered, the share of foreign professors and the number of members of the
administrative staff.
The USTAT archive provides also the information related to the average tuition fee paid by
students, and the number of scholarships and places in dormitories provided by the universities
13Some universities have branches in different cities inside the same province that are served by the same
DSU office. In these cases, we have assigned at each university the city that hosts the principal branch defined
as the branch with the highest number of students enrolled in 2013.
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outside the DSU program. The first variable is computed as the total contribution of students
over the number of students enrolled in 2013-2014. It permits to control for differences in
enrollment costs that exist among universities. The information regarding the number of non-
DSU scholarships and places in dormitories are used to control for other kinds of policies that
can be used by universities to foster their attractiveness not comprised in the DSU program.
All the data gathered from the USTAT archive refers to the academic year 2013-2014.
As for the quality of researchers employed at the universities, we have collected the number
of departments that were awarded in the dipartimenti di eccellenza (departments of excellence)
project. This project, managed by the National Agency for the Evaluation of Universities and
Research Institutes (ANVUR), consists in a standardized assessment of the research’s quality
of Italian departments and is based on the results of the third Italian Research Evaluation
Exercise (VQR) which concerned the period 2011-2014.14
The last variable used at the university level is the amount of public funding that the
universities have received in the academic year 2014-2015. This variable is used to further
control for the dimension of universities in terms of resources that they are able to spend
during the academic year. These information are gathered from the tables available from the
MIUR.
Another important determinant of the decision process of students is given by the charac-
teristics of hosting areas such as labor market conditions and cost of life (Dotti, Fratesi, Lenzi,
and Percoco, 2013; Giambona et al., 2017). To control for these variables, we have collected
the data regarding the provincial unemployment rate, the regional value added and the average
provincial housing price. The information regarding value added and unemployment rates are
collected from ISTAT. In particular, unemployment rates are computed as the average rate
between 2011 and 2013. For housing prices, we have collected the average purchase price per
square meter in 2013 from the Real Market Observatory (OMI) database.
From ISTAT we have also gathered the euclidian distance between students’ city of resi-
dence and the city that is hosting the university. This variable is used to control for a possible
deterrence effect connected with the costs of transportations, accommodation and for the psy-
chological costs related to the distance from home.15
14See Biancardi and Bratti (2019) for the evaluation of the effects of the Italian Research Evaluation Exercises
on the students’ enrollment choices.
15See, for example, Cattaneo et al. (2016) on the effect of air transportation services on the mobility of
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics on DSU policies
N Scholar.
(Prob)
Scholar.
(Exp. N)
Dormitory
(Prob)
Dormitory
(Exp. N)
Student
Package
(Exp. N)
South 44294
Islands 17914
Centre-North 113928
Social & Political sciences 19739 76.63% 2544 51.82% 87 282
Psychology 5561 84.30% 2607 46.98% 95 244
Math. & Physical sciences 8991 78.36% 2725 55.40% 85 321
Life & Natural sciences 12704 82.88% 2187 50.12% 70 259
Law 18822 80.69% 2533 51.72% 85 266
Languages 16252 80.50% 2113 56.96% 112 245
Humanities 14440 76.88% 3104 54.82% 85 325
Engineering 32628 87.34% 2901 48.44% 110 271
Education 6656 86.75% 2266 52.31% 83 253
Chemistry & Pharmacy 8964 77.15% 2730 52.19% 94 317
Business & Statistics 31379 84.23% 2145 53.34% 130 256
Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics regarding the sample students who have enrolled in an Italian
HEU for the first time in 2014 and the services provided by DSU offices. All the data regarding DSU services refer
to the academic year 2013-2014. Column (1) reports the number of students enrolled; Column (2) reports the
average probability to win a scholarship computed as the ratio between applications and scholarships provided
by the DSU office; Column (3) reports the average expected number of scholarships in destination computed as
the number of scholarships available weighted for the probability to have a scholarship; Column (4) reports the
average probability to obtain a place in one dormitory computed as the ratio between the number of applications
and the number of places in dormitory provided by the DSU office; Column (5) reports the average expected
number of places in dormitories without scholarship in destination computed as the number of places available
weighted for the probability to win a place in a dormitory; Column (6) reports the average expected number
of student packages (places in dormitories with scholarship) in destination computed as the number of student
packages available weighted for the probability to win a place in a dormitory.
All these data are combined into a unique dataset using the information regarding the
geographic position of universities. Moreover, given our sample selection strategy and that
some universities have separate branches in different areas, we define each alternative as a
Higher Education Unit (HEU) to indicate one specific branch of one Italian university in one
specific field of study.
In the next section, we provide some descriptive statistics regarding the variables used in
the estimation and students’ characteristics.
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3.4.4 Descriptive evidence on students’ choices and main statistics
Table 3.1 reports the number of students and the descriptive statistics regarding the services
provided by the DSU by region of residence and field of study. The majority of students in our
sample reside in one region in the central or northern Italy, the most chosen field of study is
Engineering whereas the least one is Psychology. Concerning the services provided by the DSU,
we can see that the figures are similar among the various fields. In particular, the probability
to win a scholarship ranges between 76.63% for students enrolled in Social & Political sciences
and 87.34% for students enrolled in Engineering. The figures related to the probability to win
places in dormitories are lower in magnitude and range from 46.98% for students enrolled in
Psychology to 56.96% for those in Languages. Therefore, DSU offices are able to satisfy more
efficacy the applications related to scholarships than the ones regarding places in dormitories.
Moreover, it is remarkable that the expected number of scholarships provided is way bigger
than the sum of the places in dormitories with and without scholarships. These differences
can be related to the fact that the provision of places in dormitories is more expensive than
the provision of scholarships and requires the existence of buildings that can be used for this
purpose.
Table 3.2 reports the descriptive statistics regarding the main individual variables used in
the estimation. The first column reports the average distance traveled by students to reach
their chosen HEU measured as the distance between students’ city of residence and HEU’s
hosting city. Students from islands and southern regions of Italy travel, respectively, 4 and 3
times more than students from central or northern regions. These differences are in line with
the findings highlighted in the previous literature regarding the out-migration of students from
southern regions and islands into central and northern regions (e.g. Cammelli and Gasperoni,
2015). We take into account this difference in our empirical strategy by exploiting the role of
the macroregion of residence in shaping the preferences of students.
With respect to the gender composition of students, we can see that the majority of students
observed are females. Although the share of female students is very similar among macroregions
it differs when considering the field of study. It ranges from a minimum of 23.7% in Engineering
to a maximum of 93.5% in Education. These differences indicate that females and males have
students in Italy
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Table 3.2: Students’ characteristics by field of study and macroregions
Distance (KM) Diploma Grade (Avg)
Distance
(KM)
Female
(%)
Dip.
Grade
(Avg)
Female Male Female Male
South 144.3 57.0% 81.8 136.4 154.6 82.9 80.2
Islands 212.0 56.3% 80.8 195.6 233.1 81.9 79.3
Centre-North 47.5 54.6% 78.5 48.1 46.7 79.5 77.4
Social & Political sciences 78.0 68.4% 75.7 78.3 77.3 76.8 73.3
Psychology 91.5 80.2% 80.0 91.4 91.7 81.0 75.9
Math. & Physical sciences 74.4 27.5% 80.5 78.3 72.9 84.0 79.1
Life & Natural sciences 78.7 64.9% 80.2 82.1 72.5 81.9 77.0
Law 93.8 63.4% 79.0 90.2 100.0 80.3 76.9
Languages 92.1 83.1% 80.2 91.8 93.5 80.9 76.9
Humanities 80.1 67.4% 79.5 78.9 82.7 80.4 77.7
Engineering 112.8 23.7% 82.5 126.4 108.6 85.9 81.4
Education 53.3 93.5% 74.7 53.0 59.1 74.9 71.9
Chemistry & Pharmacy 80.7 64.5% 81.2 84.1 74.5 82.6 78.8
Business & Statistics 86.1 44.4% 78.9 86.1 86.2 81.7 76.6
Notes: The table reports the descriptive statistics of the sample of Italian university students who have enrolled
for the first time in academic year 2014-2015 divided by fields of study and macroregions. Column (1) reports
average distance traveled by students to reach the HEU chosen from their city of residence in kilometers; Column
(2) reports the average percentage of female students; Column (3) reports the average diploma grade; Column
(4) and column (5) report the average distance traveled considering, respectively, female and male students;
Column (6) and column (7) report the average high school diploma grade considering, respectively, female and
male students.
different tastes regarding the field of study chosen.
The third column of Table 3.2 shows students’ average diploma grades by macroregions and
field of study. Students from southern regions and islands have better grades than the others.
However, this fact can be related to the differences in high school evaluation policies existing
at the regional level. We control for this element controlling for the students’ macroregion of
residence in our empirical specification. The second part of Table 3.2 presents the information
regarding the differences existing between males and females in the average distance traveled
and average diploma grades. It is remarkable to note that, although males in general travel more
than females, we have that this difference is not constant among fields of study. Interestingly,
in all the fields considered female students have a higher diploma grade compared to male
students. Because of these elements, we explore the existence of heterogeneity in preferences
due to differences in taste parameters based on students’ gender in the empirical specification.
Table 3.3 reports the shares of students that have enrolled in their province of residence
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Table 3.3: Shares of stayers and movers students by field of study and macroregions
Movers
Stayers (%) Movers (%) In Region (%) Out of Region
(%)
South 53.37% 46.63% 44.97% 55.03%
Islands 50.94% 49.06% 51.79% 48.21%
Centre-North 50.58% 49.42% 66.72% 33.28%
Social & Political sciences 51.87% 48.13% 60.93% 39.07%
Psychology 39.26% 60.74% 55.03% 44.97%
Math. & Physical sciences 53.72% 46.28% 63.35% 36.65%
Life & Natural sciences 50.31% 49.69% 64.57% 35.43%
Law 56.35% 43.65% 55.31% 44.69%
Languages 43.43% 56.57% 60.26% 39.74%
Humanities 49.29% 50.71% 61.31% 38.69%
Engineering 50.35% 49.65% 58.31% 41.69%
Education 51.92% 48.08% 69.16% 30.84%
Chemistry & Pharmacy 47.87% 52.13% 64.09% 35.91%
Business & Statistics 56.71% 43.29% 57.54% 42.46%
Notes: The table reports the descriptive statistics concerning the shares of stayers and movers students by field
of study and macroregions. Column (1) reports the percentage of students that have enrolled in an HEU located
in their province of residence; Column (2) reports the share of students that have enrolled outside their province
of residence; Column (5) reports the share of students that have enrolled in one HEU situated in their region
of residence but outside their province of residence; Column (6) reports the percentage of students that have
enrolled in an HEU located outside their region of residence.
(Stayers) or outside of it (Movers). With respect to the second group, we have presented also
the shares of students that have enrolled in their region of residence (In Region) or outside
it (Out of Region). From the table, we can see that the majority of students from southern
regions tend to remain in their province of residence while the other students are almost split
equally between movers and stayers. However, considering only the sample of movers, almost
two-thirds of students from Centre-North tend to enroll in their region of residence.
Table 3.4 reports the information regarding the differences in terms of gender composition
and diploma grade between stayers and movers. With respect to the gender composition, it
is possible to remark that, with the exceptions of Engineering, Math & Physical sciences and
Business & Statistics, the share of female students is always higher than the 50%. However, the
shares are highly heterogeneous across groups and tend to be higher when considering students
that move outside their province but inside their region of residence. Concerning the high
school diploma grade, we can see that it tends to be higher in the group of movers, especially
if when considering students that have chosen an HEU outside their region of residence.
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Table 3.4: Characterstics of stayers and movers by field of study and macroregions
Movers
Stayers Movers In Region Out of Region
Female Dip.
Grade
Female Dip.
Grade
Female Dip.
Grade
Female Dip.
Grade
South 55.43% 80.97 58.71% 82.65 60.18% 82.15 57.50% 83.05
Islands 56.57% 79.52 56.09% 82.04 60.40% 80.79 51.45% 83.38
Centre-North 52.70% 77.80 56.55% 79.27 56.69% 78.73 56.27% 80.36
Social & Political sciences 67.41% 75.00 69.57% 76.51 69.66% 75.84 69.42% 77.56
Psychology 79.80% 79.64 80.49% 80.24 80.10% 79.77 80.97% 80.81
Math. & Physical sciences 26.52% 79.92 28.70% 81.09 28.49% 80.68 29.05% 81.81
Life & Natural sciences 64.28% 80.15 65.55% 80.17 64.99% 79.74 66.56% 80.93
Law 62.98% 78.30 64.05% 79.98 66.15% 78.83 61.45% 81.41
Languages 82.11% 79.41 83.79% 80.89 84.55% 80.31 82.65% 81.76
Humanities 66.90% 79.01 67.84% 79.96 68.86% 79.61 66.22% 80.52
Engineering 22.91% 81.52 24.41% 83.51 23.27% 82.15 26.01% 85.41
Education 92.94% 74.39 94.19% 75.09 95.03% 75.27 92.30% 74.69
Chemistry & Pharmacy 62.57% 80.99 66.36% 81.47 66.04% 81.56 66.92% 81.31
Business & Statistics 43.31% 77.90 45.86% 80.20 46.75% 78.79 44.65% 82.10
Notes: The table reports the descriptive statistics concerning the share of female students and the average
diploma grade for stayers (columns 1 and 2) and movers (columns 3 and 4) by field of study and macroregions.
The rightmost part of the table provides information on the share of female students and the average diploma
grade for students that have enrolled outside their province of residence but inside their region (columns 5 and
6) and students that have enrolled in an HEU outside their region of residence (columns 7 and 8).
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Table 3.5 shows the descriptive statistics regarding HEUs’ characteristics by field of study
and hosting macroregions. The first column reports information regarding the average contri-
bution paid by students computed as the ratio between total contributions and the number
of students in 2013. HEUs in Centre-North collect, on average, more resources from students.
Since the tuition fees in Italy are progressive, this element can be related to differences in
income among students. Because of this, we control for housing prices, unemployment and
regional GDP at HEU’s location as well as student’s residence levels in the estimation. The
second column reports the total amount of public funding received on average by HEUs. Uni-
versities in Islands receive a higher share of public funding compared to universities located
in Centre-North and Southern Italy. Moreover, the amount of public funding differs among
fields of study. Indeed, the total amount ranges from 111.2 millions of Euro for Social & Po-
litical sciences to 161 millions of Euro for Chemistry & Pharmacy. However, this difference
is related more to differences in the amount of money received by universities rather than to
actual differences existing between fields of studies. Indeed, the amount of public funding is
observed at the university level and we cannot identify the exact amount of resources that are
dedicated to each field. However, given that our estimates are field-specific, we can exploit this
information to control for the relative differences in terms of resources received from the central
state between universities.
The second part of Table 3.5 presents information on scholarships and places in dormitories
provided by HEUs outside the DSU program. As we can note by comparing Table 3.5 and
Table 3.1, the provision of these services outside the DSU program is residual. Indeed, if we
consider for example Psychology, the number of scholarships provided in the DSU program
is around 132 times the one provided outside the DSU program. The last part of Table 3.5
shows the information concerning the academic staff composed by professors and researchers.
In particular, the table shows the average number of members of the academic staff employed
and its composition in terms of nationality and field of study. It is remarkable to note the very
low percentage of foreign academics in every field of study considered. With respect to the
regional distribution, we can note that universities in the Centre-North employ a higher share
compared to the others.
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Table 3.5: Characterstics of HEU by field of study and macroregions
non-DSU policies Academic staff
Avg
Contr.
(e)
Pub.
Fund.
(Mill. e)
Scholar.
(N)
Dorm.
(Prob)
Dorm.
(Exp. N)
Tot
(N)
Foreign
(%)
Field
(%)
South 934 101.2 33 19.8% 21.2 790 0.8%
Islands 1038 136.1 224 32.6% 26.9 1115 0.7%
Centre-North 1673 134.3 222 20.5% 18.5 1059 1.5%
Social & Political sciences 1453 111.2 162 23.6% 21.3 893 1.3% 3.3%
Psychology 1750 137.7 198 17.0% 15.1 1133 1.1% 9.3%
Math. & Physical sciences 1197 145.0 211 20.3% 17.1 1128 1.5% 10.3%
Life & Natural sciences 1381 125.0 176 23.0% 18.2 979 1.1% 11.6%
Law 1643 117.8 176 20.4% 19.5 940 1.1% 8.8%
Languages 1513 122.3 166 21.2% 16.1 981 1.4% 10.4%
Humanities 1438 126.1 184 25.1% 20.2 1002 1.3% 9.9%
Engineering 1331 137.4 223 26.0% 35.9 1025 1.1% 14.9%
Education 1447 138.3 209 19.9% 15.8 1130 1.2% 9.9%
Chemistry & Pharmacy 1081 161.0 217 19.0% 14.7 1211 1.1% 6.4%
Business & Statistics 1689 116.6 158 19.6% 18.7 955 1.4% 9.0%
Notes: The table reports the descriptive statistics concerning the characteristics of Italian HEUs by field of
study and hosting macroregions. All the data refers to the academic year 2013-2014. Column (1) reports the
average contribution paid by students computed as total contributions over the number of students; Column
(2) reports the total amount of public funding received on average by HEUs for the academic year 2014-2015;
Columns (3)-(5) report information on, respectively, the average number of scholarships, the probability to
obtain a place in a dormitory and the average expected number of available places in dormitories considering
policies provided by HEU outside the DSU program; Columns (7)-(9) show, respectively, the average number
of professors and researchers (academic staff) employed by HEU, the share of non-Italian academics and the
share of academics that are employed in the specific field of study.
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3.5 Empirical framework
3.5.1 The Conditional Logit Model
In order to estimate the various determinants of students’ location decision process, we base
our estimation strategy on the random utility models family (RUMs) (Train, 2003). RUMs
assume that a decision maker chooses one alternative from a definite choice set, by maximizing
her utility. The choice set is composed of mutually exclusive alternatives that are characterized
by their attributes. In our case, decision markers are students who choose the HEU into which
enroll. As explained in section 3.4.1, in this work we are modeling the choices related to the
third choice of a three-stage process in which students choose whether to enroll in the first
stage, the field of study in the second and the university into which enroll in the third stage.
Therefore, students’ choice set is made of all the HEUs that provide a degree in the field of
study chosen.
Formally, let us assume that in Italy there is a population of students n ∈ N and a set of
HEUs j ∈ J . If the student n chooses to enroll into HEU j, she obtains the following utility:
Unj = x
′
jβ + nj (3.1)
where Unj indicates the utility of student n if she decides to enroll into HEU j, xj is the vector
of observed attributes of alternative j and nj captures factors that enter in the utility Unj but
are not observed by the researcher. Consisting with the assumption of utility maximization,
student n will choose to enroll in university j only if:
Unj ≥ max
j′∈J
Unj′ with j 6= j′ (3.2)
therefore, only if the chosen HEU is the one that maximizes her utility. Given this condition,
the probability that student n chooses HEU j is given by the following:
Pnj = Prob(Unj > Unj′) ∀ j 6= j′ (3.3)
if we assume that the error term nj is i.i.d type I extreme value distributed, the probability
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that student n choose the HEU j is given by the standard Logit formula (Mcfadden, 1974):
Pnj =
exp(x′jβ)∑J
j=1 exp(x
′
jβ)
(3.4)
In the Conditional Logit framework, this probability is estimated using a maximum likelihood
approach. CL has been widely applied in exploring the determinants of students’ choices (e.g.
Pigini and Staffolani, 2015; Long, 2004).
The probability formula in Eq. (3.4) exhibits several useful proprieties: i. the estimated
probabilities are always comprised between 0 and 1; ii. the probability to choose one alternative
is positively related to choice maker’s utility; iii. the sum of all the probabilities attached to
each alternative is always equal to 1. This last propriety derives from the assumption that all
the relevant alternatives are observed and included in the choice set faced by student n.
Another characteristic of CL is that all the elements contained in the vector xj need to
vary over alternatives. This element can be an issue if we consider the student’s attributes.
Given that these characteristics are constant among alternatives, the CL is not able to identify
any parameter associated with them. However, individual characteristics can be an important
driver of students’ preferences. For example, the effect of financial and in-kind policies may
change on the basis of students’ region of residence or high school diploma grade. In these
cases, to consider individual variables in the estimation, the researcher has to define them in
a way that can be handled by the model. One solution is to interact agent’s characteristics
with the alternatives’ attributes, this way obtaining a regressor that depends upon individual
characteristics but varies among alternatives.
However, along with its useful proprieties, CL presents several limitations that are relevant
in our context. Drawing on Train (2003), these limitations can be classified into two categories:
heterogeneity in preferences and substitution patterns.
With respect to the first category, the CL approach permits, by interacting choice-makers’
and alternatives’ attributes, to represent only the systematic variation in decision markers’
preferences that depend upon their observable characteristics. However, CL is not able to
represent the variation in tastes that depends on unobservables or that are purely random from
the researcher’s point of view. This is an important limitation of the CL approach since this
unobserved heterogeneity introduces a correlation between regressors and the error term, this
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way causing an omitted variable bias. In these cases, the CL is misspecified.
The second limitation of the CL approach is related to substitutions patterns. These rep-
resent how the choice probabilities of the alternatives considered in the choice set are related.
Indeed, given that the sum of choice probabilities is equal to 1, if the choice probability of
one alternative increases, those of the other alternatives have necessarily to decrease. The
substitution patterns assumed by the CL are called ‘proportional’ and are a consequence of
the well known Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property. This property states
that the probability ratio between two alternatives j and i depends only on the attributes of
these two alternatives. The consequences of this property can be clarified using the concept
of cross-elasticities. Cross-elasticities measure the percent change in the choice probability of
alternative i when the attribute xj of alternative j changes by 1%. In the case of the CL, these
cross elasticities are given by:
εij = −xjPnjβj (3.5)
as we can see, although the cross elasticity is between alternative i and alternative j, the
formula depends only on attributes of j. This indicates that if the probability of alternative
j increases, the probabilities of all the other alternatives reduce proportionally by the same
amount. However, in reality, one would expect that the cross elasticities between these two
alternatives should depend on their relative similarities and differences. For example, let us
assume that one agent is choosing between three drinks: coke A, coke B, and water. Suppose
that the price of coke A decreases by 1%. In this case, the probability to choose coke B
should decrease more than the one to choose water. However, in the CL framework, the
two probabilities will increase by the same amount, this way overestimating the effect on the
probability to choose water, and underestimating the one on the probability to choose coke B.
To overcome this problem, the researcher needs to define a nesting structure in the choice
decision process by splitting the alternatives into different sub-samples called nests. Each nest
will contain groups of alternatives that are more correlated with each other. In our example,
the researcher can define a nest for the cokes and another nest for the water. However, nesting
structures are not allowed by the CL framework.
To solve these two limits of the CL approach, this work takes advantage of a more sophis-
ticated discrete choice approach: the Latent Class Model.
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3.5.2 The Latent Class Model
The Latent Class Logit model (LCM) belongs to the general class of Mixed Logit (ML) models
and can be used to overcome the limitations of CL that we have summarized in Section 3.5.1.
Indeed, McFadden and Train (2000) have shown that ML can be used to approximate any
choice model with any distribution of preferences to any degree of accuracy. This result implies
that the ML can be specified to control for any source of heterogeneity in preferences and the
presence of nesting structures in the observed choice set.
In the ML model, the utility that individual n obtains choosing alternative j can be denoted
as (Hess and Train, 2017):
Unj = x
′
njβn + nj (3.6)
where, differently from Eq. (3.1), we have that the vector of taste parameters βn now varies over
students. This feature allows us to consider explicitly the presence of heterogeneity in individual
preferences by estimating a different vector of preference parameters for each individual.
Assuming that the error term nj is i.i.d. extreme value we can write the probability that
agent n chooses alternative j, conditional on the student parameter βn as:
Pnj(βn) =
exp(x′njβn)∑J
j=1 exp(x
′
njβn)
(3.7)
this formula indicates that the conditional choice probability of individual n depends on her
vector of utility coefficient βn. To derive the unconditional choice probability of individual
n, the researcher need to specify the cumulative distribution function of utility parameters
in the population F (β|θ). This distribution can be assumed to be continuous or discrete, to
differs among different elements of the vector βn, and to allow any type of correlation among
parameters.
With respect to heterogeneity in preferences, we have that the ML is a flexible method
that, by allowing all the parameters to be randomly distributed and correlated, allows us
to consider any source of preference heterogeneity that may depend on students’ observable
characteristics or be caused by individual’s idiosyncratic preferences.16 Moreover, given that
16ML permits to control also for scale heterogeneity. Scale heterogeneity is a shift in the vector of taste
parameters that is related to some unobserved factor that affects different individuals in different ways. One
consequence of this heterogeneity is that the choices of individuals that are strongly affected by the unobserved
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preference heterogeneity can be let to depend on individual characteristics, the ML permits to
identify the systematic variations in individual tastes.
With respect to the nesting structure in agents’ decision process, we have that the ML
does not exhibit the IIA property and can be modeled to approximate any kind of substitution
pattern and nesting structures. This is done by defining a dummy variable that refers to the
nest and letting the coefficients associated with this regressor to be randomly distributed. In
our case, we can suppose that HEUs located in the student’s region or province of residence are
more correlated with each other compared to all the other alternatives. Hence, in our empirical
strategy, we will control for this nesting structure by inserting a dummy that takes value 1 if
the HEU is in the student’s region or province of residence. This strategy permits to consider
more realistic substitution patterns with respect to the standard CL approach.
The LCM is a special case of the ML. In particular, LCM arises when the cumulative
distribution of individual parameters F (β|θ) is assumed to be discrete. Because of this, LCM
and ML with continuous F (β|θ) may lead to different results. Indeed, the ML permits to
choose various parameter distributions and its results may differ depending on the distribution
chosen. On the other hand, LCM approximates the true distribution of the parameters without
imposing any specific distributional assumptions on coefficients (Sivey, 2012). However, as
outlined in Greene and Hensher (2003), there is no reason to prefer one specification to the
other. In this work, we have chosen the LCM in order to have a more tractable and less
computationally intensive estimation approach.
The LCM assumes that students are sorted in a set of q ∈ Q latent classes. For each latent
class identified, the model estimates a vector of class-specific parameters βq that can be used
to have an estimate of the individual set of taste parameters βn. It is worth noting that latent
classes do not contain any particular individual but that the class membership is probabilistic
and can be defined to depend on the individual’s characteristics.
In the LCM, the probability that student n chooses HEU j, conditional on the fact that she
factor appear more random from the researcher’s perspective (Hess and Train, 2017). In these cases, the ML
allows to put a lower weight on the choices of individuals that are more affected by the unobserved factor, by
letting the scale of their vector of coefficients to be lower in magnitude.
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belong to the latent class q, can be written as:
Pnjq =
exp(x′jβq)∑J
j=1 exp(x
′
jβq)
(3.8)
where βq is the class-specific vector of parameters.
In order to estimate the individual distribution of parameters, we need to define the prob-
ability that one individual belongs to class q. Following Greene and Hensher (2003), this
probability assumes the standard Logit form:
Hnq =
exp(z′nγq)∑Q
q=1 exp(z
′
nγq)
(3.9)
where zn is the vector of individual characteristics of student n that enters in the class mem-
bership probability model and γq are the parameters that links zn to the class membership
probability Hnq. Therefore, for each class, we will have two vectors of parameters: βq and γq.
The first vector contains the taste parameters associated with alternative’s attributes. The
second permits to estimate the class membership probability on the basis of individual charac-
teristics. Given this definition, the unconditional probability that student n chooses alternative
j is given by:
Pnj =
Q∑
q=1
HnqPnjq (3.10)
These elements, along with the information on students’ observed choices, can be used to
estimate the posterior class membership probability:
Hˆq|n =
PˆnqHˆnq∑Q
q=1 PˆnqHˆnq
(3.11)
where Pˆnq denotes the class-specific probability for the specific choice made by student n.
Therefore, student’s posterior class membership probability is estimated conditional on his
own individual characteristics and class-specific choice probabilities. In other words, Hˆq|n is
computed by attaching an higher weight to the latent class that permits to predict the higher
probability to choose the alternative actually chosen by student n.
Given the probability in Eq. (3.11), the set of taste parameters of individual n are defined
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as:
βˆn =
Q∑
q=1
Hˆq|nβˆq (3.12)
Therefore, the individual set of parameters will depend on decision makers’ characteristics on
the basis of their posterior class membership probabilities.
3.5.3 Endogeneity
In order to interpret our estimates of students’ utilities non-distorted estimates of the effect
that DSU policies have on students’ choice probabilities, we need that all the observed variables
are exogenous. In our case, we have various possible sources of endogeneity sources that need
to be addressed.
The first threat to our identification arises from the fact that DSU offices and HEUs, through
a process of adaptation, could increase their supply in response to a higher demand for services.
For example, the supply of DSU services in time t (2014-2015) can be affected by the demand for
services in time t− 1 (2013-2014). Therefore, changes in the demand can affect the supply, this
way raising endogeneity concerns through inverse causality. However, as explained in Section
3.4, all the information regarding DSU’s supply and HEUs’ characteristics are collected with
respect to academic year t−1 (2013-2014) and should be directly affected by changes in demand
in time t− 2 (2012-2013). Thus, to have a simultaneity bias, changes in demand in time t− 2
should affect supply in time t. This problem is even less problematic if we consider scholarships.
In fact, the data regarding this policy are observed at the universities’ level. Therefore, even if
the DSU offices can discretionally modify their supply, in order to have a simultaneity bias, also
the winning applications in each university have to increase. Ideally, to completely solve this
problem we should observe an exogenous event or collect data referring to previous academic
years. However, in the absence of these possibilities, we believe that the nature of our data is
mostly unaffected by this endogeneity source.
Correlation between the error term and our regressors can arise also in the presence of
unobserved heterogeneity in preferences and omitted variables. If students’ preferences for
DSU’s policies and HEUs’ characteristics are affected by some unobserved factor, we will have
those observationally identical students will take different decisions according to elements for
which we have not accounted for. We first address this issue by using a very rich set of controls
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variables on both HEUs’ and hosting areas’ characteristics. Second, as extensively explained
in Section 3.5.2, the ML model provides various solutions to account for observed, unobserved
and scale heterogeneity. Namely, the researcher can specify one or more parameters to be
randomly distributed and correlated in order to have an individual set of parameters that will
depend on students’ characteristics and idiosyncratic preferences. In our case, with the LCM,
we semi-parametrically approximate the continuous distribution of students’ preferences using
a discrete one. This permits to avoid assumptions on the functional form of students’ individual
preferences and to control for unobserved heterogeneity that depends also on unobserved factors.
Therefore, these sources of endogeneity should be less of an issue in our case.
3.5.4 Empirical strategy
The first step of our empirical strategy concerns the estimation of a CL in order to have a
preliminary understanding of how HEUs’ and hosting areas’ characteristics affect students’
choices.
In this case, the utility that student n will obtain choosing HEU j is specified as:
Unj = DSUjβDSU +HEU
′
jβHEU + AREA
′
jβAREA + d
′
njβd + nj (3.13)
where DSUj denotes the services provided by DSU offices in HEU’s hosting area, HEUj includes
HEUs’ controls, AREAj includes HEU’s hosting area controls, dnj indicates the regressors that
varies among alternatives and individuals, and nj is the error term.
The vector DSUj contains our main variable of interests: i. the number of scholarships
weighted by the probability to obtain a scholarship; ii. the number of places in dormitories
without scholarships weighted by the probability to obtain a place in a dormitory; iii. the num-
ber of places in dormitories with scholarships (student packages) weighted by the probability
to obtain a place in a dormitory. The probabilities to obtain the services are computed as the
ratio between the number of applications accepted by DSU offices and the number of received
applications. As explained in Section 3.4.2, the indicators concerning dormitories and student
packages vary over DSU offices while the one related to scholarships is computed considering
the information available at the HEU’s level. One important element to note is that we use
expected indicators rather than absolute numbers. This is done to consider the information
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related to the ability of DSU offices to satisfy the demand for these services.
The variables included in vector HEUj are used to control for the various dimensions of
HEUs’ attractiveness that can affect students’ choices other than our variables of interest. We
include in this vector the number of places in canteens and a dummy variable that takes value
1 if there is a college in the HEU’s hosting area. Moreover, given that universities can provide
scholarships and places in dormitories outside the DSU program, we include in HEUj also the
number of non-DSU scholarships and the number of places in dormitories provided outside
the DSU program weighted by the probability to obtain a non-DSU place in a dormitory.
The last group of variables included in HEUj are related to the various dimension of HEU’s
attractiveness that have been outlined in the previous literature summarized in Section 3.2.
In particular, we control for the dimension and the quality of HEUs using: the number of
excellence departments; the number of professors and researchers (academics) employed by
the HEU; the share of foreign academics; the number of members of administrative staff; the
number of academics employed in the field of study considered; the amount of public funding
received by the HEU. Furthermore, we control for the effect of tuition fees and enrollment
costs using the average tuition fee computed as the total students’ contribution divided by the
number of enrolled students.
Given the role highlighted in the previous literature of hosting areas’ characteristics such
as labor market conditions or life costs, we have included in vector AREAj the information
relative to: the average unemployment rate between 2011 and 2013 in HEU’s hosting province;
the average housing purchase price per square meter in 2013 in hosting provinces; the GDP in
HEU’s hosting region in 2013.
Finally, the variables contained in dnj are: a quadratic polynomial of the distance between
student’s city of residence and HEU’s hosting city; a dummy variable that indicates if the HEU
is located in student’s province of residence; a dummy variable that indicates if the HEU is
located in student’s region of residence. These variables are used to control for student’s cost
of migration.
Table 3.6 presents the list of variables used in estimation along with their definition. The
results related to the CL estimates are presented in Section 3.6.1 below.
The second step of our estimation strategy regards the estimation of the LCM outlined in
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Section 3.5.2. In this case the utility of student n in latent class q is the defined as:
Unj|q = DSUjβDSU |q +HEU ′jβHEU |q + AREA
′
jβAREA|q + d
′
njβd|q + nj|q (3.14)
Eq. (3.14) differs from Eq. (3.13) for the presence of the subscript q in all the coefficients. This
indicates that we are estimating a different utility function for each latent class q identified.
These parameters are then used to estimate a set of individual coefficients on the basis of the
posterior class membership probability defined in (3.11).
Recalling Eq. (3.9), the unconditional class membership probability is defined as:
Hnq =
exp(z′nγq)∑Q
q=1 exp(z
′
nγq)
(3.15)
where the vector zn contains the set of individual characteristics that we use to determine the
probability of class assignment. In particular, zn contains a set of individual characteristics and
a set of variables that gives information on the student’s region or province of residence. The
first set of variables contains: a constant; one dummy that takes value 1 if the student resides in
a northern or central region of Italy; student’s high school diploma grade; a dummy that takes
value 1 if the student is female; one dummy that takes value 1 if student’s city of residence hosts
at least one HEU. These variables are exploited to understand how individual characteristics
shape students’ preferences. The second set of variables contains: the average unemployment
rate between 2011 and 2013 in students’ province of residence; the GDP of students’ region of
residence in 2013; the average housing purchase price per square meter in student’s province
of residence. These variables are used in order to partially control for students’ socio-economic
background.
Table 3.6 presents the list of variables used in estimation along with their definition. The
results of LCM estimates are presented in Section 3.6.2 below.
Since the utilities estimated using the discrete choice approach presented are identified only
up to a constant, the coefficients can be interpreted only in respect of their relative magnitude
and sign. Therefore, to ease interpretation, we present the results in terms of semi-elasticities
and willingness to travel (WTT).
The semi-elasticities are defined as the percentage change in the probability that student n
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Table 3.6: Definitions of variables used in estimation
Variable Definition
Characteristics of Higher Education Units
E(Scholarship)
Number of scholarships weighted by the probability to obtain a schol-
arship.
E(Dormitory)
Number of places in dormitories without scholarship weighted by the
probability to obtain a place in a dormitory.
E(Student Package)
Number of places in dormitories with scholarships weighted by the
probability to obtain a place in a dormitory.
Places in Canteen Number of places in canteens.
College 1 if a college serves the HEU
non-DSU Scholarship Number of scholarships provided outside the DSU program.
E(non-DSU Dormitory)
Number of places in dormitories provided outside the DSU program
weighted by the probability to obtain a non-DSU place in a dormitory.
Excellence Departments Number of department of excellence.
Academics Number of professors and researchers employed by the HEU.
Share of Intern. Academics Share of foreigner professors and researchers.
Administrative staff Number of administrative staff employed by the HEU.
Field of study Academics
Number of professors and researchers employed in the field of study
considered.
Public funding (Mill.) Amount of public funding received by the HEU in millions of Euro.
Average contribution
Average tuition fee computed as the total students’ contribution di-
vided by the number of enrolled students.
Distance Distance between student’s city of residence and HEU’s hosting city.
Distance2
Distance between student’s city of residence and HEU’s hosting city
squared.
HEU in province 1 if the HEU is in the student’s province of residence.
HEU in region 1 if the HEU is in the student’s region of residence.
Unemployment Average provincial unemployment rate between 2011 and 2013.
Housing price Average provincial housing purchase price per square meter.
Regional GDP Regional GDP.
Student’s individual characteristics
Diploma Grade High school diploma grade.
CentreNorth 1 if the student resides in a central or northern region of Italy
Housing price in residence
Average housing purchase price per square meter in student’s province
of residence
Unemployment in residence
Average unemployment rate between 2011 and 2013 in student’s
province of residence.
Regional GDP in residence GDP of student’s region of residence
HEU in residence 1 if student’s city of residence hosts one HEU.
Female 1 if student is female
The table reports the definitions of the variables used in estimation. The first panel contains the definitions of
student’s utility determinants. The second panel contains informations on the student’s characteristics used to
explore the existence of heterogeneity in students’ preferences.
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chooses alternative j when the service indicator in j increases by 1%. In the LCM model, the
individual semi-elasticities with respect to the regressor xj are computed as follows:
εnj =
Q∑
q=1
Hˆq|nεnjq =
Q∑
q=1
Hˆq|nxj(1− Pnjq)βq (3.16)
where Hˆq|n is the posterior probability of individual n to belong to class q computed using Eq.
(3.11), Pnjq is the probability for student n to choose alternative j given the class q computed
using Eq. (3.8), and εnq is the semi-elasticity of the individual n for the latent class q. As we can
note, Eq. (3.16) indicates that individual semi-elasticities are computed as the average of each
latent class semi-elasticity weighted by individuals posterior class membership probabilities.
This feature allows us to have individual estimates for semi-elasticities that will depend on the
entire vector of individual characteristics zn.
The WTT is defined as the additional number of kilometers that student n is willing to
travel for a 1% increase in one of the service indicators. The WTT for a student n in the latent
class q for one of the DSU services is computed as:
WTTn = −∂Unj/∂DSUj
∂Unj/∂dnj
= − βDSU,n ×∆DSUj
2βd2,ndistnj + βd1,n
(3.17)
where ∆DSUj denotes the 1% change in DSU service indicator and βDSU,n, βd1,n, βd2,n, indicate,
respectively, the individual coefficients associated with the DSU indicator considered and the
linear and quadratic terms of the polynomial of distance. Namely, the WTT measures the
marginal rate of substitution between DSU’s services and distance. This is given by the ratio
between student’s marginal utility for the service over her marginal utility for the distance.
Each WTT estimates will be based on the individual set of parameters obtained through Eq.
(3.12).
The results related to these two measures of students’ sensitivity are visually explored
through non-parametric regressions to explore the existence of heterogeneity between different
groups of students. In particular, for each variable of interest, we have estimated a local poly-
nomial regression to estimate the relationships existing between students’ sensitivity to DSU’s
policies and their characteristics (e.g. distance traveled and high school diploma grade). Local
polynomial regressions are techniques that permit to estimate the relationship between two
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variables y and x without assuming its functional form. For a given point x0, the relationship
is estimated by regressing the realizations of y on a constant and a polynomial of the differ-
ence between x0 and one x in its neighborhood. The width of this neighborhood is chosen by
deciding a bandwidth. Larger bandwidths permit more smoothing but less resolution, whereas
smaller ones give more resolution but higher variability in the results. In our case, we have
chosen the asymptotic optimal bandwidth provided in Fan and Gijbels (1996). This bandwidth
is chosen to solve the trade-off between resolution and smoothing by minimizing the conditional
mean integrated square error of the regression. Another element to choose is the degree of the
polynomial. After various tests with higher degrees we have opted for a degree 3 polynomial.17
3.6 Results
3.6.1 Baseline: Conditional Logit estimates
Table 3.7 reports CL estimates of the utility function defined in Eq.3.13 in Section 3.5.4 for
each field of study considered.
Given that utility functions are identified only up to a constant, we cannot compare the
magnitude of coefficients across different specifications. Nevertheless, we can infer the effects
of universities’ attributes on students’ choices by comparing coefficients’ signs and relative
magnitude in each field. By applying this logic, we can highlight various interesting results.
Since coefficients’ signs change across fields of study, we have found evidence of the existence
of heterogeneity in students’ preferences among fields of study. If we consider our variables
of interest, we can note that DSU’s policies have different effects depending on the field of
study. Indeed, the effect of E(Scholarships) is positive and significant in 5 out of 11 fields
considered, whereas E(Dormitory) and E(StudentPackage) have a positive significant effect
in 7 fields. These results suggest that policies that provide places in a dormitory are more
effective in attracting students. Moreover, if we look at coefficients’ relative magnitude, we can
see that these policies have, in most of the cases, much stronger effects than the ones associated
with scholarships. This element suggests that in-kind policies play a major role in attracting
students. For example, the effect of one additional expected student package in Engineering is
17See Fan and Gijbels (1996) for details on the local polynomial regression approach.
129
almost 8 times the negative effect of one additional expected scholarship. These results can be
related to the fact that, although scholarships can reduce students’ cost of living, they do not
cover housing and accommodations costs related, for example, to the research of an apartment.
We have evidence of heterogeneity in preferences even considering places in canteens and
colleges. In fact, places in canteens have a positive, although smaller compared with other
variables, in 5 of the fields considered while colleges have a stronger positive effect in 7 fields.
Since colleges provide places in their dormitories to particular kinds of students, this result
confirms the importance of in-kind policies.
Concerning the effect of non-DSU policies we can note that, in the majority of the fields,
these policies have a negative effect on students’ choice probabilities that, in general, is stronger
than the one of DSU’s policies. Moreover, signs of coefficients associated with non-DSU policies
are in general different from those of our variable of interest. This element suggests that these
policies are a poor substitute for DSU’s policies.
Turning on the effect of the HEU’s attributes we can remark some interesting elements. The
number of excellence department is positive in the majority of fields, this way suggesting that
HEU’s quality of research is an important determinant of students’ utility functions. Concerning
the effect of variables related to the academic staff, we can see that the number of academics
has always a negative or non-significant effect on choice probabilities whereas the number of
academics employed in the specific field of study has a positive effect in all the fields considered.
This element suggests that students are more interested in the staff employed in their field
than on the number of academics in general. As for public fundings and average students’
contributions we can see that, as expected, students are more attracted by universities with
more resources and that require them a lower contribution in terms of taxes.
With respect to the effect of variables related to HEUs’ hosting areas, we can see that,
as expected, students tend to choose universities in their region or province of residence and
their utility is negatively affected by the distance between the university and their residence.
Moreover, our results suggest that students prefer universities in areas with lower unemployment
and higher GDP and housing prices. These results indicate that socio-economic conditions of
hosting areas are an important determinant of the demand for education in one specific HEU.
Although these results are interesting, they are only a partial picture of the phenomenon.
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Table 3.7a: Conditional Logit Estimates
Chemistry
&
Pharmacy
Business
&
Statistics
Life &
Natural
sciences
Law EngineeringEducation
E(Scholarship)/100 0.030*** -0.009*** 0.011*** -0.016*** -0.027*** 0.027***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
E(Dormitory)/100 0.111*** 0.028*** -0.044*** 0.132*** 0.153*** 0.166***
(0.015) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.058)
E(Student Package)/100 0.109*** 0.025*** 0.126*** 0.043*** 0.214*** -0.076***
(0.014) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.026)
Places in Canteen/100 -0.008*** 0.029*** 0.008*** 0.015*** -0.003*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
College -0.039 0.168*** -0.314*** 0.092*** 0.820*** -0.009
(0.043) (0.019) (0.033) (0.028) (0.023) (0.059)
non-DSU Scholarship/100 -0.134*** -0.072*** -0.019*** -0.0002 0.144*** -0.012
(0.009) (0.004) (0.007) (0.0064) (0.006) (0.016)
E(non-DSU Dormitory)/100 -1.909*** 0.180*** -0.530*** 0.589*** -0.235*** 0.489***
(0.100) (0.019) (0.058) (0.026) (0.012) (0.100)
Excellence Departments -0.290*** 0.145*** 0.234*** 0.219*** 0.109*** -0.043
(0.028) (0.010) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.041)
Academics/100 -0.090*** 0.004 -0.242*** -0.101*** -0.147*** -0.123***
(0.031) (0.008) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.037)
Share of Intern. Academics -0.468*** 0.034*** -0.062*** 0.096*** -0.201*** -0.621***
(0.034) (0.006) (0.018) (0.011) (0.011) (0.035)
Administrative staff -0.157*** -0.018*** 0.013* 0.078*** 0.168*** -0.005
(0.014) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.022)
Field of study Academics/100 2.107*** 0.818*** 1.057*** 0.693*** 0.141*** 0.447***
(0.109) (0.027) (0.048) (0.044) (0.016) (0.127)
Public funding (Mill.) 0.011*** 0.0005 0.007*** 0.003*** -0.001** -0.0006
(0.003) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0024)
Average contribution 0.063*** -0.007*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.094*** -0.062***
(0.010) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004)
Distance -0.022*** -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.031***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Distance2/100 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
HEU in province 1.331*** 1.599*** 1.266*** 1.847*** 1.602*** 1.183***
(0.043) (0.019) (0.032) (0.028) (0.020) (0.054)
HEU in region 1.117*** 1.470*** 1.269*** 1.344*** 1.504*** 1.043***
(0.047) (0.029) (0.039) (0.038) (0.026) (0.061)
Unemployment -0.100*** 0.034*** -0.065*** -0.041*** -0.043*** -0.273***
(0.012) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.015)
Housing price 0.049*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.115*** 0.090*** 0.166***
(0.008) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.010)
Regional GDP 0.100*** 0.136*** 0.053*** 0.122*** 0.069*** -0.0007
(0.009) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.0097)
Observations 376488 2478941 724128 1355184 2022936 279552
Pseudo R2 0.65 0.56 0.60 0.59 0.59 0.71
Log Likelihood -11821.1 -59900.4 -20681.1 -32732.1 -55065.4 -7106.7
Notes: Conditional Logit regression by field of study estimated on the sample of Italian student enrolled for the
first time in academic year 2014-2015. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Variable definitions are reported in Table 3.6.
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Table 3.7b: Conditional Logit Estimates
Humanities Languages Social &
Political
sciences
Psychology Math. &
Physical
sciences
E(Scholarship)/100 -0.023*** 0.00009 -0.007*** 0.018*** 0.021***
(0.001) (0.00099) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
E(Dormitory)/100 -0.037*** -0.025* 0.090*** 0.209*** -0.050***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.028) (0.019)
E(Student Package)/100 0.035*** -0.159*** -0.008 -0.262*** 0.218***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.016) (0.012)
Places in Canteen/100 0.002 -0.002** 0.018*** -0.012*** -0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
College 0.150*** 0.240*** 0.289*** -0.405*** 0.210***
(0.034) (0.026) (0.025) (0.056) (0.045)
non-DSU Scholarship/100 0.125*** 0.012* -0.025*** 0.104*** -0.128***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.010)
E(non-DSU Dormitory)/100 0.252*** -0.262*** -0.363*** -1.241*** -0.331***
(0.055) (0.046) (0.029) (0.084) (0.076)
Excellence Departments -0.214*** -0.013 0.474*** -0.182*** 0.171***
(0.018) (0.034) (0.033) (0.069) (0.031)
Academics/100 -0.095*** -0.071*** -0.097*** 0.006 -0.028
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.038) (0.021)
Share of Intern. Academics 0.079*** -0.033*** 0.016* 0.422*** -0.094***
(0.015) (0.012) (0.009) (0.036) (0.021)
Administrative staff 0.064*** 0.091*** -0.035*** -0.178*** -0.094***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.016) (0.011)
Field of study Academics/100 0.964*** 1.208*** 1.551*** 1.265*** 1.511***
(0.040) (0.034) (0.085) (0.131) (0.074)
Public funding (Mill.) 0.004*** -0.006*** 0.011*** 0.008*** -0.0002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0012)
Average contribution -0.029*** -0.031*** 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.010
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.008)
Distance -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.023***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Distance2/100 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
HEU in province 1.169*** 0.906*** 1.131*** 0.912*** 1.530***
(0.032) (0.028) (0.026) (0.058) (0.046)
HEU in region 1.368*** 1.017*** 1.053*** 0.935*** 1.366***
(0.038) (0.033) (0.032) (0.060) (0.052)
Unemployment -0.107*** -0.221*** -0.108*** -0.262*** -0.155***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.013) (0.011)
Housing price 0.117*** 0.095*** 0.028*** 0.078*** 0.081***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.006)
Regional GDP 0.013** -0.055*** 0.056*** -0.163*** -0.030***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.009)
Observations 880840 845104 1440947 172391 422577
Pseudo R2 0.61 0.54 0.59 0.59 0.65
Log Likelihood -23362.1 -29312.0 -35075.5 -7774.8 -11958.7
Notes: Conditional Logit regression by field of study estimated on the sample of Italian student enrolled for the
first time in academic year 2014-2015. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Variable definitions are reported in Table 3.6.
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As explained in section 3.5.1, the CL model is not able to capture random heterogeneity in
preferences that can be important in this context. Moreover, these results do not give any
information on the effect of these variables on the utilities of more narrowly defined groups
of students. For example, if we want to know the effect of scholarships on female students
with high Diploma Grades that reside in a southern region we should estimate the model with
three sets of interaction terms and with all their combinations. In Tables 3A.1 and 3A.2 in
Appendix we have reported the results related to a specification in which universities’ attributes
are interacted with all individuals’ observed characteristics. As we can see, besides the issues
related to unobserved heterogeneity in preferences, the results of this approach are very hard
to interpret. Indeed, we should combine all the coefficients related to interaction terms in order
to have an understandable estimate for specific groups of students.
To overcome these issues and shed some light on understanding how these elements affect
students’ utility in the next section we apply the LCM outlined in Section 3.5.2.
3.6.2 Latent Class Logit estimates
Table 3.8 shows the results of LCM estimates of the utility function defined in Eq. (3.14) for
each field of study. For each latent class identified we report two vectors of coefficients. The
first indicates the random utility parameters that enter in student’s utility function. The second
indicates the parameters that enter in the class membership probability model. This second
vector informs on the contribution that individual characteristics give on the probability of
student n to belong to the class q. In order to have an average estimate of students’ preferences,
we report also the mean parameter computed by weighting each class-specific parameter for
the average class membership probability.
For each field of study, we have estimated the model considering specifications with from
2 to 5 latent classes. Then, following the suggestion of Greene and Hensher (2003) and Hole
(2008), we have chosen the model on the basis of Akaike (AIC) and Bayesian (BIC) information
criteria and convergence results. In particular, we have chosen the specifications that reports
the lower values for AIC and BIC and that identify statistically significant differences between
the class-specific vectors of coefficients. With this strategy, we have chosen a specification with
2 latent classes for all the fields considered except for Engineering for which we have estimated
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a 4-class model. For each class, we report the average class membership probability that can
be used as a measure of the importance of the specific latent class in the sample. Even though
these values can be small in some cases, it is worth remembering that the weight of these
classes in computing the distribution of individual coefficients can be still important for some
individuals.
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Table 3.8a: Latent Class Logit results by field of study
Chemistry & Pharmacy Business & Statistics
Class1 Class2 Mean Class1 Class2 Mean
Random Utility Par. β
E(Scholarship)/100 0.075*** 0.015*** 0.048 0.013*** -0.029*** 0.002
(0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
E(Dormitory)/100 0.166*** 0.170*** 0.168 0.124*** -0.077** 0.068
(0.051) (0.026) (0.013) (0.031)
E(Student Package)/100 0.709*** 0.006 0.389 0.002 0.043*** 0.013
(0.062) (0.019) (0.010) (0.013)
Places in Canteen/100 -0.007 -0.022*** -0.014 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.033
(0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
College 0.041 0.118 0.076 -0.027 0.614*** 0.150
(0.171) (0.075) (0.030) (0.057)
non-DSU Scholarship/100 -0.432*** 0.010 -0.230 -0.123*** 0.065*** -0.071
(0.030) (0.016) (0.008) (0.011)
E(non-DSU Dormitory)/100 -4.173*** -1.221*** -2.827 -0.030 0.091*** 0.003
(0.317) (0.159) (0.057) (0.035)
Excellence Departments -1.141*** -0.004 -0.623 0.079*** 0.283*** 0.135
(0.113) (0.050) (0.016) (0.027)
Academics/100 0.984*** -0.288*** 0.404 0.229*** -0.295*** 0.084
(0.112) (0.050) (0.014) (0.024)
Share of Intern. Academics -0.449*** -0.539*** -0.490 0.050*** 0.130*** 0.072
(0.087) (0.067) (0.015) (0.016)
Administrative staff -0.523*** -0.032 -0.299 -0.101*** 0.271*** 0.002
(0.048) (0.024) (0.011) (0.017)
Field of study Academics/100 3.209*** 1.319*** 2.347 0.645*** 0.405*** 0.578
(0.380) (0.191) (0.046) (0.081)
Public funding (Mill.) -0.044*** 0.017*** -0.016 -0.012*** 0.004*** -0.007
(0.009) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Average contribution 0.035 0.003 0.020 -0.069*** 0.022*** -0.044
(0.029) (0.016) (0.003) (0.002)
HEU in province -0.283** 2.095*** 0.802 0.436*** 2.894*** 1.117
(0.126) (0.098) (0.033) (0.094)
HEU in region 0.663*** 1.278*** 0.943 0.832*** 0.928*** 0.859
(0.125) (0.104) (0.039) (0.085)
Unemployment 0.428*** -0.273*** 0.109 0.127*** -0.033*** 0.083
(0.044) (0.021) (0.008) (0.011)
Distance -0.076*** -0.013*** -0.047 -0.055*** -0.006*** -0.041
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Distance2/100 0.006*** 0.0007*** 0.003 0.004*** 0.0004*** 0.003
(0.000) (0.0001) (0.000) (0.0000)
Housing price -0.054** 0.128*** 0.029 0.031*** 0.005 0.024
(0.024) (0.014) (0.004) (0.006)
Regional GDP 0.085*** 0.016 0.053 0.063*** 0.068*** 0.065
(0.024) (0.015) (0.007) (0.008)
Class Probability Par. θ
Const. -1.361** Fixed 4.353*** Fixed
(0.656) Fixed (0.289) Fixed
Diploma Grade 0.010** Fixed -0.053*** Fixed
(0.004) Fixed (0.002) Fixed
CentreNorth 1.568*** Fixed 0.748*** Fixed
(0.268) Fixed (0.115) Fixed
HEU in residence 0.092 Fixed -0.614*** Fixed
(0.170) Fixed (0.047) Fixed
Housing price in residence 0.033** Fixed 0.022*** Fixed
(0.013) Fixed (0.006) Fixed
Unemployment in residence 0.027 Fixed -0.003 Fixed
(0.021) Fixed (0.009) Fixed
Regional GDP in residence -0.048** Fixed 0.008 Fixed
(0.021) Fixed (0.009) Fixed
Female 0.330*** Fixed 0.341*** Fixed
(0.091) Fixed (0.038) Fixed
Class membership prob. 0.544 0.456 0.723 0.277
BIC/N 2.520 3.426
Mc Fadden Pseudo R2 0.670 0.610
AIC/N 2.480 3.412
Log Likelihood -11064.9 -53490.2
N 8964 31379
N. Classes 2 2
Notes: Latent Class Logit regressions estimated on the sample of Italian students enrolled for the first time in the academic year
2014-2015. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. For each field, the table reports the set of
class-specific random utility parameters (β) and the class membership probability parameters θ. The mean parameter is computed
as the average of class-specific parameter weighted for the class membership probability. Variable definitions are reported in Table
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Table 3.8b: Latent Class Logit results by field of study
Life & Natural sciences Law
Class1 Class2 Mean Class1 Class2 Mean
Random Utility Par. β
E(Scholarship)/100 0.010** 0.015*** 0.012 -0.023*** -0.028*** -0.025
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
E(Dormitory)/100 -0.090*** 0.111*** -0.041 0.184*** -0.041 0.108
(0.024) (0.027) (0.027) (0.034)
E(Student Package)/100 0.038* 0.173*** 0.071 0.059*** 0.104*** 0.074
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.015)
Places in Canteen/100 0.031*** -0.005** 0.022 0.030*** 0.010*** 0.024
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
College -0.094 -0.911*** -0.295 0.335*** 0.084 0.251
(0.081) (0.106) (0.057) (0.070)
non-DSU Scholarship/100 0.010 0.019 0.012 -0.096*** 0.131*** -0.020
(0.012) (0.029) (0.014) (0.015)
E(non-DSU Dormitory)/100 0.021 -1.403*** -0.329 0.906*** 0.538*** 0.782
(0.113) (0.371) (0.106) (0.053)
Excellence Departments 0.213*** 0.160*** 0.200 0.017 0.348*** 0.129
(0.041) (0.034) (0.038) (0.036)
Academics/100 -0.151*** -0.277*** -0.182 -0.439*** 0.072*** -0.267
(0.027) (0.042) (0.034) (0.025)
Share of Intern. Academics 0.024 -0.252*** -0.044 -0.220*** 0.183*** -0.084
(0.056) (0.053) (0.046) (0.020)
Administrative staff 0.017 -0.030 0.006 0.044*** 0.125*** 0.071
(0.015) (0.036) (0.012) (0.016)
Field of study Academics/100 0.955*** 1.212*** 1.018 1.434*** -0.102 0.917
(0.105) (0.116) (0.098) (0.110)
Public funding (Mill.) 0.002 0.010*** 0.004 0.028*** -0.008*** 0.016
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Average contribution -0.028*** 0.019*** -0.017 -0.079*** 0.006** -0.050
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.003)
HEU in province 0.796*** 0.673 0.766 1.115*** 1.599*** 1.278
(0.115) (0.473) (0.057) (0.107)
HEU in region 0.510*** 2.149*** 0.914 0.675*** 1.287*** 0.881
(0.168) (0.112) (0.082) (0.079)
Unemployment 0.029** -0.135*** -0.011 -0.067*** 0.047*** -0.029
(0.014) (0.019) (0.013) (0.014)
Distance -0.048*** -0.008*** -0.038 -0.059*** -0.010*** -0.042
(0.006) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000)
Distance2/100 0.004*** 0.0006*** 0.003 0.005*** 0.0006*** 0.003
(0.000) (0.0001) (0.000) (0.0000)
Housing price -0.029*** -0.0004 -0.022 0.061*** 0.177*** 0.100
(0.010) (0.0188) (0.010) (0.008)
Regional GDP 0.013 0.015 0.014 0.016 0.111*** 0.048
(0.013) (0.022) (0.013) (0.011)
Class Probability Par. θ
Const. -5.181*** Fixed 2.243*** Fixed
(0.880) Fixed (0.333) Fixed
Diploma Grade 0.008** Fixed -0.032*** Fixed
(0.004) Fixed (0.002) Fixed
CentreNorth -1.459*** Fixed -0.096 Fixed
(0.430) Fixed (0.141) Fixed
HEU in residence 0.168 Fixed -0.0009 Fixed
(0.315) Fixed (0.0605) Fixed
Housing price in residence 0.248*** Fixed 0.068*** Fixed
(0.047) Fixed (0.009) Fixed
Unemployment in residence 0.027 Fixed -0.005 Fixed
(0.022) Fixed (0.012) Fixed
Regional GDP in residence 0.166*** Fixed 0.009 Fixed
(0.048) Fixed (0.011) Fixed
Female -0.303*** Fixed 0.287*** Fixed
(0.113) Fixed (0.048)
Class membership prob. 0.754 0.246 0.663 0.337
BIC/N 3.131 3.257
Mc Fadden Pseudo R2 0.617 0.622
AIC/N 3.102 3.236
Log Likelihood -19655.0 -30405.3
N 12704 18822
N. Classes 2
Notes: Latent Class Logit regressions estimated on the sample of Italian students enrolled for the first time in the academic year
2014-2015. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. For each field, the table reports the set of
class-specific random utility parameters (β) and the class membership probability parameters θ. The mean parameter is computed
as the average of class-specific parameter weighted for the class membership probability. Variable definitions are reported in Table
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Table 3.8c: Latent Class Logit results by field of study
Humanities Education
Class1 Class2 Mean Class1 Class2 Mean
Random Utility Par. β
E(Scholarship)/100 -0.039*** -0.017*** -0.030 0.043*** 0.022*** 0.038
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004)
E(Dormitory)/100 -0.166*** 0.060* -0.070 0.404*** 0.233*** 0.365
(0.033) (0.034) (0.144) (0.075)
E(Student Package)/100 0.187*** -0.007 0.105 0.041 -0.115*** 0.005
(0.024) (0.020) (0.050) (0.044)
Places in Canteen/100 0.017*** -0.021*** 0.0008 0.026*** -0.0006 0.020
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.0048)
College -0.008 1.508*** 0.633 0.945*** -0.886*** 0.528
(0.074) (0.114) (0.107) (0.132)
non-DSU Scholarship/100 0.050*** 0.184*** 0.106 -0.097*** 0.123*** -0.047
(0.019) (0.013) (0.029) (0.030)
E(non-DSU Dormitory)/100 0.888*** -0.422** 0.334 1.850*** -0.351** 1.348
(0.122) (0.203) (0.196) (0.166)
Excellence Departments -0.591*** 0.053 -0.318 -0.586*** 0.273*** -0.390
(0.043) (0.042) (0.087) (0.093)
Academics/100 0.210*** -0.194*** 0.039 -0.088 -0.054 -0.080
(0.035) (0.037) (0.075) (0.071)
Share of Intern. Academics -0.032 0.084** 0.017 -0.642*** -0.534*** -0.618
(0.044) (0.034) (0.063) (0.088)
Administrative staff 0.064*** 0.076** 0.069 -0.198*** -0.033 -0.160
(0.018) (0.033) (0.042) (0.040)
Field of study Academics/100 1.194*** 1.442*** 1.299 0.949*** -0.720** 0.568
(0.105) (0.099) (0.249) (0.286)
Public funding (Mill.) -0.017*** 0.006*** -0.007 0.009* 0.004 0.008
(0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005)
Average contribution -0.140*** -0.006 -0.083 -0.083*** -0.041*** -0.073
(0.011) (0.004) (0.008) (0.012)
HEU in province 0.592*** 1.035*** 0.780 0.466*** 1.317*** 0.660
(0.070) (0.097) (0.075) (0.136)
HEU in region 0.927*** 1.423*** 1.137 0.718*** 1.249*** 0.839
(0.088) (0.074) (0.092) (0.160)
Unemployment 0.067*** -0.286*** -0.082 0.083*** -0.583*** -0.069
(0.016) (0.015) (0.025) (0.041)
Distance -0.055*** -0.011*** -0.037 -0.053*** -0.026*** -0.047
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Distance2/100 0.004*** 0.0008*** 0.003 0.004*** 0.001*** 0.003
(0.000) (0.0000) (0.000) (0.000)
Housing price 0.039*** 0.289*** 0.144 0.056*** 0.113*** 0.069
(0.014) (0.013) (0.017) (0.031)
Regional GDP -0.003 -0.132*** -0.057 -0.018 -0.003 -0.015
(0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.017)
Class Probability Par. θ
Const. 1.562*** Fixed -6.187*** Fixed
(0.395) Fixed (1.613) Fixed
Diploma Grade -0.008*** Fixed -0.007 Fixed
(0.002) Fixed (0.010) Fixed
CentreNorth 0.376** Fixed -4.741*** Fixed
(0.155) Fixed (0.987) Fixed
HEU in residence -0.469*** Fixed 0.895* Fixed
(0.076) Fixed (0.498) Fixed
Housing price in residence 0.043*** Fixed 0.676*** Fixed
(0.010) Fixed (0.083) Fixed
Unemployment in residence 0.023* Fixed -0.382*** Fixed
(0.013) Fixed (0.084) Fixed
Regional GDP in residence -0.068*** Fixed 0.330*** Fixed
(0.013) Fixed (0.072) Fixed
Female 0.175*** Fixed 1.504*** Fixed
(0.059) Fixed (0.466) Fixed
Class membership prob. 0.577 0.423 0.772 0.228
BIC/N 3.050 2.017
Mc Fadden Pseudo R2 0.633 0.739
AIC/N 3.024 1.965
Log Likelihood -21783.8 -6490.8
N 14440 6656
N. Classes 2 2
Notes: Latent Class Logit regressions estimated on the sample of Italian students enrolled for the first time in the academic year
2014-2015. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. For each field, the table reports the set of
class-specific random utility parameters (β) and the class membership probability parameters θ. The mean parameter is computed
as the average of class-specific parameter weighted for the class membership probability. Variable definitions are reported in Table
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Table 3.8d: Latent Class Logit results by field of study
Math. & Physical sciences Languages
Class1 Class2 Mean Class1 Class2 Mean
Random Utility Par. β
E(Scholarship)/100 0.016*** 0.012*** 0.014 0.016*** -0.025*** -0.007
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
E(Dormitory)/100 -0.055 0.033 -0.018 0.141*** -0.010 0.054
(0.048) (0.037) (0.037) (0.026)
E(Student Package)/100 0.351*** 0.153*** 0.267 -0.462*** -0.128*** -0.269
(0.040) (0.024) (0.046) (0.012)
Places in Canteen/100 0.015** -0.011*** 0.004 -0.025*** 0.005*** -0.008
(0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
College -0.251** 0.847*** 0.213 0.147 0.207*** 0.182
(0.125) (0.112) (0.092) (0.048)
non-DSU Scholarship/100 -0.253*** -0.010 -0.151 -0.046** 0.086*** 0.030
(0.025) (0.023) (0.020) (0.012)
E(non-DSU Dormitory)/100 0.315 -0.412** 0.009 0.505*** 0.028 0.230
(0.205) (0.161) (0.187) (0.077)
Excellence Departments 0.443*** 0.112 0.303 -0.824*** -0.210*** -0.470
(0.078) (0.073) (0.115) (0.060)
Academics/100 0.422*** -0.204*** 0.158 -0.050 -0.095*** -0.076
(0.069) (0.038) (0.038) (0.021)
Share of Intern. Academics -0.022 -0.100** -0.055 -1.097*** 0.194*** -0.352
(0.060) (0.041) (0.091) (0.020)
Administrative staff -0.088*** -0.078*** -0.084 0.038 0.121*** 0.086
(0.027) (0.028) (0.030) (0.014)
Field of study Academics/100 1.070*** 1.497*** 1.250 1.051*** 1.541*** 1.334
(0.190) (0.171) (0.120) (0.065)
Public funding (Mill.) -0.030*** 0.013*** -0.012 -0.003** -0.004*** -0.004
(0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Average contribution -0.142*** 0.053*** -0.060 -0.056*** -0.016*** -0.033
(0.023) (0.015) (0.005) (0.002)
HEU in province 0.412*** 2.074*** 1.114 -0.100 0.917*** 0.487
(0.124) (0.144) (0.091) (0.056)
HEU in region 1.714*** 1.491*** 1.619 0.228*** 1.098*** 0.730
(0.151) (0.106) (0.086) (0.054)
Unemployment -0.046* -0.157*** -0.093 -0.491*** -0.184*** -0.314
(0.028) (0.028) (0.042) (0.013)
Distance -0.072*** -0.013*** -0.047 -0.075*** -0.015*** -0.040
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000)
Distance2/100 0.005*** 0.001*** 0.004 0.006*** 0.001*** 0.003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Housing price 0.101*** 0.141*** 0.118 0.107*** 0.153*** 0.134
(0.016) (0.013) (0.015) (0.007)
Regional GDP -0.234*** -0.072*** -0.166 -0.164*** -0.066*** -0.108
(0.031) (0.022) (0.020) (0.010)
Class Probability Par. θ
Const. 2.399*** Fixed 0.926** Fixed
(0.640) Fixed (0.429) Fixed
Diploma Grade -0.025*** Fixed -0.033*** Fixed
(0.004) Fixed (0.003) Fixed
CentreNorth -0.114 Fixed 1.534*** Fixed
(0.244) Fixed (0.188) Fixed
HEU in residence -0.222 Fixed -0.217** Fixed
(0.147) Fixed (0.100) Fixed
Housing price in residence 0.009 Fixed -0.067*** Fixed
(0.016) Fixed (0.010) Fixed
Unemployment in residence -0.024 Fixed 0.032** Fixed
(0.022) Fixed (0.015) Fixed
Regional GDP in residence 0.010 Fixed 0.030** Fixed
(0.021) Fixed (0.012) Fixed
Female -0.121 Fixed 0.046 Fixed
(0.091) Fixed (0.077) Fixed
Class membership prob. 0.578 0.422 0.423 0.577
BIC/N 2.537 3.455
Mc Fadden Pseudo R2 0.677 0.567
AIC/N 2.498 3.431
Log Likelihood -11178.3 -27831.3
N 8991 16252
N. Classes 2 2
Notes: Latent Class Logit regressions estimated on the sample of Italian students enrolled for the first time in the academic year
2014-2015. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. For each field, the table reports the set of
class-specific random utility parameters (β) and the class membership probability parameters θ. The mean parameter is computed
as the average of class-specific parameter weighted for the class membership probability. Variable definitions are reported in Table
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Table 3.8e: Latent Class Logit results by field of study
Social & Political sciences Psychology
Class1 Class2 Mean Class1 Class2 Mean
Random Utility Par. β
E(Scholarship)/100 -0.033*** 0.014*** -0.016 0.093*** -0.010*** 0.021
(0.002) (0.002) (0.017) (0.004)
E(Dormitory)/100 0.151*** -0.044 0.083 2.301*** 0.131*** 0.787
(0.022) (0.046) (0.475) (0.043)
E(Student Package)/100 0.026 0.013 0.021 -1.735*** -0.335*** -0.758
(0.019) (0.016) (0.375) (0.027)
Places in Canteen/100 0.034*** -0.002 0.021 -0.033* -0.011*** -0.018
(0.003) (0.002) (0.017) (0.004)
College 0.269*** 0.453*** 0.333 -0.256 0.291*** 0.126
(0.050) (0.064) (0.571) (0.096)
non-DSU Scholarship/100 0.024* -0.088*** -0.016 -1.176*** 0.278*** -0.161
(0.012) (0.013) (0.317) (0.028)
E(non-DSU Dormitory)/100 0.219** -1.105*** -0.243 -6.482*** 0.215 -1.807
(0.092) (0.049) (1.032) (0.168)
Excellence Departments -0.024 1.022*** 0.341 2.456** -0.086 0.682
(0.081) (0.078) (1.024) (0.090)
Academics/100 -0.327*** 0.228*** -0.133 0.054 0.134** 0.110
(0.032) (0.033) (0.186) (0.056)
Share of Intern. Academics -0.227*** 0.146*** -0.097 0.805*** 0.553*** 0.629
(0.031) (0.018) (0.221) (0.062)
Administrative staff 0.035** -0.207*** -0.050 -0.609*** -0.124*** -0.270
(0.015) (0.022) (0.093) (0.026)
Field of study Academics/100 2.578*** 1.419*** 2.173 0.879 0.992*** 0.958
(0.207) (0.211) (0.732) (0.173)
Public funding (Mill.) 0.023*** 0.0002 0.015 0.028*** 0.0008 0.009
(0.002) (0.0017) (0.009) (0.0022)
Average contribution -0.068*** 0.068*** -0.020 0.037*** -0.015*** 0.0010
(0.006) (0.003) (0.008) (0.005)
HEU in province 0.245*** 1.398*** 0.648 1.368*** 0.723*** 0.918
(0.054) (0.085) (0.340) (0.108)
HEU in region 0.527*** 1.139*** 0.740 3.452*** 0.946*** 1.703
(0.065) (0.070) (0.799) (0.082)
Unemployment -0.038*** -0.158*** -0.080 -0.946*** -0.409*** -0.571
(0.013) (0.017) (0.214) (0.031)
Distance -0.054*** -0.011*** -0.039 -0.048*** -0.021*** -0.029
(0.001) (0.000) (0.010) (0.001)
Distance2/100 0.004*** 0.0006*** 0.003 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002
(0.000) (0.0000) (0.001) (0.000)
Housing price 0.023*** 0.061*** 0.036 0.426*** 0.133*** 0.221
(0.009) (0.008) (0.077) (0.017)
Regional GDP 0.082*** -0.060*** 0.033 -0.337*** -0.302*** -0.312
(0.011) (0.014) (0.091) (0.024)
Class Probability Par. θ
Const. 0.320 Fixed 4.946*** Fixed
(0.358) Fixed (0.905) Fixed
Diploma Grade -0.023*** Fixed -0.065*** Fixed
(0.002) Fixed (0.006) Fixed
CentreNorth 0.147 Fixed -0.813* Fixed
(0.167) Fixed (0.448) Fixed
HEU in residence -0.194*** Fixed 0.142 Fixed
(0.059) Fixed (0.176) Fixed
Housing price in residence 0.061*** Fixed -0.078*** Fixed
(0.008) Fixed (0.023) Fixed
Unemployment in residence 0.078*** Fixed -0.027 Fixed
(0.013) Fixed (0.028) Fixed
Regional GDP in residence 0.018 Fixed 0.010 Fixed
(0.012) Fixed (0.033) Fixed
Female 0.032 Fixed 0.904*** Fixed
(0.051) Fixed (0.156) Fixed
Class membership prob. 0.651 0.349 0.302 0.698
BIC/N 3.418 2.726
Mc Fadden Pseudo R2 0.605 0.614
AIC/N 3.398 2.667
Log Likelihood -33488.1 -7364.6
N 19739 5561
N. Classes 2 2
Notes: Latent Class Logit regressions estimated on the sample of Italian students enrolled for the first time in the academic year
2014-2015. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. For each field, the table reports the set of
class-specific random utility parameters (β) and the class membership probability parameters θ. The mean parameter is computed
as the average of class-specific parameter weighted for the class membership probability. Variable definitions are reported in Table
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Table 3.8f: Latent Class Logit results by field of study
Engineering
Class1 Class2 Class3 Class4 Mean
Random Utility Par. β
E(Scholarship)/100 -0.066*** -0.045*** 0.023*** -1.409*** -0.024
(0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.018)
E(Dormitory)/100 2.438*** 1.532*** 0.523*** 3.143*** 1.154
(0.141) (0.070) (0.023) (0.153)
E(Student Package)/100 -0.075 0.866*** 0.095*** 14.398*** 0.393
(0.078) (0.063) (0.018) (0.095)
Places in Canteen/100 -0.103*** -0.079*** -0.018*** -0.087*** -0.050
(0.013) (0.005) (0.002) (0.008)
College -5.841*** 4.006*** 1.445*** 15.830*** 0.919
(0.332) (0.181) (0.051) (0.256)
non-DSU Scholarship/100 0.196*** 0.688*** -0.113*** 3.102*** 0.179
(0.064) (0.049) (0.014) (0.064)
E(non-DSU Dormitory)/100 1.367*** -0.132** 0.064 -3.629*** 0.216
(0.191) (0.062) (0.039) (0.306)
Excellence Departments -0.852*** -0.659*** 1.007*** 2.314*** 0.251
(0.192) (0.118) (0.048) (0.198)
Academics/100 0.173 0.413*** 0.026 -1.550*** 0.139
(0.153) (0.069) (0.019) (0.117)
Share of Intern. Academics -0.101 -0.323** -0.897*** 0.281 -0.593
(0.094) (0.145) (0.029) (0.242)
Administrative staff 0.227*** 0.305*** -0.176*** -2.356*** 0.002
(0.036) (0.066) (0.020) (0.055)
Field of study Academics/100 0.942*** 1.778*** -0.362*** -7.464*** 0.364
(0.213) (0.126) (0.045) (0.280)
Public funding (Mill.) -0.015* -0.057*** 0.004*** 0.387*** -0.012
(0.009) (0.007) (0.001) (0.010)
Average contribution 0.029*** -0.669*** -0.400*** 0.706*** -0.382
(0.007) (0.027) (0.009) (0.011)
HEU in province 0.941*** 1.370*** 1.509*** 5.863 1.409
(0.103) (0.082) (0.032) (5.902)
HEU in region 1.952*** 1.523*** 1.606*** 17.108*** 1.787
(0.315) (0.088) (0.045) (0.450)
Unemployment 0.559*** -0.345*** -0.412*** 4.579*** -0.174
(0.037) (0.054) (0.015) (0.054)
Distance -0.114*** -0.014*** -0.024*** -0.008*** -0.038
(0.006) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
Distance2/100 0.008** 0.0009*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003
(0.003) (0.0000) (0.000) (0.000)
Housing price 0.075** 0.498*** 0.234*** 0.425*** 0.275
(0.036) (0.024) (0.007) (0.044)
Regional GDP -0.026 -0.235*** 0.038*** 2.579*** -0.022
(0.035) (0.045) (0.009) (0.038)
Class Probability Par. θ
Const. -2.126 -5.361*** 7.686*** Fixed
(1.433) (1.391) (1.423) Fixed
Diploma Grade 0.0001 0.067*** -0.034*** Fixed
(0.0084) (0.008) (0.009) Fixed
CentreNorth -1.849*** -1.042** 0.332 Fixed
(0.553) (0.500) (0.509) Fixed
HEU in residence 1.413*** 1.255*** 2.118*** Fixed
(0.331) (0.329) (0.330) Fixed
Housing price in residence 0.565*** 0.508*** 0.541*** Fixed
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) Fixed
Unemployment in residence 0.054 -0.025 -0.244*** Fixed
(0.037) (0.036) (0.039) Fixed
Regional GDP in residence 0.080* 0.047 -0.070 Fixed
(0.047) (0.043) (0.044) Fixed
Female -2.761*** -2.803*** -3.327*** Fixed
(0.204) (0.203) (0.207) Fixed
Class membership prob. 0.181 0.259 0.551 0.009
BIC/N 3.052
Mc Fadden Pseudo R2 0.634
AIC/N 3.024
Log Likelihood -49222.9
N 32628
N. Classes 4
Notes: Latent Class Logit regressions estimated on the sample of Italian students enrolled for the first time in the academic year
2014-2015. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. For each field, the table reports the set of
class-specific random utility parameters (β) and the class membership probability parameters θ. The mean parameter is computed
as the average of class-specific parameter weighted for the class membership probability. Variable definitions are reported in Table
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These results confirm the heterogeneity in students’ preferences based on the field of study
chosen. Moreover, LCM’s estimates suggest that there is substantial heterogeneity between
different groups of students that depends upon students’ characteristics. Indeed, the sign and
the relative magnitude of random utility parameters change on the basis of the latent class
estimated.
Focusing on the effect DSU’s policies we can see that E(Scholarship) has a positive coef-
ficient in 6 fields considered while E(Dormitory) and E(StudentPackage) have, respectively,
positive coefficients in 8 of the fields considered.18 Moreover, the relative magnitude of the
coefficients associated with places in-kind policies is most of the cases much higher than the
one associated with E(Scholarships). These results confirm our interpretation of CL results
about the importance of places in dormitories and student packages in reducing substantially
the costs sustained by students. Interestingly, we have that the effect of these policies changes
among classes on the basis of individual characteristics. For example, considering Business &
Statistics the estimated coefficient of E(Dormitory) is positive for 72.3% of students whereas
is negative for the remaining 27.7%. Moreover, if we consider the individual characteristics,
we can note that this parameter is more likely to be positive if the student is female, resides
in a region in the Centre-North and does not have an HEU in her city of residence. In the
next section, we present a further interpretation of the relationship between our main variable
of interest and individual characteristics of students. In this section, we focus on the average
effect of the various determinants of students’ utility analyzed.
With regards to non-DSU policies we can note that, differently from the CL estimates, LCM
results indicate that the E(non − DSUDormitory) have a positive effect in the majority of
the field considered. However, non −DSUScholarships have still a negative effect in 7 of 11
fields. Another difference between CL and LCM is related to the effect of colleges. Indeed,
although the effect is heterogeneous among classes, we have that the presence of one college
has a positive effect in all the fields considered except for Life & Natural Sciences.
With relationship to the other determinants of students’ utility, we can highlight some
interesting elements. Differently from the CL, the LCM estimates a positive and heterogeneous
effect of the number of academics in 6 fields. However, the number of academics employed in
the specific field is still more important than the general one and has a positive and very strong
18The coefficients related to E(StudentPackage) in Social & Political sciences is not significant in both classes
identified
141
effect in all the fields considered. Moreover, the results regarding the number of departments
of excellence and the average contribution are confirmed: students tend to prefer universities
with a higher quality of research and lower average contributions.
Concerning hosting areas’ characteristics we have that LCM’s results are, in general, in line
with the one presented in the previous section. In particular, we have that students prefer
HEUs located in their region or their province of residence or HEUs closer to their residence.
Moreover, we can see that, in general, students prefer to locate in areas with a higher housing
price, a lower unemployment rate, and a higher GDP. These elements confirm that students
tend to locate in areas with better socio-economic conditions.
In the next sections, we further explore the effect of our main variable of interest exploiting
the individual distribution of parameters to better understand the effect of these policies on
specific groups of students.
Semi-elasticity results
Table 3.9 shows the results regarding the sensitivity of students’ choice probabilities to DSU’s
indicators in terms of semi-elasticities computed according to Eq. (3.16) by considering the
individual distribution of parameters. Each semi-elasticity measures the percentage change in
students’ choice probabilities caused by a 1% increase in the service indicator.
The results in Table 3.9 confirm the presence of heterogeneity in preferences that depend
on the field of study chosen. Moreover, if we consider the average effect we can see that the
results of CL and LCM are confirmed: only places in dormitories and student packages have
a positive effect on students’ choices probabilities. Indeed, a 1% increase in E(Scholarship)
is associated with an average decrease in choice probabilities of -0.125%. Another element to
note is that the figures in the row Average are computed on the basis of the distribution of
individual parameters using the entire sample of students. Therefore, although the results are
heterogeneous in each field, these elasticities can be used to infer the behavioral response of the
majority of students in our sample.
Given the individual distribution of parameters, we can explore how the effects of these
policies change on the basis of individual characteristics. In this respect, Figure 3.1 reports
the results of non parametric regressions between individual semi-elasticities and the percentile
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Table 3.9: Average semi-elasticities to DSU policies
Expected
Scholarships
Expected Places in
Dormitory
Expected Student
Packages
Average -0.125 0.176 0.163
Social & Political sciences -0.203 0.036 0.034
Psychology 0.310 0.430 -0.984
Math. & Physical sciences 0.199 -0.003 0.389
Life & Natural sciences 0.141 -0.006 0.116
Law -0.388 0.048 0.122
Languages -0.124 0.043 -0.395
Humanities -0.564 -0.024 0.179
Engineering -0.415 0.716 0.756
Education 0.399 0.156 0.009
Chemistry & Pharmacy 0.573 0.073 0.502
Business & Statistics -0.002 0.055 0.025
Notes: The table reports the average individual semi-elasticities computed using the parameters estimated with
the Latent Class Logit model by field of study. Columns 1, 2 and 3 report the semi-elasticities with respect to
a 1% increase in, respectively, Expected Scholarships, Expected Places in Dormitories and Expected Student
Packages. Each semi-elasticity is computed according to formula (3.16).
distribution of high school diploma grades for female and male students. Figures 3A.1-3A.3 in
the Appendix report the results of this exercise for each field of study considered.
The results in Figure 3.1 evidences a clear path. Indeed, the effect of these policies is always
stronger in absolute terms for students with higher diploma grades. Moreover, we can note that
male students are, on average, more interested in these policies. In fact, even though the semi-
elasticities for scholarships are always negative, we can see that the effect is weaker for these
students. This element is even clearer if we consider places in dormitories.
These results are very interesting. In fact, while confirming the positive effect of in-kind
policies, these results highlight also that these policies are more effective in attracting students
with better grades and, therefore, in increasing the average quality of students. For example,
the semi-elasticity for students package range from 0.1 for male students at the bottom of
diploma grades distribution to around 0.5 if we consider students at the top. Although there
are differences in magnitude, this effect is confirmed for male and female students.
Willingness to travel results
In this section, we give a further interpretation of the results with respect to the effect of
distance on students’ utility and their willingness to travel (WTT). Table 3.10 reports the
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Figure 3.1: Individual semi-elasticities with respect to High School Diploma Grade
Notes: The figure reports the results of non parametric regressions between semi-elasticities with respect to DSU’s policy indicators
and the percentile distribution of high school diploma grade. The regressions are estimated considering the samples of male and
female students. Semi-elasticities measure the percentage change in students’ choices probabilities caused by a 1% increase in the
DSU indicator. Each semi-elasticity is computed on the basis of the individual distribution of parameters estimated with the LCM.
In each plot we report the information regarding the kernel function used, the degree of the polynomial and the bandwidth chosen.
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Table 3.10: Average willingness to travel for a 1% increase in DSU indicators
Expected
Scholarships
Expected Places in
Dormitory
Expected Student
Packages
Average -0.1890 0.0474 0.0258
Social & Political sciences 0.0174 0.0249 0.0057
Psychology 0.1570 -0.6906 0.2536
Math. & Physical sciences 0.1089 0.1956 0.0004
Life & Natural sciences 0.1325 0.1200 0.0063
Law -1.8494 0.7203 -0.0765
Languages -0.2462 -0.2687 0.0077
Humanities -0.2774 0.0670 -0.0045
Engineering 0.2300 -0.1501 0.0934
Education 0.2568 -0.0280 0.0992
Chemistry & Pharmacy 0.3905 0.2149 0.1004
Business & Statistics -0.2255 0.0450 -0.0094
Notes: The table reports the average individual willingness to travel (WTT) computed according to the pa-
rameters estimated with the Latent Class Logit model by field of study. Each WTT measures the number of
additional kilometers that the student is willing to travel from the chosen distance for a 1% increase in DSU
indicators. Columns 1, 2 and 3 report the results with respect to, respectively, Expected Scholarships, Expected
Places in Dormitories and Expected Student Packages. Each WTT is computed according to formula (3.17).
results regarding the average WTT of students for a 1% increase in DSU indicators. These
measures are estimated according to the individual distribution of parameters using Eq. (3.17).
Each WTT measures the additional number of kilometers that the student is willing to travel
considering the chosen distance.
The figures in Table 3.10 confirm our previous results regarding the effect in terms of signs
of our variables of interest. However, by comparing Tables 3.10 and 3.9 we can notice that
the negative effect of E(Scholarship) is stronger than the positive effect of E(Dormitory) and
E(StudentPackage). This result is confirmed also by looking at the values for each field of
study. For example, we have that the students’ WTT for E(StudentPackage) is lower than
0.001 (1 meter) in 5 fields considered. This result can be related to the disutility of distance.
Indeed, the students that are more likely to be interested in these in-kind policies are those
who have already traveled outside of their city to reach the university (out-of-site students).
Therefore, given that the disutility of distance si increasing in the number of kilometers, we
have that the ratio in Eq. (3.17) assumes lower values. This effect is clear if we look at Figure
3.2.
The first plot in Figure 3.2 reports the results of non parametric regressions estimated be-
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tween individual WTT for DSU’s indicators and the distance between students’ city of residence
and HEU’s hosting city. The second plot reports the information regarding a non paramet-
ric regression of the estimated utility of distance. Figures 3A.4-3A.7 in Appendix report the
results for each field of study considered. These plots are computed by using the individual
distribution of parameters estimated with the LCM.
Results in Figure 3.2 confirm those of Table 3.10. Indeed, we can see that the effect of
E(Scholarship) is negative whereas those of E(Dormitory) and E(StudentPackage) are posi-
tive. Moreover, the effect related toE(Dormitory) is stronger than the one of E(StudentPackage)
and the difference between their magnitude grows with the distance. Although the results for
in-kind benefits are expected, the one related to scholarships is still counterintuitive. Indeed,
the negative effect of this policy is stronger for students that have already traveled to reach
their university. However, if we consider the absolute change in DSU indicators we can have a
clearer picture. Indeed, as we can see from Table 3.1, a 1% increase in E(Scholarship) indicate
25 additional scholarships whereas a 1% increase in E(Dormitory) and E(StudentPackage)
means, respectively, 0.87 and 3.21 additional places. Therefore, if we consider the unitary effect
we can see that, although negative, the effects related to E(Scholarship) are much lower than
those of in-kind benefits.
Figure 3.3 reports the result of non parametric regressions between individual WTT and dis-
tance by splitting the sample on the basis of students’ macroregion of residence. The results of
these regressions confirm those shown in Figure 3.2. Indeed, the effect related to E(Dormitory)
and E(StudentPackage) is positive in all the sample considered. Moreover, we can see that the
magnitude of WTTs associated with the former policy is stronger than those associated with
E(StudentPackage). With respect to the macroregion of residence, we can see that DSU’s
policies have a stronger effect on students in Centre-North. This difference increases with the
number of kilometers traveled by the students.
Although the magnitude of the effects is small, these results indicate that in-kind policies
can be more attractive for students who reside in Centre-North that have already traveled more
than 200 kilometers. Therefore, these policies can be a useful tool to attract students that have
already decided to move outside their region. However, the magnitude of the WTTs suggests
that, to have a relevant effect on these students, DSU offices need to strongly increase their
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Figure 3.2: Individual willingness to travel and utility of distance
Notes: The first plot of the figure reports the result of a non parametric regression between individual WTT to DSU’s policies
indicators and the distance between students’ city of residence and HEU’s hosting city. The second plot reports the result of a non
parametric regression between individual utility functions and the distance between students’ city of residence and HEU’s hosting
city. Each regression is estimated using the individual distribution of parameters estimated through the LCM. Each WTT measures
the number of additional kilometers that the student is willing to travel with respect to the chosen HEU for a 1% increase in DSU
policy indicators. In each plot we report the information regarding the kernel function used, the degree of the polynomial and the
bandwidth chosen.
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supply of in-kind benefits.
3.7 Conclusion
In this study, we have investigated the effect of financial and in-kind aid programs on the loca-
tion decision process of Italian high school leavers that decide to enroll in an Italian university.
The phenomenon has been analyzed by using administrative data regarding the entire pop-
ulation of students enrolled in an Italian university in the academic year 2014-2015 for the
first time. This data has been linked with a dataset containing detailed information regard-
ing the financial and in-kind aid program called Diritto allo studio universitario. This unique
dataset has permitted to separately consider the effects of the different services provided by
the program.
The empirical analysis has been carried by accounting explicitly for the existence of hetero-
geneity in students’ preferences. In particular, we have split the entire sample of Italian students
according to their field of study in 11 groups: business & statistics, chemistry & pharmacy,
education, engineering, humanities, languages, law, life & natural sciences, mathematical and
physical sciences, psychology, social & political sciences. Moreover, we have taken advantage
of a discrete choice Latent Class Logit model. This approach has permitted to explore the
heterogeneity in students’ preferences caused by differences in individual characteristics. This
is the first work that considers this approach in modeling students’ location choices.
The estimates have been exploited by computing students’ willingness to travel measures
and semi-elasticities, this way allowing for a better interpretation of Latent Class Logit results.
Our results provide clear evidence of the existence of heterogeneity in students’ preferences
regarding aid policies and university characteristics among different fields and with respect
to their individual characteristics. This result calls for further investigation into students’
preferences heterogeneity in order to have a better understanding of the elements that affect
universities’ attractiveness. In this way will be possible to target the policies to more sensitive
groups and to have more effective instruments to improve universities’ attractiveness.
With respect to the effect of financial and in-kind aid policies, our results suggest that
scholarships alone are not an effective instrument in attracting more students at the destination
universities. In fact, willingness to pay estimates indicate that students are almost insensitive
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or negatively affected by the number of expected scholarships. This result can be related to
the fact that these policies are not able to cover the entire students’ migration and locations
costs. These results are confirmed by semi-elasticity results. In fact, we have found that choice
probabilities are negatively affected by scholarships. Moreover, this effect is stronger for female
students and students at the top of the diploma grade distribution.
Concerning places in dormitories with and without scholarships we have a different picture.
In this case, we have found that in-kind policies have a positive effect on students choice
probabilities. These results are confirmed both using semi-elasticities measures and WTT.
However, the magnitude of WTTs suggest that DSUs offices should increase significantly their
supply of in-kind services in order to attract students that reside in very distant areas. With
respect to the results in terms of semi-elasticities we can highlight some interesting elements.
First, the effect of in-kind policies is stronger for male students than for female students. Second,
the effect of these policies increase when student’s diploma grade increases. This last effect is
even clearer if we consider student packages.
Therefore, this study has provided evidence on the effectiveness of financial and in-kind
services in attracting high school leavers that decide to enroll in an Italian university. Our
results suggest that scholarships alone are not enough but that they need to be provided along
with places in dormitories to be effective. Moreover, this combination is stronger for students
with better grades, this way suggesting that an increase in DSU’s service supply can improve
the average quality of the students in the area in which the services are provided.
3.7.1 Scope for future research
This study has provided evidence of the presence of heterogeneity in students’ preferences.
However, a better understanding of this phenomenon could be reached by considering more
detailed information on students’ individual characteristics and university characteristics. In
particular, a better proxy of students’ performances in high school could be useful to understand
the effect of DSU policies on the average quality of students.
Moreover, one clear step forward in the understanding the determinants of students’ loca-
tion choices could be to model the possibility for students to opt-out from the Italian Higher
Education system. These choices can be investigated by using accessible administrative data
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regarding Italian high school leavers in general and their family background.19
19e.g. see Dardanoni, Laudicella, and Li Donni (2018) that have investigated patients’ hospital choices in the
National Health Service system in England.
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Appendix
3.A Appendix
Table 3A.1: Conditional Logit Estimates: Interactions with individual variables
Chemistry &
Pharmacy
Business &
Statistics
Life &
Natural sciences Engineering Law Education
E(Scholarship)/100 0.005 0.065*** -0.003 -0.020 0.025* 0.005
(0.018) (0.009) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.042)
E(Scholarship)/100 × CentreNorth -0.031 -0.040*** 0.0008 -0.213*** -0.006 0.002
(0.023) (0.011) (0.0191) (0.028) (0.017) (0.049)
E(Scholarship)/100 × Female 0.017*** 0.002 -0.002 0.0010 0.003 -0.019
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.0027) (0.002) (0.012)
E(Scholarship)/100 × Higher Unemp. in res. 0.025 -0.069*** 0.0004 -0.016 -0.042*** 0.046
(0.017) (0.009) (0.0161) (0.013) (0.013) (0.040)
E(Scholarship)/100 × Higher GDP in res. 0.040** 0.004 0.011 0.241*** -0.006 0.040
(0.016) (0.007) (0.011) (0.026) (0.010) (0.042)
E(Scholarship)/100 × Higher Housing Price in res. -0.011 -0.009*** -0.013** 0.027*** -0.012*** 0.004
(0.008) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.017)
E(Scholarship)/100 × HEU in residence 0.012 -0.009*** 0.010** 0.009*** -0.002 -0.003
(0.008) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.014)
E(Scholarship)/100 × Grade: 76-85 0.005 -0.009*** 0.003 -0.002 -0.008*** -0.0004
(0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.0069)
E(Scholarship)/100 × Grade: 86-95 0.006 -0.013*** 0.005 -0.012*** -0.008*** -0.001
(0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009)
E(Scholarship)/100 × Grade: 96-102 0.005 -0.011*** 0.010** -0.015*** -0.018*** -0.044***
(0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.015)
E(Dormitory)/100 0.241 0.559*** 0.176 0.606*** 0.100 -0.619
(0.208) (0.110) (0.141) (0.101) (0.187) (1.098)
E(Dormitory)/100 × CentreNorth -0.399 -0.498*** 0.096 -0.965*** 0.112 -0.115
(0.283) (0.123) (0.171) (0.154) (0.231) (1.109)
E(Dormitory)/100 × Female 0.122*** 0.024 -0.009 -0.071*** 0.001 -0.018
(0.035) (0.020) (0.028) (0.025) (0.028) (0.255)
E(Dormitory)/100 × Higher Unemp. in res. 0.100 -0.534*** -0.027 -0.431*** -0.007 0.381
(0.203) (0.108) (0.139) (0.099) (0.185) (1.065)
E(Dormitory)/100 × Higher GDP in res. 0.163 0.036 -0.315*** 0.436*** -0.229 1.592**
(0.199) (0.072) (0.103) (0.128) (0.139) (0.623)
E(Dormitory)/100 × Higher Housing Price in res. -0.012 -0.065*** -0.098*** 0.101*** 0.141*** 0.209
(0.045) (0.023) (0.038) (0.033) (0.034) (0.315)
E(Dormitory)/100 × HEU in residence 0.153** 0.077*** -0.016 0.122*** 0.136*** -0.539
(0.068) (0.027) (0.042) (0.031) (0.038) (0.339)
E(Dormitory)/100 × Grade: 76-85 -0.029 0.049** -0.005 0.116*** 0.052 0.401***
(0.041) (0.023) (0.032) (0.028) (0.032) (0.136)
E(Dormitory)/100 × Grade: 86-95 -0.025 0.039 0.028 0.163*** 0.070* 0.484***
(0.047) (0.028) (0.038) (0.031) (0.038) (0.183)
E(Dormitory)/100 × Grade: 96-102 -0.052 0.047 0.082* 0.314*** 0.166*** 0.556**
(0.053) (0.033) (0.043) (0.032) (0.044) (0.284)
E(Student Pkg)/100 -0.278** -0.221*** -0.131* 0.234*** 0.113 -0.244
(0.113) (0.051) (0.073) (0.066) (0.073) (0.256)
E(Student Pkg)/100 × CentreNorth 0.470** 0.256*** 0.549*** 1.017*** 0.063 0.832**
(0.190) (0.061) (0.099) (0.124) (0.122) (0.366)
E(Student Pkg)/100 × Female -0.0002 0.018 -0.030 -0.034* 0.002 -0.185*
(0.0314) (0.012) (0.021) (0.019) (0.016) (0.105)
E(Student Pkg)/100 × Higher Unemp. in res. 0.360*** 0.362*** 0.344*** 0.229*** -0.032 0.321
(0.108) (0.050) (0.071) (0.064) (0.072) (0.236)
E(Student Pkg)/100 × Higher GDP in res. 0.133 -0.059 -0.329*** -0.919*** -0.092 -0.385
(0.161) (0.043) (0.077) (0.110) (0.101) (0.352)
E(Student Pkg)/100 × Higher Housing Price in res. -0.031 -0.069*** -0.145*** -0.392*** -0.045** -0.116
(0.037) (0.020) (0.043) (0.025) (0.020) (0.134)
E(Student Pkg)/100 × HEU in residence -0.029 -0.055*** 0.042 -0.041* -0.064*** 0.165
(0.064) (0.014) (0.030) (0.023) (0.021) (0.129)
E(Student Pkg)/100 × Grade: 76-85 -0.026 -0.051*** -0.007 -0.026 0.018 0.023
(0.037) (0.014) (0.024) (0.021) (0.019) (0.060)
E(Student Pkg)/100 × Grade: 86-95 -0.045 -0.025 0.005 0.032 -0.016 -0.011
(0.041) (0.017) (0.028) (0.023) (0.022) (0.086)
E(Student Pkg)/100 × Grade: 96-102 -0.017 -0.040** -0.056* -0.006 -0.071*** -0.106
(0.044) (0.019) (0.031) (0.024) (0.026) (0.125)
Pl. in Canteen/100 0.018 0.055*** -0.031*** 0.025*** 0.004 0.061**
(0.016) (0.005) (0.011) (0.005) (0.009) (0.024)
Pl. in Canteen/100 × CentreNorth -0.060*** -0.014** 0.013 -0.076*** -0.029** -0.073**
(0.021) (0.007) (0.013) (0.008) (0.013) (0.031)
Pl. in Canteen/100 × Female -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.00007 0.006
(0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.00247) (0.010)
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Pl. in Canteen/100 × Higher Unemp. in res. -0.033** -0.004 0.035*** -0.009* 0.014 -0.080***
(0.015) (0.005) (0.011) (0.005) (0.009) (0.022)
Pl. in Canteen/100 × Higher GDP in res. 0.036** -0.008 0.044*** 0.014** 0.036*** 0.034
(0.015) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.027)
Pl. in Canteen/100 × Higher Housing Price in res. -0.015** 0.0005 0.001 0.018*** -0.002 0.006
(0.006) (0.0025) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.012)
Pl. in Canteen/100 × HEU in residence -0.018** -0.015*** -0.004 -0.007*** -0.018*** 0.014
(0.009) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.012)
Pl. in Canteen/100 × Grade: 76-85 0.008 -0.001 -0.004 0.002 0.004 -0.0008
(0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.0062)
Pl. in Canteen/100 × Grade: 86-95 0.009 -0.006** -0.008* 0.005* 0.006* 0.007
(0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009)
Pl. in Canteen/100 × Grade: 96-102 0.014** -0.005* 0.003 0.009*** 0.003 0.005
(0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.016)
College -1.058** 0.081 -1.405*** 0.748*** 0.067 -4.660***
(0.465) (0.151) (0.277) (0.162) (0.332) (0.723)
College × CentreNorth 0.223 0.309 0.382 1.660*** 1.443*** 5.269***
(0.776) (0.239) (0.420) (0.292) (0.503) (0.823)
College × Female -0.424*** -0.026 -0.048 0.108** -0.069 0.019
(0.096) (0.040) (0.070) (0.052) (0.058) (0.248)
College × Higher Unemp. in res. 0.847* 0.224 0.553** -0.116 -0.530 3.506***
(0.450) (0.143) (0.265) (0.154) (0.327) (0.660)
College × Higher GDP in res. 1.501** -0.737*** 0.818** -0.908*** -1.054*** 0.113
(0.640) (0.202) (0.337) (0.261) (0.386) (0.843)
College × Higher Housing Price in res. 0.249** 0.258*** 0.078 -0.336*** 0.651*** -0.138
(0.122) (0.052) (0.100) (0.065) (0.070) (0.285)
College × HEU in residence 0.028 0.178*** -0.139 0.205*** -0.494*** 0.868***
(0.176) (0.051) (0.098) (0.063) (0.081) (0.289)
College × Grade: 76-85 0.178 0.160*** 0.043 0.049 0.042 -0.118
(0.112) (0.046) (0.081) (0.057) (0.067) (0.140)
College × Grade: 86-95 0.071 0.344*** 0.476*** 0.240*** 0.118 0.148
(0.128) (0.057) (0.095) (0.064) (0.079) (0.200)
College × Grade: 96-102 0.277* 0.474*** 0.572*** 0.531*** 0.230** 0.239
(0.144) (0.066) (0.106) (0.068) (0.095) (0.319)
non-DSU Scholar./100 -0.178* -0.303*** -0.208*** 0.078** -0.236*** 0.325**
(0.108) (0.037) (0.065) (0.039) (0.072) (0.159)
non-DSU Scholar./100 × CentreNorth 0.434*** -0.005 -0.029 0.296*** 0.248*** 0.034
(0.134) (0.045) (0.073) (0.071) (0.092) (0.201)
non-DSU Scholar./100 × Female -0.121*** -0.030*** 0.014 0.006 0.0006 0.047
(0.021) (0.010) (0.015) (0.013) (0.0147) (0.072)
non-DSU Scholar./100 × Higher Unemp. in res. -0.058 0.247*** 0.151** 0.122*** 0.269*** -0.297**
(0.104) (0.035) (0.062) (0.035) (0.071) (0.138)
non-DSU Scholar./100 × Higher GDP in res. -0.352*** 0.124*** 0.302*** -0.358*** -0.162*** -0.345*
(0.086) (0.032) (0.041) (0.064) (0.060) (0.197)
non-DSU Scholar./100 × Higher Housing Price in res. 0.045 0.024** 0.021 0.048** 0.103*** -0.117
(0.028) (0.012) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.075)
non-DSU Scholar./100 × HEU in residence -0.078** 0.043*** -0.040** -0.032** -0.012 0.094
(0.035) (0.012) (0.019) (0.015) (0.019) (0.074)
non-DSU Scholar./100 × Grade: 76-85 -0.025 0.076*** -0.011 0.015 0.003 -0.053
(0.024) (0.011) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.040)
non-DSU Scholar./100 × Grade: 86-95 -0.017 0.154*** -0.021 0.029* 0.020 -0.0005
(0.028) (0.014) (0.020) (0.016) (0.020) (0.0590)
non-DSU Scholar./100 × Grade: 96-102 -0.004 0.156*** -0.026 0.012 0.040* 0.051
(0.033) (0.016) (0.022) (0.017) (0.023) (0.088)
E(non-DSU Dorm.)/100 0.480 0.324** 3.610*** -0.504*** 0.490** 1.494
(1.082) (0.127) (0.395) (0.117) (0.200) (1.350)
E(non-DSU Dorm.)/100 × CentreNorth -0.476 0.142 -4.681*** 0.882*** -0.374 -1.161
(1.437) (0.154) (0.589) (0.171) (0.272) (1.443)
E(non-DSU Dorm.)/100 × Female -0.675*** -0.065 -0.181 -0.034 0.008 1.270***
(0.229) (0.040) (0.124) (0.032) (0.056) (0.404)
E(non-DSU Dorm.)/100 × Higher Unemp. in res. -2.636** -0.064 -3.705*** -0.229** -0.109 -2.836**
(1.052) (0.119) (0.380) (0.112) (0.192) (1.286)
E(non-DSU Dorm.)/100 × Higher GDP in res. -1.719* -0.660*** 1.132** -0.504*** 0.210 -1.008
(1.044) (0.115) (0.486) (0.140) (0.203) (1.354)
E(non-DSU Dorm.)/100 × Higher Housing Price in res. 0.867** 0.479*** 0.040 -0.075* 0.224*** 1.848***
(0.393) (0.059) (0.237) (0.039) (0.085) (0.488)
E(non-DSU Dorm.)/100 × HEU in residence -0.602 0.289*** -0.100 0.270*** 0.220*** 0.157
(0.419) (0.046) (0.175) (0.038) (0.070) (0.502)
E(non-DSU Dorm.)/100 × Grade: 76-85 -0.124 0.057 0.050 0.136*** 0.173** -0.076
(0.270) (0.048) (0.147) (0.039) (0.069) (0.220)
E(non-DSU Dorm.)/100 × Grade: 86-95 -0.082 -0.079 0.286* 0.227*** 0.247*** 0.065
(0.301) (0.054) (0.162) (0.042) (0.079) (0.301)
E(non-DSU Dorm.)/100 × Grade: 96-102 -0.512 -0.216*** 0.308* 0.391*** 0.373*** 0.343
(0.333) (0.061) (0.181) (0.041) (0.087) (0.461)
Excellence Dept. -0.905*** 0.797*** 1.060*** 0.703*** 0.390*** -0.751
(0.301) (0.093) (0.147) (0.151) (0.125) (0.716)
Excellence Dept. × CentreNorth 1.108*** -0.230** -0.600*** 2.467*** -0.018 0.004
(0.377) (0.105) (0.162) (0.293) (0.136) (0.705)
Excellence Dept. × Female -0.298*** -0.036 -0.101*** -0.092** -0.006 -0.303*
(0.062) (0.023) (0.034) (0.043) (0.032) (0.179)
Excellence Dept. × Higher Unemp. in res. 0.252 -0.322*** -1.004*** -0.724*** -0.112 1.455**
(0.289) (0.089) (0.143) (0.145) (0.118) (0.689)
Excellence Dept. × Higher GDP in res. -0.652*** -0.408*** -0.388*** -2.585*** -0.206*** 0.648
(0.248) (0.068) (0.084) (0.270) (0.076) (0.491)
Excellence Dept. × Higher Housing Price in res. 0.215** -0.453*** -0.039 -0.290*** -0.172*** -0.131
(0.085) (0.030) (0.046) (0.059) (0.046) (0.203)
Excellence Dept. × HEU in residence -0.122 -0.075*** -0.061 -0.002 0.518*** -0.556***
(0.103) (0.029) (0.045) (0.050) (0.038) (0.202)
Excellence Dept. × Grade: 76-85 0.023 -0.079*** 0.127*** 0.086* 0.005 0.205**
(0.071) (0.027) (0.039) (0.048) (0.038) (0.096)
Excellence Dept. × Grade: 86-95 0.125 -0.067** 0.228*** 0.278*** 0.041 0.012
(0.086) (0.033) (0.046) (0.054) (0.046) (0.135)
Excellence Dept. × Grade: 96-102 -0.007 -0.056 0.298*** 0.316*** -0.011 0.365*
(0.099) (0.039) (0.054) (0.056) (0.053) (0.219)
Academics/100 0.255 0.120** -0.194* -0.528*** 0.262** 0.667
(0.326) (0.061) (0.107) (0.064) (0.124) (0.469)
Academics/100 × CentreNorth -0.223 0.028 -0.024 -0.607*** -0.474*** -0.281
(0.419) (0.080) (0.130) (0.109) (0.153) (0.466)
Academics/100 × Female 0.202*** 0.003 -0.022 0.079*** 0.007 -0.215
(0.069) (0.017) (0.031) (0.024) (0.024) (0.157)
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Academics/100 × Higher Unemp. in res. -0.710** -0.178*** -0.116 0.397*** -0.296** -0.488
(0.317) (0.057) (0.099) (0.057) (0.121) (0.442)
Academics/100 × Higher GDP in res. 0.035 0.152** 0.161* 0.628*** 0.301*** -0.158
(0.299) (0.063) (0.090) (0.101) (0.101) (0.330)
Academics/100 × Higher Housing Price in res. -0.181 -0.064*** -0.009 0.351*** -0.111*** -0.284
(0.121) (0.023) (0.045) (0.038) (0.031) (0.176)
Academics/100 × HEU in residence -0.202* -0.088*** -0.098** -0.165*** 0.014 -0.028
(0.119) (0.021) (0.039) (0.026) (0.031) (0.199)
Academics/100 × Grade: 76-85 0.062 -0.016 0.042 -0.011 -0.048* -0.061
(0.082) (0.021) (0.038) (0.027) (0.029) (0.092)
Academics/100 × Grade: 86-95 0.019 -0.034 0.007 -0.042 0.008 -0.062
(0.092) (0.025) (0.043) (0.030) (0.034) (0.134)
Academics/100 × Grade: 96-102 -0.054 -0.022 0.139*** -0.098*** -0.020 -0.079
(0.098) (0.029) (0.042) (0.031) (0.039) (0.221)
Share of Intern. Acad. -0.434 -0.268*** -0.425** 0.047 -0.657*** -1.714***
(0.486) (0.054) (0.177) (0.096) (0.107) (0.297)
Share of Intern. Acad. × CentreNorth -0.689 0.113* 0.425** -0.526*** 0.362*** 0.851***
(0.654) (0.061) (0.197) (0.143) (0.131) (0.299)
Share of Intern. Acad. × Female -0.255*** 0.002 -0.071* 0.072** -0.005 -0.110
(0.075) (0.013) (0.042) (0.033) (0.023) (0.146)
Share of Intern. Acad. × Higher Unemp. in res. -0.067 0.143*** -0.034 -0.303*** 0.517*** 0.800***
(0.475) (0.051) (0.168) (0.090) (0.104) (0.220)
Share of Intern. Acad. × Higher GDP in res. 1.015** -0.022 0.129 -0.013 0.122 0.830***
(0.450) (0.040) (0.102) (0.118) (0.082) (0.257)
Share of Intern. Acad. × Higher Housing Price in res. -0.211** 0.040** -0.124** -0.053 0.075** -0.666***
(0.091) (0.017) (0.055) (0.036) (0.030) (0.130)
Share of Intern. Acad. × HEU in residence -0.408*** 0.091*** 0.157*** -0.136*** -0.017 0.349**
(0.143) (0.015) (0.056) (0.042) (0.029) (0.154)
Share of Intern. Acad. × Grade: 76-85 -0.055 0.157*** -0.038 -0.054 0.201*** 0.003
(0.085) (0.016) (0.048) (0.034) (0.031) (0.085)
Share of Intern. Acad. × Grade: 86-95 -0.295*** 0.261*** -0.001 -0.069* 0.286*** 0.085
(0.110) (0.019) (0.057) (0.040) (0.034) (0.121)
Share of Intern. Acad. × Grade: 96-102 -0.178 0.360*** 0.067 -0.041 0.406*** 0.194
(0.132) (0.021) (0.064) (0.041) (0.037) (0.182)
Admin. staff -0.250** -0.147*** 0.115* -0.081* -0.191*** -0.136
(0.116) (0.047) (0.060) (0.044) (0.064) (0.237)
Admin. staff × CentreNorth 0.216 0.066 -0.040 0.419*** 0.269*** -0.022
(0.135) (0.063) (0.075) (0.099) (0.093) (0.237)
Admin. staff × Female -0.097*** -0.006 -0.009 -0.023* -0.003 0.172**
(0.033) (0.011) (0.017) (0.014) (0.013) (0.086)
Admin. staff × Higher Unemp. in res. 0.075 0.201*** -0.070 0.184*** 0.229*** -0.121
(0.109) (0.046) (0.056) (0.042) (0.063) (0.214)
Admin. staff × Higher GDP in res. -0.017 -0.192*** -0.122** -0.303*** -0.172** -0.364*
(0.097) (0.047) (0.056) (0.094) (0.074) (0.191)
Admin. staff × Higher Housing Price in res. 0.080* 0.044*** 0.099*** 0.028* 0.049*** 0.121
(0.046) (0.015) (0.024) (0.016) (0.018) (0.099)
Admin. staff × HEU in residence 0.142** 0.064*** -0.029 0.084*** 0.013 0.129
(0.058) (0.014) (0.023) (0.019) (0.019) (0.108)
Admin. staff × Grade: 76-85 -0.012 -0.0006 -0.037* 0.064*** 0.052*** -0.106**
(0.038) (0.0130) (0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (0.051)
Admin. staff × Grade: 86-95 0.028 0.001 0.004 0.092*** 0.061*** -0.149*
(0.043) (0.016) (0.022) (0.018) (0.018) (0.076)
Admin. staff × Grade: 96-102 -0.050 -0.022 -0.002 0.172*** 0.105*** -0.029
(0.047) (0.018) (0.024) (0.018) (0.021) (0.115)
Field Academics/100 1.538* -0.148 1.390*** -0.289*** 1.345*** 1.329
(0.828) (0.247) (0.325) (0.082) (0.358) (1.692)
Field Academics/100 × CentreNorth -2.452** 1.073*** -0.802** -0.937*** -0.535 -0.110
(1.034) (0.297) (0.392) (0.163) (0.435) (1.770)
Field Academics/100 × Female 0.269 0.103** -0.065 -0.009 -0.080 0.111
(0.214) (0.048) (0.074) (0.020) (0.093) (0.422)
Field Academics/100 × Higher Unemp. in res. 0.236 0.649*** -0.602* 0.402*** -0.632* -1.905
(0.786) (0.241) (0.318) (0.080) (0.344) (1.641)
Field Academics/100 × Higher GDP in res. 1.921*** -0.431** 0.318 1.010*** -0.168 -2.534**
(0.742) (0.206) (0.249) (0.148) (0.296) (1.112)
Field Academics/100 × Higher Housing Price in res. -0.144 0.633*** -0.654*** 0.171*** 0.111 1.389***
(0.325) (0.059) (0.122) (0.027) (0.135) (0.470)
Field Academics/100 × HEU in residence 1.590*** 0.031 0.391*** -0.044* 0.276** 0.218
(0.389) (0.058) (0.099) (0.025) (0.122) (0.477)
Field Academics/100 × Grade: 76-85 0.008 -0.044 -0.008 0.026 -0.106 -0.181
(0.249) (0.058) (0.085) (0.023) (0.110) (0.248)
Field Academics/100 × Grade: 86-95 0.377 -0.293*** 0.036 -0.015 -0.343*** -0.361
(0.284) (0.068) (0.101) (0.026) (0.127) (0.352)
Field Academics/100 × Grade: 96-102 0.181 -0.511*** -0.100 0.017 -0.546*** -0.910
(0.315) (0.081) (0.114) (0.026) (0.145) (0.587)
Pub. funding (Mill.) 0.005 -0.003 -0.015* 0.044*** -0.008 -0.048
(0.030) (0.003) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.044)
Pub. funding (Mill.) × CentreNorth 0.003 -0.006* 0.019** 0.030*** 0.013* 0.013
(0.036) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.045)
Pub. funding (Mill.) × Female -0.008 -0.0007 0.003 -0.002 0.00003 0.008
(0.007) (0.0008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.00112) (0.012)
Pub. funding (Mill.) × Higher Unemp. in res. 0.033 0.0001 0.026*** -0.040*** 0.011 0.043
(0.029) (0.0033) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.043)
Pub. funding (Mill.) × Higher GDP in res. -0.016 0.004* -0.010 -0.053*** -0.006 0.060**
(0.025) (0.002) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.025)
Pub. funding (Mill.) × Higher Housing Price in res. 0.008 0.001 0.006** -0.024*** 0.005*** -0.0005
(0.012) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.0117)
Pub. funding (Mill.) × HEU in residence -0.007 0.003*** 0.006** 0.005** -0.002 -0.008
(0.011) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.014)
Pub. funding (Mill.) × Grade: 76-85 -0.003 0.003*** 0.0004 -0.004** 0.0005 0.014**
(0.008) (0.001) (0.0026) (0.002) (0.0013) (0.006)
Pub. funding (Mill.) × Grade: 86-95 -0.004 0.006*** -0.002 -0.004** -0.003** 0.019**
(0.009) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009)
Pub. funding (Mill.) × Grade: 96-102 0.008 0.008*** -0.009*** -0.006*** -0.002 0.024
(0.009) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.016)
Avg contribution 0.010 0.003 -0.055*** -0.009 0.021* 0.040
(0.075) (0.006) (0.017) (0.018) (0.012) (0.067)
Avg contribution × CentreNorth -0.021 -0.008 0.003 -0.489*** -0.007 -0.088
(0.084) (0.007) (0.024) (0.041) (0.014) (0.063)
Avg contribution × Female 0.057** -0.008*** 0.020*** 0.030*** -0.005* -0.0004
(0.022) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.0256)
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Avg contribution × Higher Unemp. in res. 0.092 -0.0003 0.032** -0.079*** -0.008 -0.045
(0.066) (0.0057) (0.016) (0.018) (0.011) (0.061)
Avg contribution × Higher GDP in res. -0.067 -0.001 0.00003 0.385*** -0.025*** 0.014
(0.054) (0.005) (0.01842) (0.038) (0.009) (0.057)
Avg contribution × Higher Housing Price in res. -0.060* -0.018*** -0.005 -0.001 -0.019*** -0.049
(0.033) (0.002) (0.006) (0.012) (0.003) (0.030)
Avg contribution × HEU in residence -0.036 0.0008 0.017*** 0.038*** 0.010*** -0.004
(0.041) (0.0019) (0.005) (0.009) (0.003) (0.022)
Avg contribution × Grade: 76-85 0.061** 0.005*** 0.018*** -0.012** -0.003 0.011
(0.026) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.014)
Avg contribution × Grade: 86-95 0.083*** 0.016*** 0.014** -0.061*** -0.004 0.019
(0.030) (0.002) (0.006) (0.010) (0.003) (0.021)
Avg contribution × Grade: 96-102 0.125*** 0.023*** 0.023*** -0.066*** -0.011*** 0.009
(0.035) (0.003) (0.006) (0.010) (0.004) (0.041)
Distance -0.016*** -0.022*** -0.005 -0.019*** -0.022*** -0.020**
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009)
Distance × CentreNorth -0.012** -0.006*** -0.022*** -0.0002 -0.018*** -0.013
(0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.0018) (0.004) (0.009)
Distance × Female -0.001 -0.0007 0.001* 0.002*** -0.003*** -0.005**
(0.001) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
Distance × Higher Unemp. in res. -0.0004 0.002 -0.012*** 0.001 0.002 -0.010
(0.0043) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.008)
Distance × Higher GDP in res. -0.007** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.016*** 0.014*** -0.021***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005)
Distance × Higher Housing Price in res. -0.001 0.003*** -0.002 0.002*** -0.003*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Distance × HEU in residence 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.010***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Distance × Grade: 76-85 -0.003*** 0.003*** -0.0006 0.001** 0.002** 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Distance × Grade: 86-95 -0.003** 0.005*** 0.0008 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Distance × Grade: 96-102 -0.002* 0.007*** -0.003** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Distance2/100 0.0009 0.001*** -0.0009** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.0008
(0.0007) (0.000) (0.0005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0013)
Distance2/100 × CentreNorth 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.0005** 0.003*** 0.002*
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.001)
Distance2/100 × Female 0.0001 0.00005 -0.00006 -0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0005**
(0.0001) (0.00004) (0.00007) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Distance2/100 × Higher Unemp. in res. -0.0001 0.0002 0.002*** 0.0004* -0.0005 0.001
(0.0007) (0.0002) (0.000) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.001)
Distance2/100 × Higher GDP in res. -0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0001 0.001*** -0.003*** 0.0008
(0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0009)
Distance2/100 × Higher Housing Price in res. 0.00009 -0.0002*** 0.0001 -0.0002*** 0.0005*** -0.0006**
(0.00017) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003)
Distance2/100 × HEU in residence -0.0006*** -0.0007*** -0.0005*** -0.0004*** -0.0005*** -0.0010***
(0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003)
Distance2/100 × Grade: 76-85 0.0003*** -0.0002*** 0.00003 -0.0001** -0.0001** -0.0002*
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.00008) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Distance2/100 × Grade: 86-95 0.0003** -0.0004*** -0.0001 -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0003
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Distance2/100 × Grade: 96-102 0.0003** -0.0006*** 0.0002* -0.0004*** -0.0005*** -0.0004
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004)
HEU in province 1.750*** 1.913*** -154.308*** 2.776*** 1.560*** -15519.109***
(0.128) (0.137) (0.090) (0.146) (0.357) (0.231)
HEU in province × CentreNorth -0.706*** -0.490*** 155.179*** -1.516*** -1.299*** 15519.981***
(0.184) (0.154) (0.116) (0.173) (0.387) (0.314)
HEU in province × Female -0.423*** -0.023 -0.069 -0.089* -0.208*** 0.322
(0.097) (0.040) (0.072) (0.048) (0.061) (0.204)
HEU in province × Higher Unemp. in res. -0.060 155.747 -1.126*** 0.241 15518.998
(0.129) (0.000) (0.139) (0.351) (0.000)
HEU in province × Higher GDP in res. -0.328* -0.445*** -0.133 -0.059 1.356*** -1.107***
(0.191) (0.094) (0.125) (0.109) (0.169) (0.309)
HEU in province × Higher Housing Price in res. 0.369*** 0.067 -0.407*** -0.069 -0.098 0.319*
(0.121) (0.053) (0.103) (0.057) (0.080) (0.167)
HEU in province × HEU in residence 0.594*** 0.693*** 0.473*** 0.514*** 0.962*** 0.437*
(0.171) (0.056) (0.105) (0.058) (0.092) (0.250)
HEU in province × Grade: 76-85 -0.187* 0.026 -0.043 -0.007 -0.085 0.162
(0.112) (0.047) (0.081) (0.052) (0.071) (0.128)
HEU in province × Grade: 86-95 -0.100 0.091 0.180* 0.108* -0.166** 0.165
(0.129) (0.057) (0.097) (0.059) (0.084) (0.193)
HEU in province × Grade: 96-102 0.128 0.160** -0.002 0.145** -0.139 0.345
(0.148) (0.067) (0.111) (0.062) (0.097) (0.312)
HEU in region 0.852* 2.133*** 4.189*** 2.289*** 2.781*** 2.545***
(0.486) (0.178) (0.383) (0.171) (0.271) (0.608)
HEU in region × CentreNorth 0.882* 0.420* -3.195*** -0.569*** 0.195 -1.031*
(0.520) (0.237) (0.399) (0.191) (0.406) (0.547)
HEU in region × Female -0.014 0.020 0.085 0.058 0.057 -0.146
(0.103) (0.058) (0.085) (0.064) (0.078) (0.245)
HEU in region × Higher Unemp. in res. 0.184 -0.419*** -2.830*** -0.129 -1.076*** -0.930*
(0.468) (0.161) (0.370) (0.149) (0.255) (0.531)
HEU in region × Higher GDP in res. -1.046*** -1.876*** -0.067 -0.603*** -2.046*** -0.833**
(0.232) (0.177) (0.155) (0.130) (0.317) (0.345)
HEU in region × Higher Housing Price in res. -0.017 0.466*** 0.204* -0.045 -0.428*** 0.619***
(0.139) (0.073) (0.117) (0.076) (0.096) (0.206)
HEU in region × HEU in residence 0.308 -0.210*** 0.317** 0.049 -0.701*** 0.011
(0.219) (0.078) (0.138) (0.091) (0.115) (0.298)
HEU in region × Grade: 76-85 -0.070 0.166** -0.031 0.015 0.160* 0.076
(0.118) (0.069) (0.095) (0.071) (0.090) (0.153)
HEU in region × Grade: 86-95 0.195 0.132 0.015 0.067 0.133 0.450*
(0.139) (0.082) (0.116) (0.079) (0.105) (0.236)
HEU in region × Grade: 96-102 0.239 0.094 -0.229* 0.041 0.074 0.062
(0.155) (0.097) (0.131) (0.083) (0.125) (0.364)
Unemployment 0.202** 0.210*** -0.221*** 0.252*** -0.071 0.301
(0.101) (0.033) (0.055) (0.030) (0.051) (0.191)
Unemployment × CentreNorth -0.643*** -0.325*** 0.059 -0.308*** -0.410*** -0.574***
(0.132) (0.041) (0.065) (0.044) (0.078) (0.184)
Unemployment × Female 0.062** 0.016* 0.047*** -0.012 0.003 0.014
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(0.025) (0.009) (0.016) (0.012) (0.013) (0.053)
Unemployment × Higher Unemp. in res. -0.307*** -0.181*** 0.172*** -0.183*** 0.0007 -0.868***
(0.097) (0.032) (0.053) (0.028) (0.0495) (0.183)
Unemployment × Higher GDP in res. 0.665*** 0.312*** 0.068 0.081** 0.553*** 0.226*
(0.092) (0.028) (0.045) (0.038) (0.062) (0.119)
Unemployment × Higher Housing Price in res. -0.248*** -0.040*** 0.041* -0.120*** -0.108*** 0.005
(0.031) (0.012) (0.022) (0.016) (0.018) (0.043)
Unemployment × HEU in residence -0.060 0.020* 0.102*** 0.038*** 0.074*** 0.063
(0.044) (0.012) (0.022) (0.014) (0.018) (0.055)
Unemployment × Grade: 76-85 0.029 -0.005 -0.005 0.010 0.048*** 0.074**
(0.029) (0.011) (0.018) (0.014) (0.015) (0.031)
Unemployment × Grade: 86-95 -0.039 -0.005 -0.048** 0.018 0.040** 0.052
(0.033) (0.013) (0.021) (0.015) (0.018) (0.046)
Unemployment × Grade: 96-102 0.040 -0.013 -0.075*** -0.011 0.006 0.058
(0.037) (0.015) (0.025) (0.015) (0.021) (0.074)
Housing price 0.004 0.095*** 0.173*** 0.108*** 0.111*** -0.449***
(0.070) (0.017) (0.046) (0.019) (0.038) (0.134)
Housing price × CentreNorth 0.062 -0.088*** -0.165*** 0.262*** 0.260*** 0.347**
(0.087) (0.023) (0.056) (0.029) (0.056) (0.138)
Housing price × Female 0.007 -0.002 -0.019* -0.006 0.014 0.066
(0.017) (0.005) (0.011) (0.007) (0.009) (0.042)
Housing price × Higher Unemp. in res. 0.037 -0.073*** -0.116*** -0.079*** 0.022 0.693***
(0.066) (0.016) (0.044) (0.018) (0.037) (0.126)
Housing price × Higher GDP in res. -0.052 0.057*** -0.054 -0.100*** -0.282*** 0.025
(0.058) (0.019) (0.037) (0.024) (0.043) (0.108)
Housing price × Higher Housing Price in res. 0.121*** -0.060*** 0.049*** -0.052*** 0.091*** 0.063*
(0.024) (0.007) (0.017) (0.008) (0.013) (0.036)
Housing price × HEU in residence 0.011 0.025*** -0.056*** 0.024*** 0.012 -0.079
(0.031) (0.007) (0.016) (0.008) (0.013) (0.051)
Housing price × Grade: 76-85 -0.016 -0.005 0.009 0.005 -0.0008 -0.030
(0.020) (0.006) (0.013) (0.008) (0.0110) (0.023)
Housing price × Grade: 86-95 -0.008 -0.013* 0.035** 0.012 0.014 -0.054
(0.023) (0.008) (0.016) (0.009) (0.013) (0.035)
Housing price × Grade: 96-102 -0.055** -0.047*** 0.041** 0.019** 0.028* -0.079
(0.027) (0.009) (0.018) (0.009) (0.015) (0.057)
Regional GDP 0.196** 0.158*** -0.097* 0.107*** 0.006 0.353***
(0.093) (0.022) (0.050) (0.022) (0.038) (0.104)
Regional GDP × CentreNorth -0.245** -0.004 0.175*** 0.298*** -0.157** -0.408***
(0.113) (0.032) (0.056) (0.045) (0.062) (0.112)
Regional GDP × Female 0.029 0.004 0.007 -0.022** -0.001 -0.010
(0.019) (0.008) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011) (0.040)
Regional GDP × Higher Unemp. in res. -0.027 -0.032 0.185*** -0.021 0.102*** -0.423***
(0.090) (0.021) (0.049) (0.020) (0.037) (0.095)
Regional GDP × Higher GDP in res. 0.185*** 0.010 -0.103*** -0.283*** 0.293*** 0.082
(0.069) (0.026) (0.032) (0.042) (0.051) (0.085)
Regional GDP × Higher Housing Price in res. -0.197*** -0.073*** -0.038** -0.130*** -0.086*** -0.103***
(0.024) (0.010) (0.019) (0.012) (0.015) (0.040)
Regional GDP × HEU in residence -0.059* -0.041*** -0.012 -0.019 -0.025* -0.133***
(0.035) (0.010) (0.019) (0.012) (0.015) (0.050)
Regional GDP × Grade: 76-85 0.019 0.006 -0.008 0.002 0.036*** 0.030
(0.022) (0.009) (0.015) (0.011) (0.013) (0.023)
Regional GDP × Grade: 86-95 -0.011 -0.021* -0.025 0.009 0.017 0.0006
(0.026) (0.011) (0.018) (0.012) (0.015) (0.0363)
Regional GDP × Grade: 96-102 -0.015 -0.017 -0.037* -0.028** 0.012 0.027
(0.029) (0.013) (0.020) (0.013) (0.018) (0.057)
Observations 376488 2478941 724128 2022936 1355184 279552
Pseudo R2 0.67 0.60 0.54 0.63 0.62 -37.91
Log Likelihood -10894.7 -54458.5 -23755.8 -49197.1 -30504.9 -968117.7
Notes: Conditional Logit regression by fields of study estimated on the sample of Italian students enrolled for the first time in the academic year 2014-2015.
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All the variables referring to HEUs’ and areas’ characteristics are interacted with in-
dividual variables. Variable definitions are reported in Table 3.6. In particular, Higher unemp. in res. indicates students that reside in provinces with an
unemployment rate higher than the average; Higher GDP in res. takes value 1 if the student lives in a region with a GDP higher than the average GDP; Higher
Housing Price indicates students that reside in provinces with a housing price higher than the national average; Grade: 76-85, Grade: 86-95, and Grade: 96-102
indicate students that have obtained a high school diploma with a final grade in the specified bracket.
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Table 3A.2: Conditional Logit Estimates: Interactions with individual variables
Humanities Languages
Social &
Political sciences Psychology
Math.
& Physical sciences
E(Scholarship)/100 -0.010 0.026** 0.007 0.067*** 0.007
(0.014) (0.010) (0.011) (0.022) (0.016)
E(Scholarship)/100 × CentreNorth -0.026* -0.005 -0.007 -0.062* -0.006
(0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.032) (0.019)
E(Scholarship)/100 × Female 0.000002 -0.002 0.010*** 0.017*** -0.003
(0.002417) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004)
E(Scholarship)/100 × Higher Unemp. in res. -0.010 -0.013 -0.012 -0.028 0.001
(0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.021) (0.016)
E(Scholarship)/100 × Higher GDP in res. 0.033*** 0.023* 0.018** 0.015 0.041***
(0.008) (0.014) (0.009) (0.026) (0.013)
E(Scholarship)/100 × Higher Housing Price in res. -0.013*** -0.023*** -0.025*** -0.009 -0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.005)
E(Scholarship)/100 × HEU in residence 0.0002 -0.009*** -0.006** -0.014** -0.014***
(0.0029) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005)
E(Scholarship)/100 × Grade: 76-85 -0.001 -0.011*** -0.006*** -0.023*** -0.005
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004)
E(Scholarship)/100 × Grade: 86-95 -0.003 -0.029*** -0.006** -0.042*** -0.014***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005)
E(Scholarship)/100 × Grade: 96-102 -0.003 -0.026*** -0.013*** -0.048*** -0.020***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005)
E(Dormitory)/100 0.608*** 0.376*** 0.444*** -0.165 0.037
(0.154) (0.120) (0.143) (0.274) (0.186)
E(Dormitory)/100 × CentreNorth -0.980*** 0.211 -1.097*** 0.347 -0.796***
(0.172) (0.146) (0.173) (0.349) (0.298)
E(Dormitory)/100 × Female -0.033 0.018 0.028 0.032 0.180***
(0.030) (0.036) (0.026) (0.074) (0.046)
E(Dormitory)/100 × Higher Unemp. in res. -0.365** -0.633*** -0.152 0.234 -0.185
(0.151) (0.116) (0.140) (0.224) (0.179)
E(Dormitory)/100 × Higher GDP in res. 0.089 -0.458*** 0.777*** 0.205 0.458*
(0.109) (0.112) (0.117) (0.244) (0.252)
E(Dormitory)/100 × Higher Housing Price in res. 0.143*** -0.145*** -0.166*** -0.109 0.008
(0.036) (0.035) (0.031) (0.096) (0.068)
E(Dormitory)/100 × HEU in residence 0.045 0.181*** 0.110*** 0.304*** -0.108
(0.039) (0.042) (0.031) (0.087) (0.076)
E(Dormitory)/100 × Grade: 76-85 0.023 -0.015 0.002 -0.224*** 0.193***
(0.034) (0.031) (0.028) (0.069) (0.059)
E(Dormitory)/100 × Grade: 86-95 0.080** 0.029 0.019 -0.313*** 0.233***
(0.040) (0.037) (0.038) (0.088) (0.063)
E(Dormitory)/100 × Grade: 96-102 0.143*** 0.051 0.018 -0.353*** 0.500***
(0.043) (0.044) (0.054) (0.114) (0.064)
E(Student Pkg)/100 -0.113 -0.163** -0.099 -0.514** 0.142
(0.074) (0.064) (0.066) (0.215) (0.122)
E(Student Pkg)/100 × CentreNorth 0.366*** -0.294*** 0.137* 0.530* -0.075
(0.090) (0.089) (0.082) (0.292) (0.155)
E(Student Pkg)/100 × Female -0.023 0.012 -0.013 -0.023 -0.179***
(0.020) (0.022) (0.017) (0.042) (0.028)
E(Student Pkg)/100 × Higher Unemp. in res. 0.199*** 0.029 0.021 0.128 0.172
(0.072) (0.061) (0.065) (0.209) (0.119)
E(Student Pkg)/100 × Higher GDP in res. -0.081 0.245*** 0.031 -0.436** 0.048
(0.067) (0.083) (0.058) (0.212) (0.123)
E(Student Pkg)/100 × Higher Housing Price in res. -0.078** -0.116*** 0.074*** -0.022 0.118**
(0.035) (0.029) (0.025) (0.051) (0.050)
E(Student Pkg)/100 × HEU in residence -0.020 0.037 -0.004 0.048 0.104***
(0.024) (0.026) (0.021) (0.053) (0.039)
E(Student Pkg)/100 × Grade: 76-85 -0.023 0.036* -0.022 0.084** -0.075**
(0.023) (0.020) (0.018) (0.040) (0.032)
E(Student Pkg)/100 × Grade: 86-95 -0.034 0.042* -0.042* 0.101** -0.070*
(0.026) (0.023) (0.023) (0.047) (0.036)
E(Student Pkg)/100 × Grade: 96-102 -0.017 -0.046* -0.053* 0.147** -0.117***
(0.028) (0.026) (0.031) (0.060) (0.038)
Pl. in Canteen/100 -0.005 0.024*** 0.008 0.002 -0.006
(0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.030) (0.015)
Pl. in Canteen/100 × CentreNorth -0.029** -0.032*** -0.012 0.014 -0.065***
(0.012) (0.009) (0.010) (0.056) (0.019)
Pl. in Canteen/100 × Female 0.006** 0.005 -0.005* -0.009 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.004)
Pl. in Canteen/100 × Higher Unemp. in res. 0.013 -0.004 0.010 -0.015 0.008
(0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.029) (0.014)
Pl. in Canteen/100 × Higher GDP in res. 0.016* -0.015** 0.005 -0.006 0.050***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.049) (0.015)
Pl. in Canteen/100 × Higher Housing Price in res. 0.006 0.011*** 0.011*** -0.001 -0.0006
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.0055)
Pl. in Canteen/100 × HEU in residence -0.013*** -0.004 -0.001 0.006 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.009) (0.006)
Pl. in Canteen/100 × Grade: 76-85 0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.011* 0.007
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005)
Pl. in Canteen/100 × Grade: 86-95 0.008** -0.002 0.008** -0.004 0.017***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.005)
Pl. in Canteen/100 × Grade: 96-102 0.011*** 0.0009 0.018*** -0.004 0.034***
(0.004) (0.0037) (0.005) (0.011) (0.006)
College -0.072 0.823*** 0.339 -1.073 -0.623
(0.276) (0.191) (0.243) (0.879) (0.522)
College × CentreNorth 1.683*** -1.729*** -0.333 0.419 1.956**
(0.359) (0.290) (0.358) (1.447) (0.834)
College × Female -0.408*** 0.184*** 0.075 -0.034 -0.366***
(0.075) (0.070) (0.058) (0.149) (0.104)
College × Higher Unemp. in res. -0.031 -0.669*** -0.523** 0.377 0.660
(0.264) (0.175) (0.235) (0.857) (0.513)
College × Higher GDP in res. -1.349*** 0.894*** 0.135 -0.001 -0.744
(0.272) (0.269) (0.286) (1.207) (0.703)
College × Higher Housing Price in res. 0.873*** 0.351*** 0.372*** -0.344 0.173
(0.113) (0.082) (0.076) (0.331) (0.150)
College × HEU in residence 0.148 -0.042 0.099 0.198 0.115
(0.095) (0.088) (0.070) (0.188) (0.147)
College × Grade: 76-85 0.172** 0.047 0.177*** 0.342** -0.058
(0.083) (0.063) (0.061) (0.143) (0.119)
College × Grade: 86-95 0.165* 0.129* 0.149* 0.523*** 0.189
(0.097) (0.073) (0.081) (0.168) (0.134)
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College × Grade: 96-102 0.465*** 0.083 0.337*** 0.898*** 0.504***
(0.105) (0.085) (0.110) (0.211) (0.144)
non-DSU Scholar./100 -0.062 -0.219*** -0.200*** -0.283* -0.258***
(0.071) (0.060) (0.050) (0.172) (0.097)
non-DSU Scholar./100 × CentreNorth 0.169** 0.261*** 0.249*** 0.561** 0.707***
(0.081) (0.097) (0.062) (0.250) (0.134)
non-DSU Scholar./100 × Female -0.033** -0.009 -0.064*** -0.073* 0.032
(0.015) (0.017) (0.012) (0.037) (0.021)
non-DSU Scholar./100 × Higher Unemp. in res. 0.162** 0.174*** 0.136*** 0.162 0.282***
(0.069) (0.057) (0.048) (0.167) (0.095)
non-DSU Scholar./100 × Higher GDP in res. 0.007 -0.174** -0.199*** -0.205 -0.629***
(0.048) (0.086) (0.044) (0.195) (0.107)
non-DSU Scholar./100 × Higher Housing Price in res. 0.032* 0.087*** 0.130*** 0.150*** -0.041
(0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.053) (0.030)
non-DSU Scholar./100 × HEU in residence 0.015 0.047** 0.035** -0.030 0.072***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.014) (0.048) (0.027)
non-DSU Scholar./100 × Grade: 76-85 -0.005 0.040*** 0.042*** 0.102*** 0.063**
(0.017) (0.015) (0.013) (0.036) (0.025)
non-DSU Scholar./100 × Grade: 86-95 -0.004 0.082*** 0.051*** 0.122*** 0.118***
(0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.042) (0.028)
non-DSU Scholar./100 × Grade: 96-102 -0.062*** 0.070*** 0.051** 0.217*** 0.099***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.054) (0.030)
E(non-DSU Dorm.)/100 0.654 -0.635* -0.190 -0.668 1.415**
(0.431) (0.365) (0.202) (2.020) (0.709)
E(non-DSU Dorm.)/100 × CentreNorth 0.054 -0.020 -0.227 -4.661 -2.390***
(0.461) (0.467) (0.244) (3.802) (0.918)
E(non-DSU Dorm.)/100 × Female -0.105 0.245** -0.131** -0.060 0.599***
(0.126) (0.122) (0.063) (0.240) (0.173)
E(non-DSU Dorm.)/100 × Higher Unemp. in res. -0.042 -0.717** -0.209 -1.089 -1.824***
(0.416) (0.342) (0.191) (2.007) (0.694)
E(non-DSU Dorm.)/100 × Higher GDP in res. -2.402*** -0.439 -0.823*** 5.044 0.524
(0.307) (0.398) (0.189) (3.293) (0.704)
E(non-DSU Dorm.)/100 × Higher Housing Price in res. 1.531*** 0.372** 0.346*** -2.119*** 0.129
(0.250) (0.186) (0.099) (0.625) (0.332)
E(non-DSU Dorm.)/100 × HEU in residence 0.086 0.238 0.313*** 0.325 -0.653***
(0.162) (0.151) (0.075) (0.316) (0.251)
E(non-DSU Dorm.)/100 × Grade: 76-85 -0.003 0.325*** 0.223*** 0.029 0.413**
(0.140) (0.117) (0.068) (0.223) (0.194)
E(non-DSU Dorm.)/100 × Grade: 86-95 0.119 0.915*** 0.249*** 0.472* 0.124
(0.158) (0.127) (0.090) (0.252) (0.226)
E(non-DSU Dorm.)/100 × Grade: 96-102 -0.089 1.164*** 0.468*** -0.108 0.476**
(0.177) (0.141) (0.109) (0.346) (0.240)
Excellence Dept. 0.243 -0.085 1.716*** -2.309*** 0.694**
(0.180) (0.284) (0.252) (0.831) (0.278)
Excellence Dept. × CentreNorth -0.495** -0.671* -1.874*** 0.870 -0.392
(0.199) (0.401) (0.297) (1.438) (0.490)
Excellence Dept. × Female -0.016 0.096 0.266*** 0.065 0.032
(0.041) (0.101) (0.072) (0.202) (0.074)
Excellence Dept. × Higher Unemp. in res. -0.403** -0.608** -0.524** 1.528* -0.715***
(0.173) (0.259) (0.237) (0.793) (0.268)
Excellence Dept. × Higher GDP in res. 0.139 0.633* 0.848*** 0.971 -0.318
(0.116) (0.351) (0.206) (1.221) (0.441)
Excellence Dept. × Higher Housing Price in res. -0.155*** -0.179* -0.638*** -0.474* 0.186
(0.056) (0.097) (0.099) (0.268) (0.122)
Excellence Dept. × HEU in residence 0.067 0.212* -0.004 0.257 -0.276**
(0.052) (0.119) (0.087) (0.247) (0.109)
Excellence Dept. × Grade: 76-85 0.079* 0.002 -0.134* -0.415** 0.112
(0.046) (0.090) (0.077) (0.203) (0.086)
Excellence Dept. × Grade: 86-95 0.060 0.381*** 0.034 -0.563** 0.131
(0.054) (0.105) (0.102) (0.246) (0.095)
Excellence Dept. × Grade: 96-102 0.025 0.119 -0.338** -0.084 -0.194**
(0.061) (0.123) (0.140) (0.340) (0.099)
Academics/100 -0.159* 0.033 0.172** -0.336 -0.145
(0.092) (0.071) (0.086) (0.333) (0.189)
Academics/100 × CentreNorth 0.464*** -0.229** 0.029 -0.095 0.320
(0.107) (0.115) (0.117) (0.519) (0.258)
Academics/100 × Female -0.003 0.016 -0.0010 0.074 0.012
(0.028) (0.032) (0.0248) (0.091) (0.050)
Academics/100 × Higher Unemp. in res. 0.008 -0.028 -0.171** 0.454 0.265
(0.083) (0.061) (0.080) (0.313) (0.182)
Academics/100 × Higher GDP in res. -0.189** 0.481*** -0.031 0.405 0.260
(0.076) (0.107) (0.093) (0.430) (0.211)
Academics/100 × Higher Housing Price in res. -0.182*** -0.408*** -0.170*** -0.169 -0.365***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.033) (0.131) (0.068)
Academics/100 × HEU in residence -0.027 -0.136*** -0.034 -0.260** -0.088
(0.033) (0.035) (0.028) (0.112) (0.062)
Academics/100 × Grade: 76-85 -0.019 -0.075*** -0.023 0.065 0.026
(0.032) (0.028) (0.027) (0.085) (0.057)
Academics/100 × Grade: 86-95 -0.066* -0.046 -0.0008 -0.102 0.002
(0.038) (0.033) (0.0358) (0.106) (0.065)
Academics/100 × Grade: 96-102 -0.033 -0.069* -0.090* -0.048 -0.262***
(0.042) (0.039) (0.051) (0.144) (0.068)
Share of Intern. Acad. 0.263 0.122 -0.242*** 0.110 -0.522**
(0.168) (0.096) (0.089) (0.355) (0.261)
Share of Intern. Acad. × CentreNorth 0.079 -0.678*** 0.348*** 0.381 0.172
(0.190) (0.137) (0.102) (0.468) (0.318)
Share of Intern. Acad. × Female 0.030 0.008 -0.033 -0.261*** -0.196***
(0.036) (0.037) (0.021) (0.094) (0.053)
Share of Intern. Acad. × Higher Unemp. in res. -0.233 -0.030 0.255*** 0.147 0.169
(0.162) (0.087) (0.085) (0.335) (0.248)
Share of Intern. Acad. × Higher GDP in res. -0.301*** 0.413*** -0.275*** 0.192 0.349
(0.110) (0.119) (0.073) (0.336) (0.251)
Share of Intern. Acad. × Higher Housing Price in res. -0.039 -0.083** 0.103*** 0.172* 0.083
(0.039) (0.032) (0.023) (0.094) (0.063)
Share of Intern. Acad. × HEU in residence 0.015 0.010 0.059*** 0.080 0.086
(0.042) (0.041) (0.023) (0.112) (0.066)
Share of Intern. Acad. × Grade: 76-85 0.013 0.014 0.070*** 0.136 -0.130**
(0.040) (0.032) (0.023) (0.091) (0.057)
Share of Intern. Acad. × Grade: 86-95 0.048 0.087** 0.122*** 0.305*** -0.097
(0.048) (0.038) (0.030) (0.109) (0.065)
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Share of Intern. Acad. × Grade: 96-102 0.084 0.011 0.158*** -0.034 -0.196***
(0.053) (0.047) (0.037) (0.149) (0.076)
Admin. staff -0.124* -0.212*** -0.214*** -0.051 -0.242**
(0.067) (0.055) (0.057) (0.148) (0.106)
Admin. staff × CentreNorth 0.081 0.219*** 0.205*** 0.058 0.520***
(0.077) (0.074) (0.072) (0.257) (0.148)
Admin. staff × Female 0.042** 0.013 -0.004 -0.081* 0.035
(0.019) (0.024) (0.016) (0.042) (0.027)
Admin. staff × Higher Unemp. in res. 0.110* 0.214*** 0.111** -0.222 0.041
(0.063) (0.048) (0.054) (0.140) (0.103)
Admin. staff × Higher GDP in res. -0.072 -0.286*** -0.312*** -0.178 -0.611***
(0.054) (0.070) (0.055) (0.224) (0.123)
Admin. staff × Higher Housing Price in res. 0.132*** 0.400*** 0.195*** 0.113** 0.010
(0.025) (0.031) (0.021) (0.048) (0.033)
Admin. staff × HEU in residence -0.017 0.043 0.018 0.080 0.100***
(0.025) (0.029) (0.019) (0.052) (0.036)
Admin. staff × Grade: 76-85 0.048** 0.052** 0.025 0.056 0.097***
(0.021) (0.022) (0.018) (0.038) (0.031)
Admin. staff × Grade: 86-95 0.080*** 0.071*** 0.049** 0.190*** 0.227***
(0.024) (0.025) (0.023) (0.047) (0.034)
Admin. staff × Grade: 96-102 0.056** 0.082*** 0.092*** 0.238*** 0.431***
(0.027) (0.028) (0.031) (0.065) (0.037)
Field Academics/100 -0.064 0.592** 1.250** 4.169*** 1.014**
(0.299) (0.231) (0.540) (1.006) (0.512)
Field Academics/100 × CentreNorth 1.431*** 1.632*** 1.559** -1.596 -1.033*
(0.346) (0.361) (0.620) (1.657) (0.620)
Field Academics/100 × Female 0.170** -0.162* -0.136 -0.102 -0.158
(0.078) (0.088) (0.141) (0.260) (0.118)
Field Academics/100 × Higher Unemp. in res. 0.592** 0.805*** -1.013** -2.335** -0.203
(0.281) (0.209) (0.513) (0.947) (0.494)
Field Academics/100 × Higher GDP in res. -0.451* -1.622*** -2.356*** -1.421 0.577
(0.238) (0.327) (0.400) (1.384) (0.486)
Field Academics/100 × Higher Housing Price in res. 0.263*** 0.467*** 0.860*** 0.042 0.248
(0.100) (0.084) (0.183) (0.375) (0.175)
Field Academics/100 × HEU in residence -0.058 0.029 0.236 0.063 0.292*
(0.090) (0.091) (0.162) (0.322) (0.166)
Field Academics/100 × Grade: 76-85 0.013 0.118 0.372** 0.411 -0.026
(0.088) (0.076) (0.151) (0.252) (0.137)
Field Academics/100 × Grade: 86-95 -0.036 0.042 0.250 0.957*** -0.065
(0.106) (0.087) (0.204) (0.314) (0.156)
Field Academics/100 × Grade: 96-102 -0.189 0.167 1.031*** 0.341 0.914***
(0.116) (0.107) (0.287) (0.443) (0.165)
Pub. funding (Mill.) 0.029*** 0.012*** 0.004 0.007 0.021*
(0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.013) (0.011)
Pub. funding (Mill.) × CentreNorth -0.044*** -0.009 -0.020*** 0.011 -0.053***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.019) (0.018)
Pub. funding (Mill.) × Female -0.004** -0.001 -0.0008 -0.002 -0.0010
(0.001) (0.002) (0.0011) (0.003) (0.0028)
Pub. funding (Mill.) × Higher Unemp. in res. -0.013* -0.018*** 0.010* -0.002 -0.019**
(0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.012) (0.010)
Pub. funding (Mill.) × Higher GDP in res. 0.015*** -0.007 0.029*** -0.005 0.020
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.014) (0.016)
Pub. funding (Mill.) × Higher Housing Price in res. 0.002 -0.002* -0.003** 0.005 0.024***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004)
Pub. funding (Mill.) × HEU in residence 0.003* 0.007*** 0.0007 0.013*** -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.0013) (0.004) (0.004)
Pub. funding (Mill.) × Grade: 76-85 -0.002 0.001 -0.0003 -0.008** -0.008***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.0012) (0.003) (0.003)
Pub. funding (Mill.) × Grade: 86-95 0.00004 0.0009 -0.003* -0.006 -0.015***
(0.00189) (0.0016) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Pub. funding (Mill.) × Grade: 96-102 0.0006 0.0007 -0.002 -0.012** -0.019***
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004)
Avg contribution -0.0010 0.006 0.017 0.007 0.013
(0.0326) (0.010) (0.011) (0.034) (0.056)
Avg contribution × CentreNorth 0.010 -0.004 0.011 0.0002 -0.234***
(0.033) (0.015) (0.014) (0.0456) (0.070)
Avg contribution × Female -0.005 -0.003 0.0009 0.005 -0.008
(0.004) (0.004) (0.0027) (0.005) (0.018)
Avg contribution × Higher Unemp. in res. -0.027 -0.012 0.020* 0.036 -0.060
(0.032) (0.009) (0.011) (0.033) (0.051)
Avg contribution × Higher GDP in res. -0.013 -0.025* 0.011 -0.0003 0.141**
(0.011) (0.014) (0.010) (0.0324) (0.055)
Avg contribution × Higher Housing Price in res. -0.033*** -0.025*** -0.020*** 0.020* 0.162***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.010) (0.029)
Avg contribution × HEU in residence 0.004 0.006 -0.001 0.011* -0.014
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.026)
Avg contribution × Grade: 76-85 -0.005 0.001 -0.003 -0.019*** -0.036*
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.021)
Avg contribution × Grade: 86-95 0.003 0.004 -0.003 -0.038*** -0.076***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.023)
Avg contribution × Grade: 96-102 0.015** -0.004 -0.010* -0.059*** -0.123***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.013) (0.024)
Distance -0.016*** -0.021*** -0.019*** -0.027*** -0.028***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004)
Distance × CentreNorth -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.006** -0.003 -0.006
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005)
Distance × Female 0.0001 0.00009 -0.0005 0.0004 -0.0005
(0.0007) (0.00071) (0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0010)
Distance × Higher Unemp. in res. -0.008*** 0.002 -0.004* 0.011** 0.008**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004)
Distance × Higher GDP in res. 0.0008 0.005*** -0.006*** 0.002 0.0006
(0.0020) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.0031)
Distance × Higher Housing Price in res. -0.0007 -0.002** 0.003*** -0.002 -0.003**
(0.0010) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Distance × HEU in residence 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Distance × Grade: 76-85 0.002** 0.0010 0.0009 -0.001 0.00009
(0.001) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.001) (0.00117)
Distance × Grade: 86-95 0.003*** 0.002** 0.003*** -0.003* 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
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Distance × Grade: 96-102 0.006*** 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.00004 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.00170) (0.001)
Distance2/100 0.0008 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.0005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Distance2/100 × CentreNorth 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.0004 0.002***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0010) (0.001)
Distance2/100 × Female -0.00002 0.000007 -0.00002 -0.00010 -0.00000001
(0.00007) (0.000064) (0.00005) (0.00011) (0.00009433)
Distance2/100 × Higher Unemp. in res. 0.001** -0.0004* 0.0005 -0.001** -0.0010*
(0.000) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.0005)
Distance2/100 × Higher GDP in res. -0.0008** -0.001*** -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.002***
(0.0003) (0.000) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.000)
Distance2/100 × Higher Housing Price in res. 0.00003 0.0002** -0.0003** 0.0003 0.0003*
(0.00012) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Distance2/100 × HEU in residence -0.0006*** -0.0007*** -0.0005*** -0.0004** -0.0007***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Distance2/100 × Grade: 76-85 -0.0002*** -0.0001** -0.00005 0.00008 -0.00002
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00006) (0.00012) (0.00011)
Distance2/100 × Grade: 86-95 -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** 0.0002* -0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Distance2/100 × Grade: 96-102 -0.0005*** -0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.000005 -0.0006***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.000159) (0.0001)
HEU in province 1.009** 0.056 0.245 1.521*** 0.663
(0.423) (0.258) (0.299) (0.199) (1.043)
HEU in province × CentreNorth 0.199 1.046*** 0.527* -0.142 0.411
(0.429) (0.256) (0.314) (0.308) (1.050)
HEU in province × Female -0.259*** -0.146* -0.098* -0.044 -0.276***
(0.075) (0.081) (0.059) (0.159) (0.105)
HEU in province × Higher Unemp. in res. 0.211 1.047*** 1.302*** 0.739
(0.413) (0.236) (0.292) (1.042)
HEU in province × Higher GDP in res. 0.247 -0.298* 0.146 0.103 0.435*
(0.164) (0.156) (0.126) (0.334) (0.224)
HEU in province × Higher Housing Price in res. -0.828*** -0.242*** -0.444*** -1.305*** -0.475***
(0.099) (0.079) (0.073) (0.196) (0.136)
HEU in province × HEU in residence 0.240** 0.737*** 0.423*** 0.342* 0.856***
(0.096) (0.100) (0.074) (0.198) (0.170)
HEU in province × Grade: 76-85 0.021 -0.119* -0.068 -0.011 0.039
(0.082) (0.070) (0.063) (0.147) (0.120)
HEU in province × Grade: 86-95 0.117 -0.032 0.025 -0.145 0.030
(0.096) (0.083) (0.084) (0.170) (0.136)
HEU in province × Grade: 96-102 0.250** -0.014 0.013 0.235 0.090
(0.110) (0.102) (0.118) (0.219) (0.143)
HEU in region 2.260*** 1.566*** 2.507*** 1.754*** 2.231***
(0.277) (0.212) (0.233) (0.591) (0.392)
HEU in region × CentreNorth -0.185 -0.847*** -0.021 -0.947 0.226
(0.333) (0.219) (0.274) (0.626) (0.472)
HEU in region × Female 0.012 0.079 -0.047 -0.084 -0.086
(0.082) (0.089) (0.072) (0.155) (0.116)
HEU in region × Higher Unemp. in res. -0.963*** -0.273 -1.260*** 0.391 -0.029
(0.255) (0.178) (0.214) (0.553) (0.361)
HEU in region × Higher GDP in res. -1.188*** 0.085 -1.698*** -0.538* -1.733***
(0.216) (0.163) (0.195) (0.287) (0.328)
HEU in region × Higher Housing Price in res. 0.032 -0.140 0.073 0.633*** -0.173
(0.106) (0.091) (0.087) (0.172) (0.156)
HEU in region × HEU in residence 0.204* -0.118 0.027 -0.095 -0.346*
(0.114) (0.124) (0.091) (0.251) (0.200)
HEU in region × Grade: 76-85 -0.029 0.024 -0.019 -0.266* 0.269**
(0.091) (0.079) (0.076) (0.148) (0.132)
HEU in region × Grade: 86-95 -0.045 -0.089 0.053 -0.030 0.170
(0.107) (0.093) (0.102) (0.177) (0.149)
HEU in region × Grade: 96-102 -0.028 -0.084 -0.120 -0.315 0.363**
(0.123) (0.110) (0.138) (0.235) (0.163)
Unemployment 0.009 -0.041 -0.003 -0.334 0.113
(0.056) (0.044) (0.037) (0.218) (0.105)
Unemployment × CentreNorth -0.709*** -0.283*** -0.106** 0.482 -0.902***
(0.073) (0.056) (0.052) (0.380) (0.156)
Unemployment × Female 0.065*** 0.028 -0.016 -0.029 -0.020
(0.017) (0.021) (0.014) (0.034) (0.026)
Unemployment × Higher Unemp. in res. -0.097* -0.150*** -0.132*** 0.009 -0.151
(0.053) (0.038) (0.034) (0.215) (0.103)
Unemployment × Higher GDP in res. 0.623*** 0.285*** 0.133*** -0.540* 0.774***
(0.056) (0.050) (0.044) (0.323) (0.131)
Unemployment × Higher Housing Price in res. -0.105*** -0.102*** -0.009 0.081 0.013
(0.023) (0.022) (0.018) (0.068) (0.037)
Unemployment × HEU in residence 0.049** 0.062** 0.053*** -0.008 0.112***
(0.020) (0.025) (0.018) (0.040) (0.036)
Unemployment × Grade: 76-85 -0.010 -0.025 -0.002 0.004 -0.088***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.015) (0.031) (0.029)
Unemployment × Grade: 86-95 -0.027 -0.037* 0.015 0.010 -0.078**
(0.021) (0.022) (0.020) (0.038) (0.034)
Unemployment × Grade: 96-102 0.003 -0.069*** 0.033 0.021 -0.043
(0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.052) (0.036)
Housing price 0.097** -0.054* 0.118*** 0.057 0.126**
(0.045) (0.030) (0.031) (0.134) (0.061)
Housing price × CentreNorth 0.170*** 0.223*** -0.008 -0.019 0.270***
(0.051) (0.035) (0.040) (0.221) (0.078)
Housing price × Female -0.053*** -0.015 -0.009 0.0005 0.055***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.0254) (0.016)
Housing price × Higher Unemp. in res. 0.111*** 0.052** -0.051* 0.041 -0.069
(0.042) (0.027) (0.029) (0.131) (0.059)
Housing price × Higher GDP in res. -0.177*** 0.0010 -0.029 0.026 -0.314***
(0.033) (0.0304) (0.030) (0.180) (0.059)
Housing price × Higher Housing Price in res. 0.128*** -0.005 -0.035*** 0.024 0.036*
(0.015) (0.013) (0.011) (0.034) (0.019)
Housing price × HEU in residence 0.033** 0.021 0.037*** -0.014 -0.074***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.030) (0.022)
Housing price × Grade: 76-85 0.007 0.018* 0.011 0.037 0.061***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.009) (0.023) (0.017)
Housing price × Grade: 86-95 -0.012 0.024* 0.003 0.001 0.022
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(0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.029) (0.020)
Housing price × Grade: 96-102 -0.028* 0.064*** -0.002 0.010 0.007
(0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.037) (0.021)
Regional GDP 0.088** 0.003 0.116*** -0.106 0.150
(0.042) (0.032) (0.027) (0.158) (0.098)
Regional GDP × CentreNorth -0.431*** -0.206*** -0.136*** 0.164 -0.517***
(0.058) (0.044) (0.041) (0.285) (0.124)
Regional GDP × Female 0.029** 0.022 -0.006 -0.040 0.018
(0.014) (0.015) (0.012) (0.029) (0.022)
Regional GDP × Higher Unemp. in res. -0.021 -0.058** -0.057** -0.079 -0.120
(0.039) (0.027) (0.024) (0.156) (0.096)
Regional GDP × Higher GDP in res. 0.346*** 0.190*** 0.188*** -0.291 0.334***
(0.047) (0.041) (0.036) (0.242) (0.097)
Regional GDP × Higher Housing Price in res. -0.099*** -0.067*** -0.091*** 0.019 -0.118***
(0.019) (0.016) (0.014) (0.042) (0.030)
Regional GDP × HEU in residence 0.008 -0.014 -0.026* -0.068** 0.051*
(0.017) (0.019) (0.014) (0.035) (0.029)
Regional GDP × Grade: 76-85 -0.016 0.001 -0.020 0.056** -0.019
(0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.026) (0.025)
Regional GDP × Grade: 86-95 -0.043** 0.002 -0.004 0.106*** -0.008
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.033) (0.028)
Regional GDP × Grade: 96-102 -0.032* -0.026 -0.013 0.122*** 0.089***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.022) (0.044) (0.031)
Observations 880840 845104 1440947 172391 422577
Pseudo R2 0.63 0.57 0.60 0.63 0.69
Log Likelihood -21946.1 -27870.1 -33683.4 -7137.9 -10891.5
Notes: Conditional Logit regression by field of study estimated on the sample of Italian students enrolled for the first time in the academic year
2014-2015. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All the variables referring to HEUs’ and areas’ characteristics are
interacted for individual variables. Variable definitions are reported in Table 3.6. In particular, Higher unemp. in res. indicates students that reside
in provinces with an unemployment rate higher than the average; Higher GDP in res. takes value 1 if the student lives in a region with a GDP higher
than the average GDP; Higher Housing Price indicates students that reside in provinces with a housing price higher than the national average; Grade:
76-85, Grade: 86-95, and Grade: 96-102 indicate students that have obtained a high school diploma with a final grade in the specified bracket.
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Figure 3A.1: Individual semi-elasticities to expected Scholarships with respect to High School
Diploma Grade
Notes: The figure reports the results of non parametric regressions between semi-elasticities with respect to E(Scholarships) and
percentile distribution of high school diploma grade by field of study. Semi-elasticities measure the percentage change in students’
choices probabilities caused by a 1% increase in the DSU indicator. Each semi-elasticity is computed on the basis of the individual
distribution of parameters estimated with the LCM. In each plot we report the information regarding the kernel function used, the
degree of the polynomial and the bandwidth chosen.
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Figure 3A.2: Individual semi-elasticities to expected places in Dormitories with respect to High
School Diploma Grade
Notes: Notes: The figure reports the results of non parametric regressions between semi-elasticities with respect to E(Dormitory)
and percentile distribution of high school diploma grade by field of study. Semi-elasticities measure the percentage change in
students’ choices probabilities caused by a 1% increase in the DSU indicator. Each semi-elasticity is computed on the basis of the
individual distribution of parameters estimated with the LCM. In each plot we report the information regarding the kernel function
used, the degree of the polynomial and the bandwidth chosen.
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Figure 3A.3: Individual semi-elasticities to expected Student Packages with respect to High
School Diploma Grade
Notes: The figure reports the results of non parametric regressions between semi-elasticities with respect to E(StudentPackage)
and percentile distribution of high school diploma grade by field of study. Semi-elasticities measure the percentage change in
students’ choices probabilities caused by a 1% increase in the DSU indicator. Each semi-elasticity is computed on the basis of the
individual distribution of parameters estimated with the LCM. In each plot we report the information regarding the kernel function
used, the degree of the polynomial and the bandwidth chosen.
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Figure 3A.4: Utility of distance
Notes: The figure reports the results of a non parametric regression between individual utility functions and the distance between
students’ city of residence and HEU’s hosting city by field of study. Each regression is estimated using the individual distribution
of parameters estimated through the LCM. In each plot we report the information regarding the kernel function used, the degree
of the polynomial and the bandwidth chosen.
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Figure 3A.5: Individual willingness to travel to a 1% increase in expected Scholarships
Notes: The figure reports the results of a non parametric regression between individual WTT with respect to E(Scholarships)
and the distance between students’ city of residence and HEU’s hosting city. Each regression is estimated using the individual
distribution of parameters estimated through the LCM. Each WTT measures the number of additional kilometers that the student
is willing to travel with respect to the chosen HEU for a 1% increase in DSU policy indicators. In each plot we report the information
regarding the kernel function used, the degree of the polynomial and the bandwidth chosen.
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Figure 3A.6: Individual willingness to travel to a 1% increase in expected Places in Dormitories
Notes: The figure reports the results of a non parametric regression between individual WTT with respect to E(Dormitory) and the
distance between students’ city of residence and HEU’s hosting city. Each regression is estimated using the individual distribution
of parameters estimated through the LCM. Each WTT measures the number of additional kilometers that the student is willing to
travel with respect to the chosen HEU for a 1% increase in DSU policy indicators. In each plot we report the information regarding
the kernel function used, the degree of the polynomial and the bandwidth chosen.
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Figure 3A.7: Individual willingness to travel to a 1% increase in expected Student Packages
Notes: The figure reports the results of a non parametric regression between individual WTT with respect to E(StudentPackage)
and the distance between students’ city of residence and HEU’s hosting city. Each regression is estimated using the individual
distribution of parameters estimated through the LCM. Each WTT measures the number of additional kilometers that the student
is willing to travel with respect to the chosen HEU for a 1% increase in DSU policy indicators. In each plot we report the information
regarding the kernel function used, the degree of the polynomial and the bandwidth chosen.
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